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Foreword
ROJECTS to amend the Constitution of the United
States have poured in an almost unceasing stream upon
the nation ever since the beginning of our national
history. Most of these have had slight intrinsic importance,
and for that reason and because backed by little popular approval nor by strong pressure groups, they have not been
given official life by Congress or the States. Only twenty-one
of these proposals have been adopted in the century and a
half of our life as a nation. But the acutely transitional character of the last quarter of a century has stimulated more
general discussion and more intensive study of our constitutional system than had heretofore taken place since the decade
or two following the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. The shattering impact of World War Number One and
its aftermath, and the even more profound dislocations
caused by the present war have inevitably induced intense
study of the organic features of our constitutional scheme as
well as of such other provisions as those relating to civil
liberties. From these changes in the conditions of life of the
nation and possibly still more from changed and changing
theories as to the objectives of government, has come the
tendency to revise and modify our constitutional arrangement, which is fairly certain to produce many definite proposals to amend the Constitution in the near future.
There has been much less study of the Amending Clause
of the Constitution than of any other of its important provisions. Consequently, there is comparatively little material of
an official sort relating to the process of amending. There
have been strangely few amendments. It is apparent from a
study of the debates in the Constitutional Convention and contemporary discussion in the States, that our much publicized
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"founding fathers" anticipated that the Amending Clause
would be employed far more often than has proved to be the
case. While most of the twenty-one amendments which are
now part of our Constitution have been frequently involved
in litigation in both Federal and State Supreme Courts, that
litigation has been concerned chiefly with the content of the
amendments and not with the manner of their adoption.
During the last five years, questions regarding the validity
of the methods actually adopted have come with greater
frequency than at any prior time in our history. That frequent
amendment of the Constitution has been avoided, whatever
the reasons therefor, is probably a most fortunate circumstance for the country. To have amended the Constitution
frequently during the first century of our national existence
might have resulted in the addition of some hastily conceived
and unwise changes creating new problems and defects and
tending to reduce our whole constitutional structure to the
level of ordinary legislation.
Nevertheless, the pressure from recent changes in our nationallife and others which will inevitably develop, would
seem likely to increase the demand for constitutional amendments, particularly when the present world-wide and revolutionary war has wreaked its complete vengeance upon society.
If present governmental tendencies in this country continue
to advance in the direction they are now taking, it is reasonably
certain that bills will be introduced in Congress, the purpose of
which is to create new boards, commissions or other offices,
granting new authority and still further extending govern. mental regulatory power or control, especially in the fields of
commerce, industrial relations, agriculture and taxation. Already there has been an enormous extension of governmental
administration into fields which had heretofore been regarded
as strictly private and insulated from governmental interference by the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Four-
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teenth Amendments. But with the decision of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. I 13, the old strictly limited category of public
utilities and other businesses subject to public regulation was
demonstrated to be utterly inadequate and illogical. The concept of businesses charged with a public interest, which had
lain relatively dormant since Sir Mathew Hale's time, was revived and became the justification for an extension of governmental activity which shocked and frightened a great many
people whose sincere beliefs concerning political and economic
matters, or whose selfish interest, had made them the partisans
of an extreme laissez faire theory of government. And recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, especially several since the
First World War, have opened the way for repeated and
successful attacks upon the economic and political theories
of John Stewart Mill and his followers in this country. It is
not easy to find any logical and permanent limit beyond which
the doctrines with regard to businesses charged with public
interest may not be carried to sustain public regulation and
perhaps control.
For a half century at least, the United States and the several States have been greatly enlarging the field of administrative law and action. Until recently Congress has been
restrained by a rigid and historically unsound conception of
due process of law, which has now been greatly modified if
indeed not wholly rejected by the Supreme Court.
Important decisions of the Court during the last five years
have all but destroyed the heretofore prevailing view that administrative proceedings must be conducted in accordance
with certain implicit requirements, not unlike those which
dictate judicial procedure. The same decisions have come
near to establishing the power of administrative commissions
and officers to exercise so-called quasi-judicial functions
without review by the courts, but complete finality of determination by administrative functionaries has not been de-
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dared by the courts, and agitation for constitutional amendment to bring about that finality is not improbable.
Theories and even sentimental notions about state sovereignty and the Reserved Powers Clause of the Tenth Amendment had imposed other restrictions upon the exercise of the
police power of the States and unduly restrained the exercise
of the so-called implied powers of Congress. There had been
a gradual invasion of the supposed field of reserved rights
through a slowly enlarging conception of the scope of the
interstate commerce power of Congress. Recent decisions of
the Court have practically discarded the old and very unsatisfactory test of the direct or indirect effect upon interstate
commerce by the application and enforcement of both state
and congressional legislation concerned with industrial and
business functioning. This, of course, has opened the door
wider for both state and federal regulation of business. But
the door is not yet as wide open as some think it should be,
and it is far too wide open to accord with the views and opinions of a probably small minority at the present time. That
minority, however, may after a time develop new strength
and find new opportunity, say from an increasing popular
fear of totalitarian government, to impose restraints, with the
probable result of a demand for constitutional amendment.
As to the scope of the commerce power of Congress, opinions continue to differ greatly. And so, the vexing question
whether state legislation interferes with or usurps the
power given to Congress, and the converse of that question
whether Congressional legislation is in reality regulation
of interstate commerce, or whether it goes beyond such
regulation and affects the exercise of state police powers, and
interferes with legal intra-state commerce, are bound to arise
and to be vigorously debated. So it is with respect to some
areas in the field of taxation.
The specific grants of authority have left the extent of
the President's power far from clear. Thus the bitter con-
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troversy raging about our relationship to the present war
has made it painfully clear that the clause making the
President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
those conferring the power over foreign relations, and the
general grant of executive power, make it entirely possible
for the President to make war in effect or bring on war,
even though the power to declare war is given to Congress exclusively. If a President, however wisely, were so to exercise
his clearly granted power as to bring us into war, and if the
Congress were opposed to his policy and refused to make
adequate appropriations and other arrangements for carrying on the war, the consequences obviously might be disastrous.
There are many other unsettled areas of national power
concerning the executive and other departments, and, while
probably it is fortunate that the Constitution makers refrained
from making many specific grants, and from making any
disposition of some areas of power not falling clearly within
any of the three great departments of government, it seems
probable that there may be a demand for making, clarifying
or re-arranging some of the distributions of power in this and
other fields. How many are the possibilities of clash of views,
how many important matters are still undetermined, are
made very clear by Professor E. S. Corwin's book recently
published, entitled "The President, Office and Powers." This
book is based upon an exhaustive, analytical and historical
study of the Presidency, and is one of the most important contributions to the understanding of American government
made in many years. It gives expression to a few interpretations and some views with which the writer, at least, does
not wholly agree, but the book as a whole is thoroughly sound
and penetrating.
Doubtless the stream of criticism of our judicial department will continue. Criticism of our courts is inevitable, and,
if it is not accompanied by maladroit efforts to weaken the
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foundations of the judicial system, criticism is healthful.
Already many proposals to amend Article Two of the Constitution have been made and doubtless many more will be
made in the future.
By no means all of the possible defects or deficiencies indicated in the foregoing pages are likely to require or be accorded constitutional amendment. They have been suggested
merely as illustrative of the fact that at any time we may have
the beginning of a more determined and systematic attempt
to amend the Constitution; and this makes Professor Orfield's
book particularly timely. Professor Orfield has made an
exhaustive study of all of the materials available for consideration of his subject. His book presents a comprehensive
picture of constitutional amendment as provided for and developed during the century and a half of our national existence. The author presents a statement of what has happened
and of judicial and other official opinions relating to the
Amending Clause. He has said comparatively little by way
of argument for any particular theory relating to the various
steps in procedure. To have restricted his treatment of the
subject in this manner, seems to the writer a wise decision. The
important thing at the present time is to have an accurate,
fair and wholly non-partisan presentation of the subject.
Various steps in procedure can best be investigated and the
existing ones perhaps improved upon by separate studies of
each step, or of groups of related steps. A reader of Professor
Orfield's book would do well to examine Everett S. Brown's
book "The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States," and also Professor
Brown's article on the same subject in the "American Political Science Review" XXIX (Dec. 1935) 1005-1017.
Professor Orfield has made a valuable contribution to a
most important subject.
HENRY M. BATES

Preface
OST treatises on constitutional law dispose of the
federal amending clause in summary fashion. The
commentators have thought fit to stress chiefly
the division of authority between the federal government and
the states. They have attached a high degree of significance to
the dogma of separation of powers. A great deal of attention
has been devoted to the doctrines of judicial review, the
supremacy of the Federal Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.
The taxation and the commerce clauses have come in for their
full share of consideration. In recent years extensive studies
have been made of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, the amendment clause has almost
been lost sight of. No monograph on Article Five has been
published prior to the present book. Yet when one stops to
realize that the subjects just referred to have to do only with
the existing distribution of powers, and that the operation of
the amending power may bring about a complete reshuflling
of the Constitution, it becomes obvious that one is dealing
with a power of a higher grade and of more potential importance than any other power provided for in the Constitution. As John W. Burgess says:

M

"A complete constitution may be said to consist of three
fundamental parts. The first is the organization of the state
for the accomplishment of future changes in the constitution.
This is usually called the amending clause, and the power
which it describes and regulates is called the amending power.
This is the most important part of a constitution. Upon its
existence and truthfulness, i.e., its correspondence with real
and natural conditions, depends the question as to whether the
state shall develop with peaceful continuity or shall suffer
alternations of stagnation, retrogression and revolution. A
XIll
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constitution, which may be imperfect and erroneous in its
other parts, can be easily supplemented and corrected, if only
the state be truthfully organized in the constitution; but if
this be not accomplished, error will accumulate until nothing
short of revolution can save the life of a state." 1
One may approach the study of the amending clause from
at least three different points of view: from that of constitutional law, from that of jurisprudence and legal philosophy,
and from that of political science and legislation. From the
standpoint of constitutional law the genesis and justiciability
of the power may be considered; the procedure of amendment may be examined in detail; and the scope of the amending power may be analyzed. From the point of jurisprudence,
the relation of the amending power to the concept of sovereignty may be developed. Finally, from the standpoint of
political science and legislation, the reform of the amending
process itself may be made the basis of investigation.
The writer has experienced considerable difficulty and
hesitation with respect to the use of the expression "federal
amending power." Closely analyzed, "power" admits of
several meanings. It may mean the capacity to amend, the
composite body which does the amending, or even the process
of amending. Ambiguity at least as to title has been sought
to be avoided by calling this book "The Amending of the
Federal Constitution." The writer is indebted to Dean
E. Blythe Stason of the University of Michigan Law School
for valuable suggestions with respect to the problem of
terminology.
This book was begun by the writer as the holder of a Research Fellowship in the University of Michigan Law School
during the year 1928-1929. The writer there was fortunate
in having the advice and assistance of Dean Henry M. Bates.
1

1
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POLITICAL
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Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, now Dean of the School of
Jurisprudence of the University of California, offered some
suggestions as to the topic of sovereignty. Full responsibility
is assumed by the writer, however, for all statements and
conclusions. The writer first became interested in the federal
amending process as a student in the classes of Professor
Henry Rottschaefer of the University of Minnesota Law
School.
All but one of the chapters were published in I930, I93I
and I932 in various law reviews, all of which have graciously
consented to the reprinting. These reviews were the Illinois
Law Review, Iowa Law Review, Michigan Law Review,
Minnesota Law Review, Nebraska Law Bulletin, and the
North Carolina Law Review. All of these articles have since
been revised and brought up to date and a new chapter has
been added. Special attention has been given to the farreaching I939 decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States and to recent suggestions for changing the amending
process.
Gratitude is due to the University of Minnesota Law School
for the use of its library during the summer of I939, and to
the University of Southern California Law School for similar
use in the summer of I 940. Sincere appreciation is felt to
Miss Katherine Kempfer for editing the manuscript in its
latest form. It would be impossible to overrate the value of
suggestions made by her. She has given freely of her time
and first rate ability at analysis. The writer is deeply indebted
to Dean Emeritus Henry M. Bates for writing the introduction, as well as for encouragement in the revision and publication of this book.
LESTER

Lake Minnetonka, Minnesota
September 2, I 94I
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ARTICLE FIVE
THE CoNSTITUTioN

OF THE UNITED STATES

"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate."

CHAPTER

I

The Genesis of Article Five

T

HE idea of amending the organic instrument of a
state is peculiarly American. Although many of our
political and legal institutions take their origin from
English and occasionally Continental conceptions, such is not
the case in the fundamental matter of altering the constitution. The idea of a written constitution was developed at a late
stage of Western civilization, and the United States, not
Europe, took the lead. The doctrine of popular sovereignty
had an especially strong appeal to the inhabitants of the colonies in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The people
were sovereign: it followed that they could make a constitution. Corollary to this, of course, they could revise and
amend the document which they had adopted.
The first written charters or constitutions providing for
their amendment appear to have been the charters of the
Colony of Pennsylvania, which was the only colony to make
such provision. 1 Eight of the state constitutions during the
period between the declaration of independence and the meeting of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 contained
amendment clauses. 2 Even more important, the Articles of
Confederation, defective as they were, made provision for
their alteration. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that when
the Constitutional Convention assembled some plan of revision would be presented.
The Constitutional Convention assembled on May 14,
1787, and at the meeting of May 29, Randolph presented
1
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AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, zd ed. (1878) 1518,
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the first plan for a new constitution in the form of fifteen
resolutions. 3 The thirteenth declared that provision should
be made for amendment of the constitution whenever thought
necessary and that the assent of the national legislature should
not be required. Charles Pinckney presented a proposed draft
of a constitution at the same meeting.4 Article sixteen of his
draft set forth that if the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states should apply for a convention to amend the constitution, the national legislature should call one; or, in the alternative, Congress by a two-thirds vote of each house might
propose, and two-thirds of the legislatures might adopt. Both
drafts were referred to the committee of the whole house.
On June s, the convention discussed Randolph's resolution. 5 Pinckney expressed doubt as to the propriety or need of
an amendment clause. Gerry defended it, however, on the
grounds that such a new and difficult experiment required
periodical revision, that the opportunity for such revision
would stabilize the government, and that "Nothing had yet
happened in the states where the provision existed to prove
its impropriety." Randolph's resolution was again brought up
on June 9. 6 Several members thought it not a necessity; they
furthermore thought it improper to dispense with the consent of Congress. Mason was of the opinion that the provision
was necessary, since the Constitution, like the Articles of Confederation, would prove defective. It would be better to provide for amendments in any easy constitutional way than to
rely on chance and violence. He was opposed to having Congress participate in the process since it might abuse its power
and refuse to give its assent to changes desired. The resolution
8

ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

2d ed. (1937 facsimile of 1836 ed.) 127-128. Volume 5 is a revised edition of
Madison's diary of the debates.
4
Ibid. 129-132·
1
Ibid. 157.
8
Ibid. 182.
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was unanimously adopted, but the clause dispensing with the
consent of Congress was postponed for further discussion.
A long interval now occurred during which the convention
appears to have ignored or overlooked the question of an
amending clause. Randolph's original resolution, except as
to congressional participation in amending, 7 seems to have been
the basis of action until August 6, when Rutledge delivered
the report 8 of the committee of detail, to which the resolution had been referred. Article nineteen of the committee's
draft provided that Congress should call a convention on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states.
There was no discussion of the report until August 30, when
Gouverneur Morris suggested that Congress be permitted
to call a convention whenever it chose. 9 But the convention
unanimously agreed to the article as reported by the committee.
The most serious and detailed discussion did not occur until
the last week of the convention. 10 On September 10, Gerry
moved to reconsider article nineteen. The Constitution, he
asserted, would be paramount to the state constitutions. Under the article, two-thirds of the states could obtain a convention, "a majority of which can bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the state constitutions altogether."
He asked whether such a state of affairs should be brought
about. Hamilton seconded Gerry's motion, but with a different motive than the latter. He did not object to the result
described by Gerry and contended that it was no worse to
subject the people of the United States to "the major voice"
than to so subject the people of a particular state. He desired
an easier mode of amendment than that provided in the
Articles of Confederation, and regarded article nineteen as
• Ibid. I 90, 35 I, 376.
8
Ibid. 376-38I.
• Ibid. 498.
10
Ibid. 53o-53z.
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inadequate in accomplishing this. Like Gouverneur Morris,
he proposed that Congress be given a free hand in calling a
convention.
"The state legislatures will not apply for alterations, but with
a view to increase their own powers. The national legislature
will be the first to perceive, and will be most sensible to the
necessity of amendments; and ought also to be empowered,
whenever two thirds of each branch should concur, to call a
convention. There could be no danger in giving this power,
as the people would finally decide in the case.'' 11
James Madison also supported the motion for reconsideration. The language concerning the calling of a convention was
too vague. It was not clear how the convention would be
formed, nor by what rules it would transact business, nor
what force its acts would have. The motion to reconsider was
thereupon passed, nine states favoring and one opposing.
Sherman moved that Congress be permitted to propose
amendments to the states, but that "no amendments shall be
binding until consented to by the several states." Wilson
moved to insert "two thirds of" before the words "several
states" in Sherman's proposal. This failed by a five to six vote,
but a later motion by Wilson to insert instead "three fourths
of" was adopted.
Madison then moved to postpone the amended proposition in order to consider a proposal of his own, worded much
like the present Article Five providing for proposal of amendments by Congress either on a two-thirds vote of each house
or on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states,
and ratification by the legislatures or conventions of threefourths of the states. Hamilton seconded the motion. This proposal meant a significant change in the entire scheme. Instead
of permitting amendment by a single convention, the plan
made necessary the participation of the legislatures or conventions of the states. At this point Rutledge stated that he would
n
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never agree to an amending power "by which the articles
relating to slaves might be altered by the states not interested
in that property, and prejudiced against it." 12 A proviso was
then added to Madison's plan to meet this objection, and his
amended proposition was adopted by a vote of nine to one.
Five days later, as the convention was about to conclude
its labors, the amendment clause was reported as Article Five
by the committee of style and arrangement. 13 Sherman
feared that "three fourths of the states might be brought to
do things fatal to particular states; as abolishing them altogether, or depriving them of their equality in the Senate."
He therefore thought it reasonable that the limitations on
the amending power should be enlarged so as to provide
"that no state should be affected in its internal police, or deprived of their equality in the Senate."
Mason believed that the proposed method of amending
the constitution was "exceptionable and dangerous." Both
modes required action by Congress immediately or ultimately; hence no amendment of the proper kind could be obtained by the people if the government became oppressive,
as he believed would be the case. Gouverneur Morris and
Gerry then moved to amend the article so as to require a
convention on the application of two-thirds of the states, in
order to obviate this objection. Madison pointed out in response that he did not see why Congress would not be as much
obligated to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds
of the states, as to call a convention on a similar application.
He was not unalterably opposed to providing for a convention, but thought that difficulties might arise as to the
form and quorum, matters which should be avoided in constitutional regulations. The motion for a convention was,
however, unanimously adopted. Sherman moved to amend
lJI

u

Ibid. 532.
Ibid. ssx-ssz.

6

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Article Five so as to require ratification of amendments by all
state legislatures or conventions instead of three-fourths of
them, but his motion failed, seven to three. Gerry moved
to amend so as to allow ratification only by the state legislatures and not by state conventions as an alternative method,
but this failed, ten to one.
One last attempt was made to limit the amending body.
Sherman, in accordance with his previously expressed idea,
moved to annex at the end of the article a clause that "no state
shall, without its consent, be affected in its internal police,
or deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." 14 Madison
objected that if such special provisos w~re added every state
would insist on them, for their boundaries, exports, and other
matters. Sherman's motion then failed, eight to three, the
small states, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware voting
for it. He then moved to strike out Article Five altogether,
and this motion also failed, by an eight to two vote. Gouverneur Morris moved to annex the simple proviso, as it now
appears in Article Five, "that no state, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." And
as Madison concisely reports it, this motion, "being dictated
by the circulating murmurs of the small states, was agreed
to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question,
saying no." At this same meeting the entire Constitution as
amended was accepted by the convention, and ordered to be
engrossed.15 Two days later on Monday, September 17, the
engrossed Constitution was read and signed, and the convention adjourned. 16
1
'

Ibid. 552.
Ibid. 553· ,
16
Ibid. 553-567. For an account of the adoption of the Constitution by the
states, see Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MICH. L. REV.
1253 at u6I-u66.
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CHAPTER

II

Judicial Review of Validity of Amendments
A. JUSTICIABILITY

T

O one not particularly familiar with constitutional
law the notion of a court's passing on the legality of
a constitutional amendment might seem strange. To
him it would perhaps seem correct that the courts should unquestionably assume the validity of the Constitution and its
amendments as an irreducible minimum in the decision of
cases. To a Continental lawyer accustomed to a legal system
in which the courts may not declare invalid even a statute,
the idea of a court's determining whether a constitutional
amendment is valid or not would seem astonishing. Even one
familiar with American constitutional law might well have
had some doubts before the litigation over the legality of the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
Prior to the decisions in the 1920's, the only instance in
which the Supreme Court of the United States had passed
on the legitimacy of an amendment to the federal Constitution
had arisen more than a century before in the case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia/ as to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. In that case the attorney general of the United States,
in defending the legality of the amendment, made no attempt to show that the matter was a political question, and
the court did not discuss the issue. The case can therefore be
cited only to the effect that the court and the parties assumed
it to be a legal question. The court, moreover, passed only
on the legality of the procedure of amendment, and not on
the content of the amendment itself. In the later and much
1

(1798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378.
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cited case of Luther v. Barden/ the Supreme Court declared
in dictum that the question of validity of the adoption of
an amendment was a political question. This case attracted
great attention and was widely cited in the state decisions, so
that many came to have the view that the question was political. Last of all, inasmuch as the courts have not assumed to
pass on the constitutionality of the Constitution itself, there is
some logic in arguing that, since an amendment becomes as
much a part of the Constitution as any other part of it (in
fact repeals any part inconsistent with it), the legality of an
amendment is no more open to attack than that of the Constitution itself.
It may be laid down dogmatically that the constitutionality
of the Constitution itself is a political question. 3 In the first
place it would seem a contradiction in terms to raise such a
question, except in reference to the matter of its having been
• (I849) 7 How. (48 U. S.) I at 39· Taney, C. J., said: "In forming the
constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration of Independence, and
in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political
department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has
followed its decision." As late as I 8 8 8 it was asserted that this case "is still
the law of the federal courts" in Smith v. Good, (C. C. R. I. I888) 34 Fed.
204 at 208.
3
Luther v. Borden, (I 849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) I; Smith v. Good, (C. C. R.I.
I888) 34 F. 204; Brickhouse v. Brooks, (C. C. Va. I9o8) I65 F. 534; State v.
Starling, (1867) IS Rich. L. (S.C.) 12o; Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o Iowa
543, I4 N. W. 738, I5 N. W. 6o9; Miller v. Johnson, (I892) 92 Ky. 589, I8
S. W. 522, constitution held valid although the convention which had been
elected to draft it made several changes in it after it had been voted on by the
people of the state; Taylor v. Commonwealth, (I903) 10I Va. 829, 44 S. E.
7 54, constitution upheld though it had never been submitted to popular vote;
Carpenter v. Cornish, (I 9 I 2) 83 N.J. L. 696, 85 A. 240, affirming 83 N.J. L.
254, 83 A. 3I; O'Neill, J., dissenting in Foley v. Democratic Parish Committee,
(I9I5) 138 La. 22o, 70 So. Io4. See the statement in Brittle v. People, (I87J)
2 Neb. I 98 at 2 I o: "When, however, a State government has been formed, and
the State admitted to the Union with a given constitution, courts must recognize,
and are as fully bound by, the fact as the merest citizen; and I submit, with all
respect, that we can as well dispute the validity of the United States Constitution, because the convention framing it, disregarding all instructions limiting
its members to making amendments to the old articles of confederation, assumed
to make an entirely new frame of government, as we can inquire into any supposed irregularities or illegalities which may have entered into the construction
of our own."
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validly adopted according to the previously existing constitution. Where the existing constitution has come into operation through a revolution, obviously a very dangerous problem would arise if the courts should attempt to pass on the
validity of the new constitution. Where the new constitution
has not been the result of a revolution, a new government has
not begun to function under the new constitution, the people
have not acquiesced, and the old courts continue to operate,
they could declare the new constitution void. 4 Where a new
government, executive and legislative, had taken their oaths
under the new constitution, or even where a new government
had commenced to operate under the new constitution and
there was popular acquiescence, it would still perhaps be logically possible for the old courts to declare the new constitution invalid. But where the courts, as well as the other branches
of the government, are operating under the new constitution,
it seems inconceivable that they could pass on the validity of
the instrument which is their creator. In theory, the court
might decide the new constitution was invalid. But this would
be tantamount to a declaration that the court itself no longer
exists, since it was the creature of the constitution. The futility of the proceeding would make such a decision unlikely.
As an actual fact such a court might continue to exist if the
other departments of government accepted and enforced the
decision, but this would seem to be a case of usurpation.
From the fact that the courts cannot declare the existing
constitution invalid, it follows that they cannot so declare
•Loring v. Young, (t9z1) z39 Mass. 349, IJZ N. E. 65. The paucity of
precedent on this point seems to have led to the broad view frequently asserted
that the validity of a constitution is not assailable at any stage. In 1 5 L. R. A.
5z4, the commentator on Miller v. Johnson, (189z) 9z Ky. 589, 18 S. W.
5 zz, points out that since there is no question of opposing governments or of
the existence of the court, and since the adoption of a new constitution is in
effect only an amendment of the old one and does not in fact upset the existing
government, "it is difficult to see why the question of lawful adoption is not as
much a judicial question in case of a new constitution as it is in the case of an
amendment, eo nomine."

1o
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any part of it (exclusive of amendments) 5 except where the
parts are in conflict, in which event the courts perhaps would
speak of construing or harmonizing. In fact, to declare a
part void would seem even less justifiable than to nullify
the whole new constitution, for in recognizing part of a new
constitution it must recognize its entire validity. Since the old
constitution is no longer in existence, there is no authority on
which it can predicate a declaration that a part of the new
constitution is invalid.
The view that the courts may not declare the existing
constitution or a part of it (exclusive of amendments) invalid
has particular force as to the federal Constitution. In the case
of the states, many of them have adopted wholly new constitutions in pursuance, in most cases, of the mode prescribed
in the previous constitution. In such cases there is doubtless
justification for the courts' passing on the validity of the new
constitution, though as a matter of fact such cases have been
very rare. But the Constitution of the United States was not
adopted according to the mode prescribed in the Articles of
Confederation. In other words, our existing constitution is
the product of a revolution, bloodless though it was. 6 The
• Carpenter v. Cornish, (z9rz) 83 N.J. L. 696, 85 A. 240, affg. 83 N. J. L.
254, 83 A. 31. But this view seems to have been departed from in a number of
Louisiana cases arising over the 1920 state constitution. Huff v. Seiber, (D. C.
La. 1925) zo F. (2d) 236; Pender v. Gray, (1921) 149 La. z84, 88 So. 786;
State ex rei. Hoffman v. Judge, (1921) 149 La. 363, 89 So. 215; State v.
Jones, (1922) 151 La. 714, 92 So. 310. An earlier case, State v. American
Sugar Refining Co., (1915) 137 La. 507, 68 So. 742, is partially explainable on the ground that the constitution then made no provision for a convention, that the people by popular vote adopted the legislative restrictions as to
subject matter imposed on the convention, and that the constitution was never
ratified by popular vote. O'Neill, J., dissented on the ground that if part of
the constitution could be declared invalid, the whole might be. See also, Foley
v. Democratic Parish Committee, (1915) 138 La. 220, 70 So. 104.
8
Jameson says that "it is clear, that the act of disregarding the provisions
of the I 3th of the Articles of Confederation, was done confessedly as an act of
revolution, and not as an act within the legal competence of either the people or
the Convention, under the Constitution then in force." JAMESON, CoNSTITU·
TIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (z887) 1 § 5641 p. 596. Under Article Thirteen,
Congress should have proposed and the legislatures of every state should have
ratified the constitution. Technically, every step was complied with except that
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Supreme Court and all the other federal courts are and
always have been the creatures of the existing Constitution.
Thus there has never been any court before whom its invalidity might be asserted. The federal courts have never assumed
to pass on the validity of the original Constitution or any part
of it, and have never admitted that it was the creature of
revolution, though the commentators have frequently
pointed it out.
Passing from the question of judicial cognizance of the
validity of the Constitution to that of an amendment thereto,
it would not be illogical to expect somewhat the same treatment of the problem. 7 The adoption of a constitution and the
adoption of an amendment certainly have many points in
ratification was by three-fourths of the states (though all eventually ratified),
inasmuch as the Constitutional Convention sent the Constitution to Congress,
which at the advisory direction of the convention transmitted it to the state
legislatures, which in turn at the recommendation of the convention passed it on
to the state conventions. The framing of an entirely new constitution in violation of the directions of Congress and the designating of the ratifying bodies
have been asserted to be revolutionary, but if the Constitutional Convention and
the state conventions be regarded as advisory bodies the only illegal step was
ratification by less than a unanimous vote. The ground of necessity pleaded by
Randolph seems a rather dubious legal justification. See also, I CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed. (I 927) 9; I BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (I89I) 98; McCulloch v. Maryland, (I8I9) 4 Wheat. (I7 U.S.) 3I6 at 403.
Professor Powell has stated: "At one time I inclined toward the view that the
Constitution is still unconstitutional and that from the lawyer's standpoint
we should still be operating under the Articles of Confederation which provided for a perpetual union that could not be changed without the consent of
Congress and the legislatures of all the states. I have since modified that view.
While the Constitution was ratified in state conventions rather than in state
legislatures as the Articles of Confederation prescribed, the conventions were
called by the state legislatures and so may be regarded as having lawful authority delegated by the legislatures. I now think that all irregularities were
cured when North Carolina and Rhode Island finally ratified and that the
Constitution then became constitutional though it had not been constitutional
previously. Of course, Rhode Island's concurrence was coerced by threats of
economic pressure, but she still concurred." Powell, "Changing Constitutional
Phases," (I939) I9 BosT. u. L. REV. 509 at sn-su.
• In Smith v. Good, (C. C. R. I. I888) 34 F. 204, it is asserted that both
questions are political; while in Loring v. Young, (I92I) 239 Mass. 349,
I32 N. E. 65, it is stated that both are judicial, Luther v. Borden, (I849)
7 How. (48 U. S.) I, being distinguished on the ground that in that case two
rival governments were arrayed against each other in armed conflict.
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common. In both there is the exercise of the highest sovereign
power of the state. The adoption of an amendment is the
adoption of a constitution in little. It is conceivable that over
a long period of time a constitution might be so altered as to
bear little resemblance to the original document. Looked at
from one point of view, an amendment is of even greater
import than the original provisions of the constitution since it
automatically repeals all clauses inconsistent with it. 8 It may
even repeal a Supreme Court decision. 9 Looked at from a
practical standpoint, however, the chief difference is seen
to be that an amendment does not produce so comprehensive
and so serious an effect on the existing frame of government.
The courts are left relatively free to see that the prescribed
constitutional mode of alterations is complied with.
I.

Validity of Procedure of Adoption

At the outset it should be noted that as a matter of logic
a distinction might be taken between the justiciability of matters of procedure on the one hand and matters of substance on
the other hand. By matters of procedure are meant questions
as to whether amendments were properly proposed or properly ratified or both. Has an amendment been proposed or
ratified according to the methods expressly or impliedly specified in Article Five? By matters of substance are meant, assuming that the proper procedure for amending has been followed, questions as to the content of the amendment proper.
Are there limitations as to the type of subject which may be
dealt with by constitutional amendment, or if not, are there
8
Johnson v. Tompkins, (C. C. Pa. r833) Baldw. 571 at 598, F. Cas. No.
7416; Osborn v. Nicholson, (C. C. Ark. r87o) r Dill. 219, F. Cas. No. 10595;
University v. Mciver, (r875) 72 N.C. 76; Grant v. Hardage, (1913) xo6
Ark. 506, I53 s. W. 826.
• The Eleventh, Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments operated to nullify
previous decisions. Such would also be the effect of the child labor amendment. The Eleventh Amendment operated retroactively.
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limitations as to how certain subjects may be treated by constitutional amendment? The Supreme Court need not treat
these two problems alike, and the two types of validity will
be discussed separately. The justiciability of matters of procedure of adoption will first be discussed.
If the Constitution made specific provision for the submission of the question of the validity of amendments to a designated tribunal, it might perhaps be asserted that their validity
is not a question for the ordinary courts, 10 though even in that
case the exclusion of the courts has been doubted. 11 Article
Five, however, is silent, so that there is much reason to assert
that the validity of amendments, like so many other controversies which may arise over the interpretation of the
Constitution, is a legal question. 12 The theory of the courts
in claiming the power to adjudicate amendments is doubtless
the same as that back of the power to declare laws unconstitutional. The Supreme Court may set aside any unconstitutional
act of Congress or of the President, and reverse its own and
the decisions of the lower courts where the interpretation was
erroneous. From this it follows that where there is a failure to
10
Worman v. Hagen, (1893) 78 Md. 152, 27 A. 616. In State v. Swift,
(r88o) 69 Ind. 505, two judges dissenting, it appears that the court assumed
the validity of a statute interpreted to allow the governor to ascertain the adoption of the amendment; in Rice v. Palmer, (1906) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396,
there is dictum that a statute could establish a special tribunal for the purpose.
Jameson is of the view that Congress alone has the power to pass on amendments
except in suits between individuals. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS,
4th ed. (1887) 626-627.
·
n McConaughy v. Secretary of State, (1909) 106 Minn. 392, 119 N. W.
408. But this seems improper since the courts, as well as the other departments
of government, are bound by the Constitution.
12
In practice, Congress has several times in effect decided on the meaning
of Article Five. In resolutions it has asserted that the approval of an amendment by the President is unnecessary (see infra, chap. III, note 30), that twothirds of a quorum of each house of Congress is the majority required for proposing amendments [SENATE JouRNAL, rst <Cong., rst sess. (Sept. 9, 1789),
p. 77 ], that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified [ ( 1868) 15 Stat. L.
708-711], and that states may not withdraw their ratifications [(r868) 15
Stat. L. 7o6, 708].
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comply with the regular mode of amendment prescribed in
Article Five, the courts may regard the procedure as null and
void.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia/ 3 as mentioned above, seems
to hav.e been the first case, either national or state, in which
the validity of an amendment was passed on. But, as there
stated, no attempt was made to show that the issue was a
political one; the question, moreover, was simply one as to
the procedure in adopting the amendment; and the court
upheld the validity of the amendment. In I 83 6 a state
case 14 on the subject maintained the right of the courts to inquire into the validity of amendments. But the opinion of the
court was brief, and like the prior federal case upheld the
validity of the amendment. In I 849 the federal Supreme
Court asserted in dictum that the question was political. 15
Until the recent cases on the Eighteenth 16 and Nineteenth 17
Amendments, this was the only pronouncement of the court
on the subject, so that if there had been no intervening circumstances the court might have adhered to its view in that
case. However, in the meantime there had been constantly
increasing litigation in the state courts over the validity of
amendments. In I854 the Alabama court in Collier v.
Frierson 18 asserted that it was a justiciable question and held
an amendment invalid. The case is notable for the fact that
it is the first and only case before I88o holding an amendment unconstitutional. In I 856 the Mississippi Supreme
Court held the question a judicial one. 19 In I864, however,
:Ill (1798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378. See note r, supra.
"State v. McBride, (r 836) 4 Mo. 303.
18
Luther v. Borden, (r849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) r.
"'National Prohibition Cases, (r92o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
17
Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 1301 42 S. Ct. 217.
18
(r854) 24 Ala. roo.
19
Green v. Weller, (r856) 32 Miss. 650.
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the Maryland court took the view that it was a political question. 20 In I 876 the Minnesota court regarded it as judiciaJ.21
Up to I88o only about seven cases had arisen in which the
validity of an amendment was attacked in the courts. Up to
I 890 about twenty such cases had arisen. But since that date
a large number of cases have been decided. The state decisions
have been virtually unanimous to the effect that the question
is judicial, and the state courts now exercise supervision over
every step of the amending process. 22 Luther v. B orden23
was discussed by many of the courts, and the limited holding
of that case was precisely defined.
What then should be the position of the courts as to amendment of the federal Constitution? That the question has been
an open one even up to recent times is indicated by the cases
which have arisen. In the first case which arose, H olling.sworth v. Virginia, 24 the Supreme Court in I798 passed on
the procedure of amendment with respect to a proposal by
Congress and held that the President need not concur in the
proposal of an amendment. But no one raised the point that
20
Miles v. Bradford, (I864) :u Md. I7o. The same view has since been
taken in State v. Swift, (I88o) 69 Ind. sos, power of political department
inferred from a statute; Beck, J., dissenting in Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o
Iowa 543 at 568, I4 N. W. 738, IS N. W. 6o9; Van Syckel, J., dissenting in
Bott v. Board of Registry, (I 897) 6I N. J. L. I 6o, 3 8 A. 848; McCulloch, J.,
dissenting in Rice v. Palmer, (I9o6) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396, pointing out
that if the question is judicial the validity of an amendment is never definitely
settled.
21
Dayton v. St. Paul, (I 8 76) 22 Minn. 400.
""(I939) 53 HARV. L. REV. IJ4; (I94o) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 402.
""(I849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) x. In that case two rival governments were in
armed conflict; the validity of a constitution, not an amendment, was in issue,
and the opinion was therefore dictum; federal jurisdiction was involved as to
the validity of a state constitution, and not of a federal amendment; the constitution of Rhode Island provided no mode of amendment. There are dicta in a
few cases that when the amendment relates to the existence, power or functions
of the courts, the question is political. Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o Iowa 543,
I4 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 6o9; State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, (I9oo) 77
Miss. 543, 27 So. 927 •
.. (I798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378.

16

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

the issue was a political one; and it should be noted that the
court upheld the amendment involved. The opinion was a
brief one of only five lines. In I 849 the Supreme Court in a
dictum in the famous case of Luther v. Borden 25 stated that
the question was a political one. In White v. H art 26 the
Supreme Court in dictum intimated that the validity of the
Civil War Amendments was a political question. In Dodge
v. Woolsey 27 Mr. Justice Campbell in a dissenting opinion
referred with approval to the doctrine of political questions
as laid down in Luther v. Borden. In Smith v. Good 28 a
federal circuit judge, in passing on a controversy involving
the validity of an amendment to a state constitution, held the
controversy to be a political one and stated that the case of
Luther v. Borden was still controlling in the federal courts,
and that it had been followed in White v. Hart. Thus the
cases arising in the nineteenth century seem to have regarded
the question as a political one.
It was in the first one-third of the twentieth century that
support for the view that the issue should be regarded as a
judicial one received its greatest impetus, though some of the
cases involved substance rather then procedure. In 1905 a
lower federal court held that the validity of an amendment
to a state constitution was a judicial question. 29 In 1910 a
lower federal court passed on the validity of the Fifteenth
Amendment, seeming to have assumed that the validity of
the substance of an amendment involved a judicial question. 30
This latter case was offset by a lower federal court decision
as to the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment that only the
.. (1849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) r. The facts are given in note 23, supra.
.., (1871) 13 Wall. (8o U.S.) 646.
~ (1885) 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 373· This case did not involve the
validity of an amendment .
.. (C. C. R.I. 1888) 34 F. 204 .
.,. Knight v. Shelton, (C. C. Ark. 1905) 134 F. 423.
10
Anderson v. Myers, (C. C. Md. 1910) 182 F. 223, affd. Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932.
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political department can declare an amendment void for violating alleged limitations as to substance. 81 Thus up to I920
there were no decisions by the Supreme Court itself squarely
passing on the justiciability of amendments. In fact, between
1798 and I920 the validity of no federal amendment was
passed upon by the Supreme Court. In I 920 in Hawke v.
Smith 32 the Supreme Court passed on a question of ratification by the state legislatures and concluded that the states
could not restrict the ratifying power by providing for a binding popular referendum. The decision, it is to be noted, is
aimed at the acts of the states and not those of Congress. The
court did, however, construe the meaning of the phrase
"legislatures" in the federal Constitution rather than the
phrase as it appeared in the resolution of Congress proposing
the amendment.
In the same year came the National Prohibition Cases,S 3 in
which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment against arguments of unconstitutional
content and improper procedure of adoption. The solicitor
general argued that both of these questions were political.
The procedural question involved the meaning of "two-thirds
of both Houses" in the proposal of an amendment by
Congress. 34 The Supreme Court failed to develop any doctrine as to just what questions it was deciding, or of its own
power. Hence the decision is somewhat dubious as a precedent.
In Dillon v. Gloss,S 5 decided a year later, the court seemed
more clearly to review the extent of the powers of Congress
under Article Five with respect to fixing the time limit for
ratification, but the court was not very explicit as to its own
powers. In I 922, in Leser v. Garnett,S 6 the court again seems
Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F. 186.
•• (192o) 253 U.S. 221,40 S. Ct. 495·
as (192o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
•• See infra, chap. III, at note 28 .
.. (1921) 256 u.s. 368, 41 s. Ct. 510.
•• (1922) 258 U.S. 130,42 S. Ct. 217.
51
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inferentially to have given comfort to the doctrine of political question. After arguing only by analogy to the Fifteenth Amendment, the court declared that the subject of
the Nineteenth Amendment was within the amending power.
But as to the argument that two of the states had not ratified
properly, the court gave the broad answer that "official notice
to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so
was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts." 37 Thus in effect the
court treated the state acts and the acts of the secretary of
state as involving the doctrine of political question.
In 1931 after almost a decade the court in United States v.
Sprague 38 did not try to distinguish the question before it
from that in Leser v. Garnett. The court ruled that Congress
could select the method of ratification, whether by state legislatures or by state conventions. The language of the court is
such as to induce the belief that the court regarded the
amending process as generally justiciable.
There was an interval of eight years without any decisions
on the amending clause. Then came the decisions in 1939
involving the ratification of the child labor amendment. 39
The court laid down a doctrine that some steps in the amending process involved political questions. It should be carefully
noted that it did not hold all questions concerning the amending process to be political. The effect of the previous rejection
by a state of an amendment was held to involve a political
rt Ibid., 258 U. S. at 13 7· ROTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw ( 1939)
399, states: "It should be noted that the conclusive effect of the official notice

to, and the certification thereof by, the Secretary is based on certain assumptions.
How far a court would reach its own independent conclusion on the matters
thus assumed cannot be definitely stated." See also Quarles, "Amendments to
the Federal Constitution," (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 617 at 618, Mr. Quarles,
however, states that the proposal of an amendment is a political question •
.. (1931) 282 u.s. 716,51 s. Ct. 220.
""Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v.
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 922,
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question. The interval of time in which the states might ratify
an amendment was also held to involve a political question. 40
Thus it is only as to these two questions that the court definitely decides that no justiciable question is involved. The
court came to no conclusion as to the justiciability of the question whether a lieutenant governor of a state was such a part
of the legislature that he could cast a deciding vote when
the state senate was evenly divided. The court gave as its reason that the court was equally divided, although nine judges
heard the case. 41 The Kansas Supreme Court had apparently
regarded all three of the above issues as justiciable/2 and the
Kentucky Court of Appeals had inferentially regarded the
first two as justiciable. 43 The majority opinion thus seems to
leave untouched the apparent doctrine of the earlier cases
that certain procedural questions were justiciable.
The difficulties in deciding how long the states should have
to ratify, particularly where there has been a considerable
period of no action at all followed by widespread action,
doubtless justified the court in treating the question of time
as a political one. A proper review of whether Kansas had
ratified the child labor amendment would entail "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political,
social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within
the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of
justice." 44 It should be noted, however, that just such an
.. Two of the justices, McReynolds and Butler, seemed to dissent on the issue
of lapse of time. Presumably they concurred in the view that the effect of prior
rejection by a state was a political question. See note, (1939) 48 YALE L. J.
1455 at 1457.
01
It is therefore suggested in (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455 that the court
"sawed a justice in half." But McReynolds,]., was absent at the last conference
of the court held on June 3· (1939) 28 GEo. L. J. 199 at 2001 note 7·
"Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518; see opinion
by Mr. Justice Black, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 456, 59 S. Ct. 972.
'"Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 11 108 S. W. (2d) 1024.
"Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 453, 59 S. Ct. 972.
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appraisal has been made in the multitudinous cases involving
due process. 45 On the other hand, the difficulties as to the
effect of rejection were not so great, although admittedly the
theorists were badly divided. The court might well have
held, as the solicitor general argued, that states could constitutionally reverse their former acts of rejection or ratification
until such time as three-fourths of them had ratified. Perhaps, however, that question was deemed too closely linked
with the time allowable for ratification. The court indicated
two reasons for regarding the question of the effect of a prior
rejection as involving a political question: (I) historical
precedent in the efforts made by New Jersey and Ohio to
withdraw their ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress in effect declaring their withdrawals abortive/ 6 and
( 2) the absence of any basis in either Constitution or statute
for judicial interference. But neither reason is strongly convincing.47 With respect to the first, it seems an unusual approach for the body recognized as having the power to review acts of Congress to adopt and rely on an act of Congress
as precedent, particularly since the act of Congress was passed
in a period of unrest and since the court had had no opportunity to pass on its validity. With respect to the second reason,
it should be observed that there were no stronger constitutional or statutory bases for the decisions rendered in previous
cases arising concerning the amending process.
Making the effect of a prior rejection a political question
results in greater uncertainty as to the status of an amendment. On the general problem of justiciability it should be
remembered also that the state courts have frequently and
by the great weight of authority held that they may pass
45

Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26
VA. L. REv. 697 at 709; (1939) 39 CoL. L. REV. 1232 at 1235-1236; (1940)
24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 404.
48

(x868) 15 Stat. L. 708.

•• ( 1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 399-400,
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upon the validity of the procedure of amending the state
constitutions, even though there be no express basis therefor.
From the point of view of orderly amending procedure it
is doubtful that the doctrine of political question should be
extended to other procedural steps. If orderly procedure is
essential in the enactment of ordinary statutes, should it not
be even more so as to the adoption of important and permanent constitutional amendments? Such orderly procedure
might call for compliance with certain fundamental prerequisites without emphasizing small details.
In Coleman v. Miller/ 8 four of the members of the Supreme Court felt that a far more sweeping doctrine of political questions should be laid down. Mr. Justice Black in an
opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, thought that Congress
possesses "exclusive power over the amending process," that
neither "state nor federal courts can review that power," and
that "whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands
of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a 'political department' of questions of a type which this Court has frequently
designated 'political.' " 49 No question can get into the courts.
"The process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference
at any point." 50 In the companion case of Chandler v. Wise/ 1
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas state that "we do
'"(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.
""Ibid., 307 U.S. at 459, 457·
00
Ibid., 307 U. S. at 459·
151
(1939) 307 U.S. 474 at 478, 59 S. Ct. 992. For a criticism of this view,
see Quarles, "Amendments to the Federal Constitution," (1940) 26 A. B. A. J.
617. It is pointed out that the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly ex-

cept the amending process from the judicial power of the federal courts, whereas
it inferentially does except the processes of impeachment, election of Congressmen, expulsion of Congressmen, and suits against the United States by citizens
of another state.
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not believe that state or federal courts have any jurisdiction
to interfere with the amending process."
The view that the amending process involves essentially
political issues has been urged by a number of writers. Albert
E. Pillsbury, former Attorney General of Massachusetts,
argued in I 909 that the scope of the amending power is a
political question. 52 Wayne B. Wheeler argued in I920 that
the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was a political
question. 53 Professor Oliver P. Field in I 924 pointed out
that courts had developed the doctrine of political questions
where there was a "lack of legal principles for the courts to
apply in their consideration of cases involving certain types
of subject matter." 5 4 Melville Fuller Weston set forth a doctrine of political questions in I 92 5 particularly with respect
to the adoption and amendment of constitutions. 55 Walter F.
Dodd in I93I was one of the most recent writers on the subject. 56
2. Validity of Substance
It has just been seen that even under the most recent decisions some questions of procedure in amendment are justici.. Address, (1909) 16 ME. ST. BAR. AssN. PRoc. 17 at 26 .
.. "The Constitutionality of the Constitution is not a Justiciable Question,"
(1920) 90 CENT. L. J. tp .
.. "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," (1924) 8
MINN. L. REv. 485 at 513· Professor Field did not suggest application of the
doctrine to the federal amending process. His article is cited as authoritative by
Chief Justice Hughes in Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 455,
59 s. Ct. 972.
I
.. "Political Questions," (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 296 at 304, 307. This
article was also cited as authoritative in Coleman v. Miller, supra. Compare
Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, and
"Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation," (1925) 39 HARV. L. REv. 221
at 234 .
.. "Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions," ( 193 I) 8o
U. PA. L. REv. 54 at 89. See also Yawitz, "The Legal Effect under American
Decisions of Alleged Irregularities in the Adoption of a Constitution or Copstitutional Amendment," (1925) 10 ST. LoUis L. REv. 279 at 283; note
(1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 72; (1938) 26 KY. L. J. 364; page 5 of brief of the
Solicitor General of the United States as amicus curiae in Coleman v. Miller,
(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232 at 1235;
Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme·Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L.
REv. 697 at 707-709.
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able. But there may be difficulties other than procedural ones.
Will the courts inquire into the substance of an amendment,
or is that a political question? Most of the cases have involved
the question of the validity of procedure. It was not until I 920
that the Supreme Court passed on the substance of an amendment. The court ruled, in the National Prohibition Cases, 51
that there were no defects of substance in the Eighteenth
Amendment. The following year the Nineteenth Amendment was attacked as improper in substance and the court expressly discussed the: question of substance,58 whereas no
reasoning was set out in the National Prohibition Cases. Back
in I 9 I 5 when the content of the Fifteenth Amendment was
attacked, the court completely ignored that argument in its
decision. 59 In I 93 I the Supreme Court inferentially refused
to allow an attack on the substance of an amendment when it
held that all amendments were subject to ratification by state
legislatures if Congress so chose. 60 In the light of the recent
decisions on the child labor amendment, it may be that the
court now regards the substance of an amendment as presenting a political question. That would from a practical point
of view be a defensible position since no limitations on substance have yet been found, and it is unlikely that any will
ever be found. 61
Relatively few attacks have been made on the substance
of amendments in the state courts. Apparently the first case
in which this question was directly raised was that of Livermore v. Waite 62 by the California court in I 894. That court
""National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486 •
.. Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. IJo, 42 S. Ct. 217.
""Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932.
00
United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220.
81
See infra, chap. IV.
82
(1894) 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424. The court suggests that the power of
the legislature to propose amendments is much less than that of a convention,
and that a convention is subject only to the Constitution of the United States.
The distinction appears unsound, however, as a convention is merely a legal
agent of the state for the purpose of amendment, just as the legislature is.
The court also contends that an amendment which if adopted would be in-
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held that an amendment was void in substance because certain
of its provisions were to become operative at the will of certain
officials mentioned in it, although it was regularly voted on
by the people. Neither the federal nor the state constitution
imposed such a restriction and it seems that it was one discovered by the California courts. Two years later the Missouri
court took the opposite view in a case involving similar facts. 63
Where the constitution is silent as to the scope of an amendment, the view of the state courts appears to be that the courts
may not pass on the character of the amendment. 64 Where
the state constitution contains limitations on the scope of.
amendments, logically the courts should have power to determine whether the content is proper. 65 Limitations on the
scope of amendments should be found within the amending
clause, and the other articles of the constitution should not be
viewed as limitations. Thus the bill of rights and the amending clause are themselves subject to alteration unless expressly
forbidden to be altered. Most state constitutions contain no
such limitations, however, and the problem therefore seldom
operative, or contingent on the acts of a group of individuals, is invalid. But if
the people have imposed no such limitations, there would seem to be no good
reason why such an amendment may not be proposed.
83
Edwards v. Lesueur, (I 896) I 32 Mo. 4I o, 33 S. W. I I 30. But in State ex
rei. Halliburton v. Roach, (I9Io) 230 Mo. 408, I30 S. W. 689, an amendment was held void as being legislative in character, and also because it was
operative for only ten years; but in dictum the court said that a proposed prohibition amendment would be valid, since prohibition was subject to permanent
as well as temporary regulation. This decision was probably a political one.
Professor Rottschaefer says its position is indefensible. RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 398.
•• State v. Swift, ( r 88o) 69 Ind. 512; Prohibitory Amendment Cases,
(r88r) 24 Kan. 700; State ex rei. Cranmer v. Thorson, (I896) 9 S.D. I49>
68 N. W. 202; People ex rei. Elder v. Sours, (1903) 3I Colo. 369, 74 P. 167;
Frantz v. Autry, (I907) I8 Okla. 561,91 P. I93; Louisiana Ry. & Navigation
Co. v. Madere, (I9o9) I24 La. 635, so So. 6o9; State ex rei. Greenlund v.
Fulton, (19I9) 99 Ohio St. I68, I24 N. E. I72; Switzer v. State ex rei.
Silvey, (1921) 103 Ohio St. 3o6, I33 N. E. 552, suggesting that a federal
amendment may be invalid for indefiniteness; Browne v. City of New York,
(1925) 24I N.Y. 96,149 N. E. 2II.
65
The Alabama constitution, article I 8, § 284, forbids the change of representation in the legislature on any other than a population basis.
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arises, as the doctrine of implied limits on the nature of
amendments has not been adopted by the state courts.
The Constitution of the United States contains one express restriction on the nature of amendments. No state may
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its
consent. Prior to I 8o8 no amendment could be made abolishing the slave trade, or imposing a direct tax without apportionment. Since that date, unless the courts adopt the view
that there are implied limitations, the only criterion of character an amendment has had to meet is that it must not violate
the equal suffrage clause. The absence of any limitations as
to form or substance is shown in the cases of the Eleventh and
the Eighteenth Amendments. The Eleventh Amendment
operated retroactively. The Eighteenth Amendment by its
own provision was not to go into effect until a year after its
ratification, and was to be inoperative unless ratified within
seven years after its submission by Congress to the states. 66
Though, as has been seen, the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments were attacked as void in substance, the contentions were rejected. 67 Since no implied limitations as to scope
are likely to be laid down and since the only limitation on
content is the equal suffrage clause and that is really a limitation on the method of ratification rather than on the substance
of amendments, there would seem to be no great dangers
arising out of the view that a political question is here involved. Arguably, however, the Supreme Court cases on substance might be interpreted as meaning simply that there are
no limitations on the substance of amendments. On that view
it would not be necessary to assert that conformance to limitations is a political question.
86
See Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510; Druggan v.
Anderson, (1925) 269 U.S. 36, 46 S. Ct. 14.
61
National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350 at 386, 40 S. Ct. 486;
Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217.
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The question of justiciability has now been treated both as
to the validity of the procedure of adoption and the validity
of substance. It would seem of value to summarize the state
of the law after the I 93 9 decisions. First, as to procedure it
may be said that certain phases of procedure are political and
certain are justiciable questions. The effect of a state's previous rejection of an amendment upon its later approval involves a political question. 68 The time interval after submission of an amendment in which states may ratify also involves
a political question. On the other hand, neither expressly nor
impliedly overruled 69 are earlier holdings that the following
involve justiciable questions: (I) the meaning of "two-thirds
of both Houses" in the proposal of an amendment by Congress; ( 2) whether Congress has the power of selecting ratification by legislatures rather than by conventions; (3) the
necessity of the President's approval of the proposal of an
amendment; and (4) the meaning of "legislatures" ratifying
federal amendments with respect to compulsory popular referenda. Undecided is the question whether a lieutenant governor of a state is such a part of the legislature that he may cast a
deciding vote when the state senate is evenly divided. Second,
as to the justiciability of the substance of an amendment, possibly though not probably unaffected are decisions as to the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments holding inferentially that the problem is justiciable.
With respect to the proper procedure required as a result
of the doctrine of political question, it would seem the following is called for: a proper party plaintiff must first prosecute a suit to determine whether the matter involved is justi.. Probably there would be the same result as to the effect of a prior ratification. (1939) 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 122 at 124.
•• Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26
VA. L. REv. 697 at 707-709. The majority of the court carefully distinguished
Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510; four justices wished to
overrule it. See also (1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 399·
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ciable, and if it is not justiciable he must appeal to Congress. 70
If the question is found to be a political one, there would seem
to be no very effective or regular methods of enforcing the
procedure Article Five seems to demand. Thus political
prestige rather than legal right may become the more dominant influence.
The doctrine of political question raises a number of questions, the answers to which cannot easily be predicted. Where
a political question is found to be involved as to a certain procedural step in a given case, what are the powers of the Secretary of State of the United States? May he promulgate the
adoption of the amendment only under the formal express
permission conferred by Congress, or may he do so unless
Congress forbids promulgation? Is a two-thirds vote of Congress necessary to allow or to prevent promulgation of the
amendment? May Congress decide the political question before three-fourths of the states have ratified? If it does, may it
later, but before three-fourths have ratified, change its position? May Congress decide, with respect to a particular
amendment, that a state once having rejected may later ratify, and then decide differently with respect to a different
amendment?
B. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

It has been seen that at least some questions of the legality
of the procedure of adoption of an amendment to the federal
Constitution are justiciable. If the court had held that all
questions concerning the amending process are political, obviously no one could raise the question of validity in the
courts. But since the court regards some questions as justiciable, the problem immediately arises as to how the validity
of an amendment may be attacked.
•• (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 406.
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r. Proper Forum
It would seem feasible to raise the question of the validity
of ratification by a particular state in the courts of that state
as well as in the federal courts. One case reached the United
States Supreme Court by writ of error to the Supreme Court
of the state of Ohio to review a decree of the latter court. 71
Another case reached the Supreme Court by writ of error to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland to review a judgment of
the latter court. 72 In each of these cases state courts passed on
the validity of amendments to the federal Constitution. In
each of them the proceeding was by a citizen and voter, or
citizens and voters, of a state against its public officers. No
question as to the jurisdiction of the state courts or as to the
availability of the relief prayed, if a case were made out for
the granting of such relief, was raised.
2.

Time of Attack

It will be conceded that the validity of an amendment, if
justiciable at all, can be attacked after its promulgation and
when it is sought to be put into effect. But must the plaintiff
wait until then to bring suit or may he sue before ratification?
In an early case a federal trial court refused to permit attack on the validity of an amendment prior to adoption. 73
However, the state courts have permitted attacks on an
amendment proposed by Congress even though it has not as
yet been ratified by three-fourths of the states. 74 This practice was impliedly approved by the Supreme Court when it
refused jurisdiction upon other grounds of an appeal from an
71

Hawke v. Smith, (r92o) 253 U.S. 22r, 40 S. Ct. 495·
""Leser v. Garnett, (r922) 258 U.S. 130,42 S. Ct. 2I7.
"' State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I 9 I 9) 257 F. 334·
"Wise v. Chandler, (I937) 270 Ky. I, I08 S. W. (2d) 1024; Coleman v.
Miller, (I9J7) I46 Kan. 390, 71 P. (zd) 5I8. In Hawke v. Smith, (I920)
253 U.S. 2JI, 40 S. Ct. 495, the Supreme Court reviewed an Ohio case where
the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment was attacked prior to adoption.
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attack in a state court on the Child Labor Amendment after
only twenty-eight states had ratified. 75 Arguably an employer of child labor might have a sufficient special interest
to attack the child labor amendment, and yet not be able
to show that the injury is clear and immediate. 76 In the first
place, thirty-six states might never ratify. In the second place,
the child labor amendment does not abolish child labor, but
merely authorizes Congress to do so. Moreover, technically
an injunction as to certifying by one state would be useless,
since it is the action of three-fourths of the states and not the
certifying notice that marks the adoption of an amendment. 77
Another theory which may bar relief is that of the doctrine
of separation of powers. 78 That doctrine prevents interference
with legislative processes. For instance, no injunction lies
against an administrative official who is submitting to the
electorate a proposed amendment to a state constitution. 79
••coleman v. Miller, (I939) 307 U.S. 433,59 S. Ct. 972.
•• (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 1201. No irreparable injury was found in State of
Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334·
77
United States ex rel. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C. I92o) 265 F. 998,
affirmed (I92I) 257 U.S. 6I9, 42 S. Ct. I69.
"' (I 9 3 7) 3 7 CoL. L. REV. 120 I ; State of Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox,
(D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334 (Eighteenth Amendment); Clements v.
Roberts, (I92I) I44 Tenn. I29, 230 S. W. 30 (Nineteenth Amendment).
79

State ex rel. Cranmer v. Thorson, (I 896) 9 S. D. I49, 68 N. W. 202;
People ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mills, (I902) 30 Colo. 262, 70 P. 322. Cf. Ellingham v. Dye, (I9I2) I78 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. r. See also Frantz v. Autry,
(1907) I8 Okla. 56I at 6o3-6II, 91 P. I93; Threadgill v. Cross, (I9Io) 26
Okla. 403, I09 P. 558; State ex rel. Byerley v. State Board of Canvassers,
(I9I9) 44 N.D. 126, 172 N. W. 8o; State ex rel. Marcolin v. Smith, (I922)
105 Ohio St. 570, q8 N. E. 881; McAlister v. State ex rel. Short, (1923) 95
Okla. zoo, ZI9 P. I34; Hamilton v. Secretary of State, (I924) 227 Mich. III,
198 N. W. 843. But see Wells v. Bain, (I873) 75 Pa. St. 39; Hatch v. Stoneman, (I88s) 66 Cal. 632,6 P. 734; Livermore v. Waite, (I894) Ioz Cal. xq,
36 P. 424; Edwards v. Lesueur, (I896) IJZ Mo. 4Io at 441, 33 S. W. xqo;
People ex rel. Attorney General v. Curry, (I9oo) qo Cal. 8z, 6z P. SI6;
Holmberg v. Jones, (190I) 7 Idaho 752, 65 P. 563; State ex rel. Halliburton
v. Roach, (I9Io) 230 Mo. 408, qo S. W. 689, two judges dissenting;
State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, (I9I4) 49 Mont. 387, I42 P. zio; Tax Commission Case, (I923) 68 Mont. 450, 2I9 P. 8I7; State ex rel. Linde v. Hall,
(I917) 35 N.D. 34, I59 N. W. z8I, which seems not to have been followed
in State ex rel. Byerley v. State Board of Canvassers, supra.
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Arguably the same theory should apply where the federal
secretary of state is the defendant. 80 Hence to attack the validity of an amendment it is thought necessary to await its apparent ratification. The difficulty of the plaintiff if he does so
wait is that he will run into the objection that the courts will
not go behind the secretary of state's promulgation of ratification. It has been argued that the validity of ratification of
an amendment as distinct from the substance of an amendment may not be attacked after the secretary of state's proclamation of its adoption. 81 It has also been stated that an irregularity of Congress in proposing an amendment cannot be
attacked prior to adoption, as for instance by an action to enjoin the governor of a state from submitting an amendment
to the legislature, but only after its promulgation and when
it is sought to put it into effect. 82 That seems sound policy as
preventing too free attack on amendments, and as giving
proper weight to the fact that it was Congress that was acting.
With respect to the remedy of injunction, it should be .
noted that it might be sought at any of a number of stages:
(I) against the submission of an amendment to the state by
the Secretary of State of the United States; ( 2) against submission by the governor to the legislature or state convention; (3) against legislative officers certifying action by the
legislature; ( 4) against certification of ratification by the
governor; ( 5) and against certification by the Secretary of
State of the United States. No case has arisen as to submission
by the United States Secretary of State to the state. It is true
that after Congress has proposed an amendment, the secretary
of state sends a copy thereof to each governor, and the gov"" Nor would mandamus lie against the secretary of state to compel announcement of the rejection of an amendment, since the statute under which he acts
imposes no such duty on him, (1818) 3 Stat. L. 439; (1934) 5 U.S. C.§ 16o.
81
Brief for Appellant, p. 2, in Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 1, ro8
S. W. (2d) 1024.
82
RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 388, citing State of Ohio
ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334·
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ernor in turn transmits it to the legislature. But the Constitution is silent as to these two steps, which are based simply on
statute. It would therefore seem that they might be omitted
as unnecessary. Since the two steps are not legally significant,
injunction would be refused as futile. With respect to submission by the governor to the legislature, it has been held in a
lower federal case that no injunction lies to attack an irregularity of Congress in proposing. 83 With respect to legislative
officers certifying action by the legislature, the Supreme
Court of Kansas refused relief by way of mandamus. 84 The
Kentucky state court allowed injunction and a declaratory
judgment with respect to certification by the governor to the
Secretary of State of the United States. 85 With respect to
injunction against certification by the secretary of state, no
injunction should lie, and it has been refused, 86 since the Constitution calls for no act by the secretary of state, the final act
being the approval by three-fourths of the states.
In favor of permitting attack before adoption by threefourths of the states is the view that procedural difficulties
in framing constitutional questions should be minimized in
the interests of efficiency and certainty. 87 To refuse relief
seems technical. To grant it makes for speed. The opposing
argument is that constitutional decisions should be few in
83

State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 2.57 F. 334·
"'Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 4901 71 P. (zd) 518.
""Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 2.70 Ky. 11 108 S. W. (zd) 102.4. Since the
governor had already mailed the certificate of ratification to. the secretary of
state (subsequent to the filing of the bill for injunction and issuance of the
restraining order, but prior to the service thereof), it is hard to see how either
an injunction or a declaratory judgment would accomplish anything. (1937)
37 CoL. L. REv. 12.01. It was argued in the case that since, under the doctrine
of Leser v. Garnett, (192.2.) 2.58 u.s. 130, 42. s. Ct. 2.17, the validity of inoperative ratifications might not be assailed after promulgation by the federal
secretary of state, the proper time to attack was at the time the governor was
about to send in notice of ratification.
88
Fairchild v. Hughes, (192.2.) 2.58 U. S. u6, 42. S. Ct. 2.74.
81
Comments, (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 148; (1932.) 41 YALE L. J. 1195;
Fraenkel, "Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1935 Term," (1936)
85 U. PA. L. REv. 2.7 at 78.
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number, postponed as long as possible, and rendered only
if necessary. 88

3· Proper Party Plaintiff
The right of a party to raise the issue of validity of an
amendment should be determined by the same theories that
are applied to other constitutional issues. In a case arising in
the federal courts it was held that the general right of a
citizen to have the federal government administered according to law, and to prevent waste of public moneys was not
a basis for a suit to decide whether a federal amendment about
to be adopted was valid. 89 But a private individual whose
interests of person or property have been injured, or are
threatened with injury, by the enforcement of legislation
the validity of which depends upon the validity of a constitutional amendment, should have the right to raise the issue
in a proceeding to which he is a party.
Members of the Kansas legislature assailed the validity
of the ratification of the child labor amendment by an original proceeding in mandamus in the Kansas Supreme Court
to enjoin further proceedings, and to compel the secretary
of state of Kansas to erase the indorsement that the resolution
had passed the senate and to indorse on the resolution a statement that it did not pass. Petitioners also sought to restrain
the officers of the legislature from signing the resolution, and
the secretary of state from authenticating and delivering it
89
Comments, (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 148; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 649 at
67o-67t; (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 255 at 268 ff.; Frankfurter, "A Note on Advisory Opinions," (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002.
89
Fairchild v. Hughes, (1922) 258 U.S. 12.6, 42 S. Ct. 274. This case did
not decide that such a party could not attack in the state courts. See also, notes
(1937) 37COL.L.REV,12.01; (1937) 24VA.L.REV.194; comments, (1937)
47 YALE L. J. 148; (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455; and article by Moore and
Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 697
at 706.
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to the governor. The Kansas Supreme Court denied a writ of
mandamus but stated that the right of the plaintiffs to sue was
itself clear. 90 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and though it upheld the action of the legislature it
agreed, four judges dissenting, that the parties had a right to
sue. 91 This holding is probably consistent with earlier cases. 92
The holding is also in accord with the theory of most state
courts recognizing any citizen's interest. 93 The Wyoming court
has held that a taxpayer might sue to enjoin an election as to
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, although the injunction
was refused in the particular case since the election was
legal. 94 In Iowa a recent statute authorized injunctions against
the submission of amendments to state constitutions. Any
taxpayer might sue. The governor and secretary of state could
be enjoined from submitting the amendment. Thus Iowa is
the first state to allow the judicial determination of the validity of a constitutional amendment before its adoption. 95
In Kentucky, where a suit was brought by individual citizens and members of the legislature to enjoin certification of
ratification to the secretary of state by state officials, no ques90Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518. Petitioners
were 21 members of the Kansas senate, 20 of whom voted against the resolution, and 3 members of the house.
91

Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. For the views
of the four judges dissenting as to jurisdiction, see the opinion by Frankfurter, J.,
307 U.S. at 464-470. See also (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232; cf. (1937) 47
YALE L. J. 148 at 150; (1937) 24 VA. L. REv. 194 at 195.
03
Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221,40 S. Ct. 475; Leser v. Garnett,
( 19 2 2) 2 58 U. S. 13 o, 42 S. Ct. 21 7 (suits by citizens and electors) ; Moore and
Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938' Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 697
at 707. Compare (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232 at 1233-1234.
03
(1937) 47 YALE L.]. 148; (1933) 43 YALE L. ]. 340 at 341; Ellingham
v. Dye, (1912) 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1; Zoercher v. Alger, (1930) 202 Ind.
214, 172 N. E. 186, 907.
•• Spriggs v. Clark, (1932) 45 Wyo. 62, 14 P. (2d) 667, noted (1933) r8
CoRN. L. Q. 278, (1933) 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 271 and (1933) roN. Y.
u. L. Q. REV. 395·
.. Comment, (1932) 17 IowA L. REv. 250.
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tion of the plaintiff's capacity to sue was raised, for the defendant had failed to file a special demurrer. 96 When the
Kentucky case came to the United States Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General of the United States, in his brief for the
United States as amicus curiae, conceded that the case was
properly before the court. 97 He pointed out that the petitioners (defendants in the state court) were public officers
performing federal functions and were seeking to sustain the
validity of the act of ratification. Hence decisions holding
that public officers may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court
in their official capacity .to challenge the constitutionality of
state acts were not in point. The case, moreover, was not
academic. To prevent official notice of the action of the state
from reaching the Secretary of State of the United States
interfered with the amending process. Official notice from the
state is conclusive on the federal secretary of state as to the
procedural validity of the ratification, and the proclamation
by the federal secretary of state is conclusive on the courts in
that regard. Moreover, the orderly receipt of official notice
aids in avoiding confusion and uncertainty.
The solicitor general was more dubious in the Kansas case,
since the petitioners (plaintiffs in the state court) were public
officers attacking the validity of the claimed ratification. But
he went on to point out that at least two of the petitioners
were members of the state legislature when the amendment
was previously rejected and had voted for rejection. Hence
their suit might be regarded as an effort on their part to pro96Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024. The Kansas
and Kentucky cases seem to be the first cases involving attacks on federal amendments by legislators. (1939) 28 GEo. L. J. 199 at 201. Possibly in reality legislators were given a standing to sue because they take part in the amending
process. Or possibly jurisdiction was taken to make possible a decision on the
merits.
91
But he admitted that if the case had been first brought in a federal court it
would properly have been dismissed on the ground that the complainants had no
sufficient legal interest. Brief, p. 34•
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teet and vindicate their votes as against what was asserted
to be a spuriously countervailing act.
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the Kentucky case, concluded that it was without jurisdiction on certiorari to review the action of the Kentucky court directing the clerk o£
the court to give official notice to the secretary of state of rejection of the child labor amendment, since after the governor forwarded the certificate of ratification there no longer
existed a controversy. 98 The case had become moot. That is
to say, while the petitioners might be proper parties, there
must still be a controversy. The writ of certiorari was therefore dismissed. The court thought that the state court had
jurisdiction up to the time of forwarding the certification
of ratification. After such forwarding "there was no longer
a controversy susceptible of judicial determination." 99 Justices Black and Douglas concurred on the ground that neither
the state nor federal courts "have any jurisdiction to interfere with the amending process." 100 Justices McReynolds and
Butler thought that the Kentucky judgment should be affirmed.
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the Kansas case, concluded that the members of the Kansas Senate who voted
against ratification of the child labor amendment, and who
claimed that their votes were sufficient to prevent ratification,
had such an interest in mandamus proceedings begun by them
and other legislatures questioning the validity of the legislative action as to give the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review on certiorari the adverse decision of the
Kansas Supreme Court even though they would not have had
standing to sue initially in the federal courts. 101 The Kansas
98
Compare Chase v. Billings, (1934) 106 Vt. 149, 170 A. 903.
•• Chandler v. Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474 at 477-478, 59 S. Ct. 992.
100
Ibid., 307 U. S. at 478.
101
Moore and Adelson, "Thf.! ~upr~rne CQuxt; 19~8 Term, lit (194-o) z6
VA. L. REV. 697 at 7o(i,
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court had likewise treated the legislator's interest as sufficient
to justify it in entertaining and deciding federal questions
raised. The decision of the Kansas court was affirmed. Four
of the judges thought that the petitioners had no standing to
sue; that there was no controversy before the court. These
four judges, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
thought it immaterial that such petitioners were given standing to sue in the Kansas Supreme Court. Such petitioners had
no more standing than other citizens of Kansas or even of
other parts of the United States. Every United States citizen
was equally interested in whether or not the child labor
amendment was still alive. Clearly such petitioners would
have no standing to sue in a federal court. The federal courts
are not bound by state court rulings as to the petitioners'
standing. 102 Petitioners' rights of voting in the Kansas legislature were merely political rights undeserving of protection.
Justice Butler, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice
McReynolds, did not deny that the petitioners could sue.
The present chapter indicates the difficulties encountered
in attacking the validity of an amendment to the federal Constitution. If the Supreme Court is not ready to apply the
doctrine of political questions to all phases of the amending
process, as four members of the court wish, it will apply it
to some phases of the amending process and what such phases
are remains largely uncertain. Even if the court finds a justiciable question presented, the court may find that the case was
brought in the wrong court, or that it was brought at too early
a stage in the amending process, or that it was not brought
by a proper party plaintiff, or that there was no controversy.
102
A more logical line of reasoning would seem to be as follows: a majority
of the court hold that the effect of a prior rejection and the time interval for
ratification are not justiciable questions. Such a holding means that they are not
justiciable in either state or federal courts, Mr. Justice Black's opinion brings
this out clearly. Moreover, since the issues are "exclusively federal questions and
not state questions," as pointed out by the Chief Justice, Coleman v. Miller,
307 U. S. 433 at 438, 59 S. Ct. 972, the holding as to justiciability binds the
state courts. See comment, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455 at 1456, note 4·

CHAPTER

III

The Procedure for Amending the Federal
Constitution
A. EXCLUSIVENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MODES

NE of the basic questions which may arise concerning
the validity of a constitutional amendment, and the
one which has most frequently arisen, is whether
the proper procedure was followed in its adoption. The Constitution in Article Five makes express provision as to the
mode of procedure, and resort must therefore first be had to
it. Two methods of proposal and two of ratification are designated. Proposal may be by a two-thirds vote of each house of
Congress, or by application Of the legislatures of two-thirds
of the states to Congress for the call of a national convention.
Ratification may be by the state legislatures or by specially
called state conventions, as Congress may choose, a favorable
vote by three-fourths of the states being required in either
case. From these express provisions it reasonably follows that
the indicated methods are exclusive, and the courts have so
declared. 1
Revolution as a mode of changing the Constitution would
thus be unlawful. In fact, it seems inconsistent to speak of
revolution and law in the same breath, for supposedly one
of the essential characteristics of the conception of law is order
and regular procedure. Jameson defines a revolution as "a
political act or acts done in violation of law, or without law." 2
A century and a half ago, and for that matter a good deal

O

'Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495; RoTTSCHAEFER,
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8.
• }AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 101.
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later, it was common for the courts to refer to the right of
revolution as a legal right, and not to distinguish it as a political or ethical right. Our revolt from England and the irregular procedure in the adoption of our Constitution resulted in stamping the judicial mind with a tolerant attitude
toward revolution. Both, while perhaps justifiable politically
and morally, were not so from a juridical viewpoint. For
many years the courts and the commentators either tacitly
affirmed the right, or used vague language capable of varying
interpretations. 3 In several state constitutions the bill of rights
expressly declared that the people at all times had a right
to alter and amend the constitution. 4 But for over a century
the states, as well as the nation, have lived under constitutions in most cases regularly adopted and amended. As aresult the courts look .askance at the idea of revolution, and
expressly refer to it as illegal. 5 Hence, alteration in the constitution not secured by constitutional methods would be in"In Wells v. Bain, (1873) 75 Pa. 39 at 47, the following modes of altering
the Constitution are indicated: "r. The mode provided in the existing constitution. 2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the body for revision and
conveying it to the powers of the people. 3· A revolution." For discussion of
this case, see Shenton, "The 'Sovereign' Convention of 1873,'' (1935) 22
PA. B. A. Q. 171. See also Fuller, "Political Questions," (1925) 38 HARV. L.
REv. 296 at 305.
• Madison proposed an amendment to be prefixed to the Constitution providing "That the people have an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right
to reform or change their Government, whenever it may be found adverse
or inadequate to the purposes of its institution." AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) 185.
5
"No heresy has ever been taught in this country so fraught with evil, as the
doctrine that the people have a constitutional right to disregard the constitution, and that they can set themselves above the instrumentalities appointed by
the constitution for the administration of law. It tends directly to the encouragement of revolution and anarchy." Koehler v. Hill, (1883) 6o Iowa 543 at 616.
"The Society has, it is true, the physical power to override its own restrictions.
But such an act would almost certainly be illegal, because in violation of the
letter of the law. Even were the whole people, by unanimous action, to effect
organic changes in modes forbidden by the existing organic law, it would be
an act of revolution." ]AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed.
(1887) 599·
"The legal assumption that sovereignty is ultimately vested in the people
affords no legal basis for the direct exercise by the people of any sovereign
power whose direct exercise by them has not been expressly or impliedly reserved." ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8.
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valid, although sought by a large section of the people. The
principle that the people are sovereign does not mean that
they can change the constitution except as provided therein.
As a result of the express provisions of Article Five, the
federal Constitution has always been free from the difficulty
existing in the case of the early state constitutions, which in
several instances made no provision whatever for amendment
or revision. 6 In those cases, it was held that the legislature had
an implied power to call a convention for revision, after a
popular vote on the question, but that the legislature itself
had no power to propose amendments. 7 Where the constitution provided for amendment by legislative proposal and did
not expressly negative any other mode, the legislature might
call a convention; but where the constitution provided for
changes by a convention, it appeared that the legislature could
not propose amendments. The early constitutions were either
silent on the subject, or permitted revision in only one of the
two ways just referred to. The earliest mode was revision by
convention. Later some of the Southern states developed the
legislative mode. Article Five embodies both modes, so that
there can be no doubt of the authority to make use of either
method. The subsequent state constitutions have in most cases
copied the federal plan, which was the first to provide for
both modes. In the event of a repeal of the amendment clause,
perhaps Congress might, on analogy to the procedure in the
case of early state constitutions, call a convention, but could
not itself propose amendments. On the other hand, perhaps
even its power to call a convention might be doubtful, inasmuch as the powers of the Congress must be expressly or impliedly conferred by the Constitution. 8
8

DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I

o)

44-45·

• Ibid.
8
Where there is no amending clause in the constitution of a nation, the general view is "that it is to be considered as tacitly understood, that amendment
may be made either by the ordinary legislative method, or by the same power
by which the constitution was originally adopted." This was the opinion given
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1.

PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS

Proposal by National Convention

One of the two modes of proposing a federal amendment
is by constitutional convention, a method corresponding to
the original organization which proposed the Constitution
itself. Congress, at the request of two-thirds of the state legislatures, is to call a convention. It is thus to be noted that
Congress may not call a convention on its own initiative apart
from state action. In this respect Congress resembles the state
legislatures, which generally are not authorized to call a convention without a previous popular vote. When it is remembered that a state legislature has all powers not forbidden it
by the state or national constitution, while Congress has only
the powers expressly or impliedly conferred by the Constitution, it seems clear that Congress has no power in the absence
of a request by the state legislatures. Revision of the Constitution by a convention is thus left to the initiative of the states.
All that Congress can do in bringing about a convention is of
a purely advisory character, as by resolution inviting the state
legislatures to apply for a convention.
It must not be assumed, however, that Congress is a mere
ministerial cog in the call of a convention. The convention
does not come about through the mere act of the state legislatures. It is necessary that Congress act upon their applications. It would appear to be the constitutional duty of Congress to issue the call when requested. 9 A simple majority of
by Italian jurists as to alterations of the Italian constitution, which is silent on
the subject. WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 215. See also
RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 9·
• This seems to have been the early view. See Speech of Representative Samuel
Lyman on March 14, I 796, in I BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF
CoNGRESS (I857) 659. The debates at the Constitutional Convention show
that this mode was provided because of the fear that the federal government
might become oppressive and refuse to initiate amendments desired by the
states. Iredell in his argument before the North Carolina Convention asserted
that the duty was mandatory. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed. (1937 facsimile of 1836 ed.) 178.
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Congress could issue it, and it is probable that the approval
of the President is unnecessary. 10 But suppose that Congress
would refuse. Since Congress is one of the three coordinate
branches of the government, there would seem to be no valid
method of coercing it to make the call. While the federal
courts may declare acts of Congress invalid, they may not do so
until the act h~ been passed. Viewed negatively, there is no
valid method of preventing Congress from passing an unconstitutional act. Viewed affirmatively, there is no method of
coercing Congress into performing its constitutional duty at
any time. 11 The Constitution specifically provides that Congress shall reapportion the number of representatives in the
lower house every ten years. Yet it is a well-known fact that
reapportionment which ought to have been made in r 920 was
not then made. A further difficulty is that Congress seemingly
is left some discretion in the matter, as probably it is in the
hands of Congress to decide when two-thirds of the state
legislature have made the request. This would seem to follow
from the 1939 decision leaving to Congress the power to fix
the time for ratification and the effect of prior re j ections. 12
A clear case is of course possible should two-thirds of the
states all at one time request a convention for an identical purpose, and little discretion would seem to be left to Congress.
In all likelihood, however, a much wider range of discretion
will be left to Congress, since the probability of simultaneous
requests for a single purpose seems remote.
A question, then, which may face either Congress or the
courts is, when have two-thirds of the legislatures made application for the call of a convention? The issue may arise as
to the time each individual state makes its request. Must the
requests be simultaneous or approximately so? The answer
would seem to be that the time relation between the action
Supra, chap. II, at note 24.
Dodd, "Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions," ( 19 32)
8o U. PA. L. REV. 54 at 82.
10
Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 1 59 S. Ct. 972.
lJJ

n
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of each legislature must be reasonably approximate. The call
would seem to outlive the particular Congress to which it is
addressed. But it would seem unreasonable that, for example,
the request of a legislature in I 8oo should be joined to arequest in another state in I825, and these to requests in I850
and I 900, to constitute the necessary two-thirds. The maximum life of a request should not be more than a generation.
Perhaps the most perfect analogy is to be found in the length
of time allowed for the ratification of amendments by the
state legislatures. 13
A closely related problem is whether the requests must
seek a convention for identical purposes. Should two-thirds
of the legislatures ask a convention for the purpose of a general revision or for the same specific purpose, there would be
no difficulty. But when one legislature desires a convention
for one purpose, as to prohibit polygamy, another legislature
for another purpose, as to adopt the initiative and referendum,
and a third legislature for a general purpose, there is some
doubt whether the prerequisite for a call has been met. The
better view would seem to be that the ground of the applications would be immaterial, and that a demand by two-thirds
of the states would conclusively show a widespread desire for
constitutional changes.
It may be pertinent to inquire whether or not a convention
is now impending. The question is not wholly speculative, inasmuch as some of the opponents of the Eighteenth Amendment have asserted that two-thirds, or almost that number, of
the state legislatures have made the necessary request. Until
I 9 30 there had been no systematic study of the instances where
state legislatures had petitioned Congress to call a convention.14 In I 90 I several legislatures petitioned for a convention
18

Infra, subdivision C.
"See study by Senator Tydings of Maryland, S. Doc. 78, 71st Cong., 2d
sess. ( 19 3o) . The best discussion seems to be that by Wheeler, "Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?" (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 782.
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to consider an amendment for the popular election of Senators, and by I 909 twenty-six states had petitioned for that
purpose. The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment would
perhaps destroy the effect of these petitions. Eighteen
states have requested a convention to punish polygamy.
Twelve states have petitioned with reference to amendments
on other subjects. In I899 Texas. and in I9II Wisconsin petitioned for a convention without indicating its purpose. All
in all, from I 90 I to I 926 thirty-two different states, or the
necessary two-thirds, petitioned for a convention. The requests have been over a considerable length of time, so that
it seems proper to conclude that there is no sufficient basis for
the call of a convention. 15 The repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment fortifies this view.
Assuming that a proper request for the call has been made
and that Congress is willing to issue the call, a number of
issues would still remain unsettled. When and where could
the convention meet? How would the delegates be elected?
W auld they represent the states or the people as an aggregate?
The debates of the Constitutional Convention throw no light
on these problems. Logically it would seem that Congress
could regulate all these matters. In the first place, Congress
is the general legislative body of the nation. Moreover under
Article Five Congress is vested with three distinct powers:
to propose amendments, to call a convention when requested
by two-thirds of the states, and to designate the mode of ratification (as, e. g., whether by state conventions). 16 The 1939
115
Where a legislature merely petitions Congress to. submit an amendment,
it would seem improper to regard this as an application for a convention. See
Report by New York State Bar Association Committee, 74 CoNG. REc. (1931)
2924 at 2926, and (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 143·
lB "As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to
deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may require; and Article V is no exception to the rule." Dillon v.
Gloss, (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510. It would seem, however, that
Congress could not add additional burdens to the constitutional procedure for
amending the Constitution. See Hamilton v. Secretary of State, (1924) 2'1.7
Mich, 111, 198 N. W. 843.
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate a tendency to give wide powers to Congress. It might reasonably
be argued that under its power to call a convention it has implied authority to fix the time and place of meeting, the number, manner, and date of the election of delegates, and that it
also may determine whether the delegates shall represent
the states or the nation at large. If the precedent of the Constitutional Convention were followed, the call would be addressed to the states, and would leave to them the method of
selecting delegates; and the convention would vote by states.
Perhaps the most important question concerning a convention is as to the extent of its powers. Could it propose a
wholly new constitution? Article Five says that Congress
"shall call a convention for proposing amendments." If this
rule were interpreted literally, it might be argued that the
convention could not propose an entirely new constitution in
the form of a single document superseding the existing Constitution. But there would seem to be no lawful reason why
the convention could not propose what was the equivalent of a
new constitution in the form of separate amendments. 17 The
organization and peculiar mandate from the people of a convention would seem to warrant the belief that it may revise
the Constitution at its discretion. The courts should be slow
to adopt a construction which would permit a new constitution
only by revolution. The precedent of instructions by Congress
as to the scope of its action and the violation thereof by the
Constitutional Convention can, however, scarcely be cited, as
the convention had no legal standing under the Articles of
Confederation. Where the states apply for a convention for
general purposes, it would seem that the convention would be
free to draft a new document. But even though the application
17
Mr. Stone, Representative from Maryland in the First Congress, doubted
that the amending power extended to the making of a new constitution. ANNALS
OF CoNGREss, 1st Cong., 1st sess. (1789) 739; Platz, "Article Five of the
Federal Constitution," ( 19 34) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 17 at 24, 46.
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were for a limited purpose, it would seem that the state legislatures would have no authority to limit an instrumentality
set up under the federal Constitution. 18 In reality, the right of
the legislatures is confined to applying for a convention, and
any statement of purposes in their petitions would be irrelevant as to the scope of powers of the convention. Inasmuch
as Congress issues the call simply on the basis of the application of the state legislatures, there would seem to be no warrant for an attempt by Congress to limit the changes proposed.19 The primary and in fact the sole business of the convention would be to propose changes in the Constitution. In
this sphere the only limitation on it would seem to be Article
Five.
A very serious disturbance might be created if the convention should go beyond its constituent functions and attempt to
legislate. An analysis of the fundamental nature of a con~
vention would seem to exclude such a power. The earliest
view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. 20 The
18
In I903 the California legislature adopted the following resolution: "And
the request of and consent to, the calling and holding of such convention as
hereby made and given, is limited to the consideration and adoption of such
amendments to said Constitution as herein mentioned and no other." Cal. Stat.
(I903) 68J.
19
Wells v. Bain, (I874) 75 Pa. 39; Woods' Appeal, (I874) 75 Pa. 59·
In State ex rel. McCready v. Hunt, (I834) 2 Hill. L. (S.C.) I, it was held
that acts of the convention on subjects not mentioned in the legislative call
were valid only if ratified by the people. The Louisiana cases have taken the
view that the convention is confined to the subjects specified. Huff v. Selber,
(D. C. La. I925) IO F. (2d) 236; State v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
(I9I5) 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742. The 1920 convention was forbidden to alter
the existing provisions as to limits on the indebtedness of the state and its
political subdivisions, the tenure and salary of officers, and the location of the
state capital.
20
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I o),
chap. III. A recent case leaning in that direction is Baker v. Moorhead, (I 9 I 9)
I03 Neb. 8II, I74 N. W. 84o, holding that the general rule that provisions of
a constitution will be construed as mandatory, rather than directory, does not
apply with the same strictness to the provisions for constitutional conventions,
as it applies to other clauses of the constitution, even that providing for amendments, on the ground that the constitution makers of one generation do not intend to prevent later generations from exercising their "sovereign right" to alter
the constitution.
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convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently
cited in decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly
limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it
by the legislative call. 21 A third and intermediate view is that
urged by Dodd-that a convention, though not sovereign, is
a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as
to the extent of its constituent power. 22 This view has become
increasingly prevalent in the state decisions. Accepting this
view, it would seem that no restrictions can be placed on the
scope of its constituent activity, but that its acts beyond this
function would be void. 23 Hence a convention would have no
power to interfere with the President or Congress or the states,
except of course as the provisions of the proposed constitution might do. It probably could not appropriate money except where Congress failed to act. 24 The Constitutional Convention referred the matter of salaries to Congress. After all
it seems that there need be no fear of usurpation by a convention. In the first place, it is limited to the business of altering the Constitution. In the second place, its power in this
respect is further limited, for it may merely propose, not
adopt, changes. In the third place, the convention not only
has no power to adopt, but also has no power to provide for
ratification. The latter power is left to Congress. Under the
proposed Wadsworth-Garrett amendment the convention
would be authorized to refer its proposals to the state legis}AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (I887) §§ 382-389.
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I9IO)
7 3· n-8o; HoAR, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS (I 9 I 7) 9 I.
23
Ex parte Birmingham & Atlantic Ry. Co., (I905) I45 Ala. 5I41 42 So.
II8; Opinion of the Justices, (I889) 76 N.H. 6I2 1 85 A. 78I. The convention may not fix the date when amendments shall go into effect, hut if the legislature authorizes, and the people acquiesce, its action is valid. See Hawkins v.
Filkins, (I866) 24 Ark. 286.
"Platz, "Article Five of the Constitution," (I934) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
I7 at 47·
01
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latures or state conventions, as it chose, in the same manner
that Congress may now act.
What is the precise nature of the control to which a convention would be subject? Clearly it would be bound by the
Constitution, since under our legal system there is no organ of
government not subject to the Constitution. Congress's control would seem to be limited to fixing the date and place
of elections and meeting, and to determining the mode of
representation, whether by states or by the nation. The state
legislatures would have no control over the convention whatever. The convention should not be hindered from selecting
its own officers, fixing its own rules of procedure, passing on
the qualifications and election of its members, and from proposing any alterations it chooses. 25 While in existence it is a
separate arm of the nation, coordinate with Congress in its
sphere. A more doubtful question is whether the courts might
enjoin the convention. As to mere irregular procedure this is
doubtful, particularly since the convention merely proposes
while the states accept or reject; but if the convention went
beyond its constituent functions, and sought to perform executive or legislative acts, perhaps the courts might intervene.
The courts could probably pass on the legality of amendments
proposed by the convention after they had been adopted by
the states. Its proposals would stand on no different footing
than amendments proposed by Congress. A nice problem
might be raised if Congress should issue a call, and an attempt
should be made to enjoin the election of delegates on the
ground that the applications of the state legislatures for the
call were insufficient. The state decisions, however, have held
that the courts will not supervise conventions, nor anticipate
their action when assembled. 26 On the principle that the courts
""Goodrich v. Moore, (1858) z Minn. 49·
Frantz v. Autry, (1907) 18 Okla. 561, 91 P. 193; but see Wells v. Bain,
(1873) 75 Pa. 39, which asserts Jameson's view that a convention is not a
coordinate branch of the government.
20
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will not enjoin the acts of a coordinate branch of the government, the courts would probably refuse to intervene in the
case of a federal convention.
2.

Proposal by Congress

The second method of proposing an amendment is by a
two-thirds vote of each House of Congress. Under the Articles
of Confederation, Congress alone could propose amendments,
but only a majority vote was required. This mode is of particular importance inasmuch as every amendment thus far
adopted, as well as proposed, has been initiated in this manner.
Since all but five amendments proposed by Congress have
been adopted by the states, proposal seems to have been the
most critical step in the amending process. Something like
three thousahd propositions to amend have been offered to
Congress, and only twenty-six have emerged successfully.
A proposition to amend is generally offered in the form of a
joint resolution, though on occasion the form of a bill has been
employed. At this point it may be well to note that when
Congress is engaged in the amending process it is not legislating. It is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
Article Five. This article for the most part controls the process; and other provisions of the Constitution, such as those
relating to the passage of legislation, have but little bearing. 27
As it is couched in general terms as to the mode of proposal, it
appears that considerable discretion is left to Congress. In
practice, after the proposition has been introduced and read
twice, it is referred to a committee, generally the committee
on the judiciary, unless there is a committee on the subject
to which the amendment refers. If the resolution is important
and many favor it, it is referred to a select committee. Most
"'But Professor Rottschaefer states that Congress could prescribe rules for
ratification by state conventions and that in doing so, it would be exercising
power under Article One. RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 387.
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amendments die in committee. Next the amendment may be
reported and discussed but not voted on. If fortunate, it may
be voted on, and either passes or fails. Amendments may be
proposed in Congress at any time and in any number, and
there is no requirement that an amendment deal only with
one subject. In this respect the process is much freer than that
provided in the constitutions of many of the states. Nor is
there any requirement that the amendment be entered on the
journals of each house of Congress, nor passed by more than
one Congress. The state constitutions generally contain a substantial number of regulations on the legislative procedure
of amendment, and a large number of cases arise on such subjects as entry on the legislative journals and publication in
the newspapers of the proposed amendment.
As a result of the broad phrasing of Article Five, there has
been but little litigation concerning the legality of the procedure of Congress in proposing amendments. One question
which has arisen is what is meant by "two-thirds of both
Houses." The question was first raised as to the adoption of
the Twelfth Amendment. It has been contended that it means
two-thirds of the entire membership. Congress in practice
interpreted it to mean two-thirds of a quorum of each house,
and many amendments, including some of the first ten, have
thus been proposed. The Supreme Court upheld this interpretation.28 Article Five also provides that amendments shall be
28

National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U. S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588;
State of Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I 9 I 9) z 57 F. 3 34;
Jebbia v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 343; semble, Missouri
Pacific Ry. Co .. v. Kansas, (I9I9) 248 U.S. 276, 39 S. Ct. 93; Green v. Weller,
(I856) 32 Miss. 650. The two-thirds vote is required only on the final passage
of the resolution; the amendment, while being considered, may be amended
by a majority vote. Apparently the absence of representation in Congress,
through secession or otherwise, is no bar to a proposal, as the Fourteenth
Amendment was submitted by a Congress in which only twenty-five out of
thirty-six states were represented. When the Fifteenth Amendment was pro•
posed it was argued in the Senate that there was no authority to propose as
three states were still excluded from membership. CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong.,
3d sess. ( r 8 6 9) 7 I r. The function of selecting the mode of ratification would
seem to be apart from that of proposing an amendment, and it might be argued
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proposed whenever Congress "shall deem it necessary."
When the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was attacked, its opponents asserted that Congress had not shown
that it deemed it necessary. The Supreme Court pointed out,
however, that there had been no such express declaration in
any previous resolution of amendment. 29 The earliest question to arise was whether the approval of the President was
necessary. The Attorney General, in arguing the case, pointed
out that the amending process was unique in its nature and not
legislative, and also that a two-thirds instead of a majority
vote was required to pass a proposal. The Supreme Court in
a concise opinion thought it obvious that the President's approval was unnecessary. 30
that only a majority vote is required, But Congress has always performed both
functions in a single resolution. Perhaps the call of a convention would require
only a majority vote.
29
National Prohibition Cases, (r92o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588;
Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86.
80
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, (r 798) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 378; see also Hawke
v. Smith, (r92o) 253 U. S. 221 at 229, 40 S. Ct. 495· In spite of the early
decision of the point, there seem to have been some doubts as to the necessity
of the President's approval, JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed.
(r887) ~§ 556-561. In I803 a motion in the Senate to submit the Twelfth
Amendment to the President was defeated. In r 86r the President signed the
Corwin amendment without anyone's protesting. President Lincoln inadvertently signed the Thirteenth Amendment, but immediately notified Congress,
and the Senate adopted a motion that his approval was unnecessary and not
a precedent. In submitting the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, President
Johnson informed Congress that he was acting in a purely ministerial capacity.
The President has signed no subsequent amendments. President John Quincy
Adams was of the view that the President should not even suggest amendments
to Congress. At present resolutions of amendment are printed in the statutes as
signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and attested to by the clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate.
Some state decisions have distinguished between the proposal and the submission of an amendment, and assert that the governor must approve the latter.
Hatch v. Stoneman, (r885) 66 Cal. 632, 6 P. 734· This has not been the practice of Congress, which has always performed both acts in a single resolution.
Jameson is of the view that both the submission of a state amendment and the
call of a state convention are legislative. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (r887) 576. But it seems doubtful that the President's approval would be required if Congress were to call a convention, particularly
as the call arises at the application of the state legislatures. The same reasoning
would seem to apply to an attempted, distinction between the proposal and the
selection of the mode of ratification, whether by legislatures or conventions.
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Several important speculative questions might arise in connection with the powers of Congress. Could Congress propose
an entirely new constitution in the form of an amendment?
Though such action would be extraordinary, there would
seem to be no legal reason why it could not. Article Five contains no limit as to the number and nature and separability of
amendments. It might perhaps be asserted that a general revision is more appropriate by a convention, particularly since
this alternative mode is expressly provided, but this would
seem a question of policy rather than of law, and no limitation should be implied. The Constitution itself makes no distinction between proposals by Congress and by a convention,
since provision is for a "Convention for proposing amendments." Since a convention would probably have full powers
to propose and since Congress probably has the same powers
as a convention, it would seem that Congress could probably
propose a whole new constitution. No one has yet been able to
draw a satisfactory line between amendment and revision,
and it is doubtful that the courts would attempt to do so. An
Indiana case, however, appears to hold that a legislature may
not propose a wholly new constitution. 31
Suppose Congress should attempt to withdraw an amendment after it had been proposed. 32 This question was directly
81
Ellingham v. Dye, (x9rz) 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1. But in that case
the legislature failed to go through the form of legislative proposal under the
amending clause. In Root's brief in the National Prohibition Cases, (x9zo)
Z53 u.s. 350, 40 s. Ct. 486, s88, it is contended that the power of Congress to
propose is not so great as that of a convention. See also Livermore v. Waite,
(1894) xoz Cal. 113, 36 P. 4Z4. In Switzer v. State ex rei. Silvey, (x9zx) 103
Ohio St. 306 at 317, 133 N. E. ssz, the court puts this query: "What would be
said of a proposed amendment to the federal constitution, if bearing the proper
label 'amendment' which this proposal does not do, it suggested merely that it
proposed to abandon the present written constitution and adopt the 'English' or
the 'Chinese Plan' of government, instead of the American 'Federal' plan?
Could it logically be held that such proposal fell within the word 'amendment'
as contemplated in the federal constitution?"
32
}AMESoN, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONs, 4th ed. (x887) 634; BuRDICK,
THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (19zz) § 19. Perhaps it would
be improper for one House of Congress to withdraw its proposal after the other
House had acted, and possibly even before. In Crawford v. Gilchrist, (19rz)
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raised in I 864 when Senator Anthony proposed to repeal the
joint resolution submitting the Corwin amendment. 33 In such
a case the analogy of a state legislature's attempting to withdraw its ratification of an amendment would seem apposite. 34
The practice has been to regard such a withdrawal as ineffectual. The theory apparently is that each affirmative step
in the passage of an amendment is irrevocable. If Congress
had first rejected and then passed the proposition, its action
would be proper, since negative action is viewed as no action
at all. From a strictly logical viewpoint it would seem that
Congress could withdraw an amendment before three-fourths
of the states had ratified. The amendment has no legal effect
until adopted. It is a mere res nullius. Yet on the basis of convenience it may be replied that confusion would be introduced
if Congress were permitted to retract its action. It may also
be argued that when Congress has proposed, its work is done,
since Article Five limits it to proposing, and leaves the matter
of adoption up to the states. Both of these arguments are rather
technical, and possibly on the basis of the I 939 cases the Supreme Court would regard the question as a political one. 35
The questions of the power of Congress to provide that
ratification should be only by legislatures elected subsequently
to the proposal by Congress and its power to regulate the
rules of procedure of the legislatures in ratifying amendments36 are discussed in the section on ratification by state
legislatures.
64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963, one house of the state legislature was allowed to withdraw its consent to a proposed state amendment after the other house had consented. Cockrell, J., dissenting, pointed out that when the Civil War Amendments were ratified, the legislatures were not allowed to withdraw their
ratifications.
33
S. J. R. 25, CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., rst sess. ( r 864) 522.
"'See this chapter, infra, p. 70 et seq.
35
Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433,59 S. Ct. 972; (1940) 24
MINN. L. REv. 393 at 396.
36
See infra, p. 63 et seq.
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Suppose the Congressional procedure of proposing an
amendment was defective in some respect. Would such defect be cured by ratification by the states? One writer asserts
that the Supreme Court would have to find the amendment
invalid. 37 There are some cases involving amendment of state
constitutions which hold that the defect would be cured. 38
C.

1.

RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

Ratification by State Conventions

The second great step in the amending process is ratification by the states. 39 One method of such ratification is by state
conventions. The first amending clause proposed at the Constitutional Convention provided for this mode of ratification
exclusively. The Constitution itself was adopted by such con. ventions. The fact of ratification by such conventions was early
asserted to prove the national, rather than the federal, character of the Constitution. This mode of ratification may therefore be described as the national method, and that by the
state legislatures as the federal. The framers of the Constitution doubtless expected that the method would be used, but
so far every amendment except one has been referred to the
state legislatures. 40 Attempts had sometimes been made to use
the method even before it was used as to the Twenty-First
Amendment. At the time of proposal of the Thirteenth and
"'Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," ( r 9 34) 3 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 17 at 31 •
.. (1922) 35

HARV. L. REV. 593·
The selection of the mode is left up to Congress. As has been pointed out,
the question seems distinct from that of the content of the amendment itself.
Both have always been provided for in the resolution of amendment.
'"Ratification by conventions might become useful if a state should abolish
its legislature and adopt the initiative and referendum for all legislation. See the
suggestion of Parker, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919)
107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920. But the state would lose its vote unless Congress
provided for ratification by conventions. It would seem that Congress could
not provide for ratification in some states by conventions and in others by the
legislatures.
39
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Fifteenth Amendments it was sought to secure such a submission. In connection with the latter amendment it was
argued that gerrymandering prevailed in many of the states
and that Congress could regulate the selection of the convention so that they would truly represent the people. Furthermore it was pointed out that the previous amendments, especially the first twelve, restricted only the national government,
while this amendment curtailed the power of the states.
Therefore the people should have an opportunity to pass
upon it. In reply it was stated that Congress had never used
the method because it was dilatory, expensive, and generally
unw1se.
The claim has been made that the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments should have been ratified by conventions
on the ground that they took away power from the states and
interfered with personalliberty. 41 There is nothing in Article
Five, however, which gives any greater validity to ratification by conventions than by the state legislatures. Certainly
the language of the article makes no distinction, and there
seems no reasonable basis to imply one. The question has been
adjudicated in the recent case of United States v. Sprague/ 2
which went to the Supreme Court. In this case the Eighteenth
Amendment was assailed on the ground that it should have
been ratified by conventions because it conferred "new direct
powers over individuals" and was not simply a change in the
u JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW (1927) 7I; Marbury, "The Nineteenth Amendment and
After," (1920) 7 VA. L. REV. I at s; Root's brief in the National Prohibition
Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. In Ex parte Kerby, (1922)
102 Ore. 612, 205 P. 279, it was held that the power to amend the state
constitution through legislative proposal with a subsequent popular vote was
equally broad as that by the constitutional initiative, including the right to alter
the bill of rights. That the Eighteenth Amendment should have been ratified
by state conventions is the chief contention of Smith, "Is Prohibition Constitu~
tional?" (1929) 4 PLAIN TALK 415.
'"(1931) 282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. zzo, noted (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 72,
(1931) 29 MicH. L. REV. 777, (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REV. 8o7 and Creekmore,
"The Sprague Case," (1931) 3 Miss. L. J. 282.
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machinery of the federal government. It was pointed out that
the Constitution itself, which surrendered up liberties of the
people, was ratified by conventions. Finally it was urged that
the Tenth Amendment re-enforced this view and cured any
doubts. 43 The trial court rejected all these views, yet held the
Eighteenth Amendment unconstitutional on a theory of
"political science" and a "scientific approach to the problem
of government." 44 The United States Supreme Court in upholding the Eighteenth Amendment rejected all these
theories.
Conventions, like legislatures, are mere agents of the
people. Much criticism of the amending process has arisen in
recent years on the ground that the people do not participate.
The difficulties of changing Article Five so as to permit of
such participation seem very great, but it should never be
forgotten that there is always the possibility of ratification by
conventions if Congress so chooses.
Perhaps the nearest approach until the last decade to a possible controversy over the legality of ratification by conventions was in the case of the Corwin amendment. This amendment was submitted by Congress to the state legislatures. An
Illinois convention, which had been convened to change the
state constitution, on its own initiative voted on the amendment and accepted it. As only two other states ratified it, the
effect of its action never got into the courts. But since Congress
is vested with the power to select the mode of ratification, and
had here chosen the other mode, it would seem that the action
of the convention was null and void. 45
"'Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the
Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771.
"United States v. Sprague, (D. C. N.J. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 967 at 982, 984.
Oddly enough, the trial court, though criticising the Supreme Court for its
holding in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486,
588, that the court could pass on the substance of amendments, held that certain
amendments must be ratified by conventions.
411
AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) .286.
Fullerton, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash.
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Another question of great importance is, in case ratification
by conventions is provided for, what body can regulate their
election and procedure? Since Congress is given several
powers under the amending clause, among which is the power
to determine that ratification shall be by conventions, it might
reasonably be argued that it has the power to prescribe the
date and mode of their election. 46 When the Constitution
itself was adopted, the state legislatures appear to have controlled these matters. Congress simply referred the Constitution to the state legislatures with the recommendation that
they pass it on to conventions to be called in each state.
Up to 1933 no amendments had been submitted to conventions. The first twenty amendments had been ratified by
legislatures. When the Twenty-First Amendment was proposed there was considerable discussion as to whether Congress should call the conventions, and as to whether Congress
should lay down the rules for conventions with respect to
qualifications of electors, protection against fraud and irregularities, and election by districts or at large. Mr. James M.
Beck, formerly solicitor general, claimed that Congress had
no power to regulate such conventions in any respect. 47 Former
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer asserted that Congress
had such power and that its power was exclusive. 48 But he
later advised Congress to regulate a few matters and leave
the rest to the states. 49 Senators Hebert and Lewis and RepI67 at I99> I8I P. 920, uses as reductio ad absurdum the conclusion that conventions could ratify, although Congress selected the legislative mode, if the
constitutional methods of ratification were not exclusive .
.. "· . . Congress is plainly given the power to submit such a proposal to
conventions in the several states, and to provide the manner of electing delegates
to, and the calling of, such conventions, all of which could be readily done by
Congress wholly apart from state constitutional and statutory law." Parker,
J., dissenting in State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (I9I9) 107 Wash. I67 at I96,
I8I P. 920. Jameson is of the view that the state legislatures would issue the
calls for conventions. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (I 8 8 7)
6I, I53·
•• 76 CoNG. REc. (I932) I24-I3o.
"'76 CoNG. REc. (I932) 130.
'"NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 2, I933, p. 8, col. I.
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resentative Sumners thought that Congress might regulate,
while Senators Bratton (now United States Circuit Judge)
and Walsh were of the opposite opinion. 50 The writers were
also divided. Howard Lee McBain/ 1 Ralph T. Martig 52 and
Professor Dowling53 thought that Congress could regulate.
Professor Rottschaefer, writing in 1939, has taken the same
view. 54 Former Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby in 1938
likewise expressed that opinion. 55 Historical evidence to show
that Congress may call state conventions is cited in a recent
article by Abraham C. Weinfeld. 56 Other writers have denied
the power, for example, Alexander Lincoln,57 former Attorney
General William D. Mitchell, 58 and Herbert S. Phillips/9
and Federal Judge William Clark. 60 In 1937 Representative
Wadsworth introduced a bill to regulate ratifying conventions in several respects. 61 Election was to be at large, within
five years after proposal, and the time of convention meeting
was fixed.
In favor of Congressional regulation several arguments
may be made. If Congress could not control, ratification by
50
76 CoNG. REC. (1932) 4153, 4152-4153, 4163, 4148-4150; see Weinfeld,
"Power of Congress over State Ratifying Conventions," (1938) 51 HARV. L.
REV. 473 at 474•
51
McBain, "Or by Conventions," NEW YoRK TIMES, Dec. 11, 1932, §IV,
p. I :7•
"""Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MICH. L. REv. 1253 at 12731274, 1284; see also (1934) 2 GEO. WASH L. REV. 216; (1933) 7 ST. JoHN's
L. REV. 375·
53
"A New Experiment in Ratification," (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 383 at 387.
•• CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 392 .
.. HEARINGS ON s. J. RES. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess, (I 9 3 8) 6o.
56
"Power of Congress over State Ratifying Conventions," (1938) 51 HARV.
L. REV. 473 at 476-488.
07
"Ratification by Conventions," (1933) 18 MASS. L. Q. 287.
58
"Methods of Amending the Constitution," (1932) 25 LAWY. & BANKER
265.
50
"Has the Congress Power Under Article V of the Constitution to Call and
Regulate the Holding of Ratifying Conventions Independent of State Legislatures?" (1933) 6 FLA. S. B. A. J. 573·
80
HEARINGS ON S. J. REs. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938) 21-25,
01
H. R. 299, 75th Cong., xst sess. (1937).
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convention would be at the mercy of the state legislatures,
hence this method of ratification would be almost the same
as legislative ratification. Although the Twenty-First Amendment was rapidly ratified, other amendments might be long
delayed if the regulation of conventions was left to the state
legislatures. Ratification by state conventions is a federal
function, as is ratification by state legislatures. 62 Under Article
One, section 4, Congress may regulate the election of United
States Senators and Representatives. Even though reasoning
from the premise that a legislature must be what was a legislature at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, a convention must be what a convention then was, not all conventions were even then called by the states.
When the Twenty-First Amendment was submitted, Congress after considerable debate was silent as to the calling of
conventions. In 1933 forty-three states passed laws providing for the holding of conventions to ratify the Twenty-First
Amendment. 63 The only states not passing statutes were
Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Dakota.
Pursuant to such statutes, conventions were held in 1933 in
thirty-eight states. Thirty-seven conventions ratified, the
only rejection occurring in South Carolina. In North Carolina, the electorate voted for convention delegates, but against
holding a convention. In Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
62
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently advised that a state
constitutional provision as to calling a convention to amend the state constitution did not apply to state conventions to amend the federal Constitution.
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 204 N. C. 8o6, 172 S. E. 474· The United
States Supreme Court has held that state constitutions may not fetter state legislatures in the ratification of federal amendments. Leser v. Garnett, ( 1922) 2 58
U. S. uo, 42 S. Ct. 2 1 7. See also the opinion of Judge Parker, dissenting, in
State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash. 167 at 196, 181 P. 920,
quoted in note 46, supra.
08
BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (I 93 8) 5 I 5 ; see also article by the same
author on the same subject, (1935) 29 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. I005-IOI7. The
state convention records and laws are set out in detail in the volume by Brown,
a book indispensable to the student of ratification of federal amendments by
state conventions.
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South Dakota provision was made for the choice of convention
delegates in the next year, 1934. 64 The number of delegates
varied from 329 in Indiana to 3 in New Mexico. 65 In only
six conventions were there more than a hundred delegates.
The states, in providing for conventions, inferentially
recognized the power of Congress to deal with the subject.
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that when Congress fails
to act, the state legislatures may call conventions. 66 Twentyone state laws provided that if Congress later acted as to the
organization of state conventions, then the state statute was
superseded. Only New Mexico framed a statute denying the
power of Congress to act. 67
The scope of the power of state conventions would seem
to be reasonably clear. They have the exclusive power of the
states to ratify amendments proposed to them by Congress.
They are not at liberty to go outside their constituent functions, however, so as to interfere with the state or national
governments. What was said of the powers of a national convention applies almost completely to state conventions with
the sole exception that the function of the former is to propose and the latter to ratify. In passing on the amendment,
the conventions have the same powers and disabilities as the
state legislatures have. 68 The same time limits and the same
right to reject and later to ratify would seem to govern. 69
While these conventions are state instrumentalities in some
respects, their powers with respect to ratification are derived
from Article Five, so that they may also be looked upon as
federal agencies. Doubtless the states might empower such
81

BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT (1938) 5 ,

.. Ibid. SI6.
00

State ex rei. Donnelly v. Myers, (1933) IZ7 Ohio St. 104, 186 N. E. 918.
Brown, "The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment," (I 935) 29
AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1005 at IOo8-I009,
08
See in general, }AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887)
chap. VI.
69
See infra, p. 70 et seq.
81
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conventions to perform strictly state functions in addition to
their functions of ratification. The Illinois convention which
attempted to ratify the Corwin amendment was sitting as a
state constitutional convention.
The most striking characteristic of the conventions which
ratified the Twenty-First Amendment was their lack of true
deliberation. 70 The question arose whether the state legislatures could so regulate the conventions as to strip them of
their deliberative character, as by providing for a popular
referendum which should be binding on the convention. The
Alabama Supreme Court advised that no deliberation was
necessary and that a popular referendum might be made
binding. 71 The Alabama legislature passed a bill over the governor's veto providing for such referendum. The Maine Supreme Court advised that deliberation was essential. 72
In favor of the view that deliberation is not necessary, it
may be pointed out that Congress has already deliberated,
whereas a convention to amend the state constitution must
take that preliminary step; 73 and that the language of Hawke
v. Smith/ 4 speaking of "deliberative assemblages" was immediately followed by the statement that such bodies "would
voice the will of the people." Moreover, legislative action was
involved there, and legislative action is naturally deliberative,
70

BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT (I938) 5·
In re Opinion of the Justices, (I9J3) 226 Ala. 565, I48 So. Io7, noted
(I933) 47 HARV. L. REV. I3o, (I934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 709, (I933) IS MINN.
L. REV. 70,
72
In re Opinion of the Justices, (I933) I32 Me. 49I, I67 A. I76, noted in
(I934) 2 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 2I6. There are decisions which go even farther
and reject a popular referendum as to a state statute providing machinery for the
selection of members of conventions to ratify a federal amendment and for
conducting such conventions. State ex rei. Donnelly v. Myers, (I933) I27
Ohio St. I04, I86 N. E. 9I8; State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, (I933) 333 Mo. 662,
62 S. W. (2d) 895. That this view is extreme is pointed out by RoTTSCHAEFER,
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw (I939) 39I; (I934) I U. CHI. L. REv. 498; (I934)
34 CoL. L. REv. I68.
78
Dowling, "A New Experiment in Ratification," (I933) I9 A. B. A. J.
383.
•• (I92o) 253 U.S. 22I at 227, 40 S. Ct. 495·
71
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at least to some extent. It may also be pointed out that the
fact that the conventions which ratified the Constitution were
deliberative is not conclusive, since there were no facilities
for taking a popular vote in the early days. 75 The meaning
of "conventions" was vague in the early days. 76 Finally it
may be argued that certification by the state and proclamation by the secretary of state of ratification by three-fourths
of the states bar any attack on the deliberative character of the
conventions. 77 But, prior to the proclamation by the secretary
of state, possibly the proper state officials might be enjoined
from certifying the results of a pledged convention.
2.

Ratification by State Legislatures

As has been indicated, the other method of ratification is
by the state legislatures. This was the method of ratification
used in amending the Articles of Confederation, and gives
peculiar prominence to the states as such. The usual course
of procedure is that after Congress has proposed an amendment,· the secretary of state sends a copy thereof to the governor of each state. The governor of each state in turn submits
it to the legislature. These two steps, it is to be noted, are not
mentioned in the Constitution, but are based simply on statute
or practice. 78 Even though both of them were omitted, it
would therefore seem that the amendment could not be attacked for such omission. The only substantial requirements
demanded by the Constitution are that there be a two-thirds
•• McPherson v. Blacker, (I S92) I46 U.S. I at 36, I 3 S. Ct. 3·
76
(I934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 709·
77
Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258 U.S. I3o, 42 S. Ct. 217.
78
State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F.
334· Some state legislatures attempted to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment upon
telegraphic information without waiting for the official copy. This would seem
to be valid where the legislature acts on the basis of correct information. Thus
Nevada's ratification before an official copy reached the state seems to have been
good. See MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT (I909) 57·
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vote of each house of Congress in its favor and that it be
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures. In this
respect Article Five resembles the chief prerequisites for the
amendment of a state constitution: the vote of the constitutionally designated majority of the legislature and the approval of the constitutional majority of the voters. 79 It would
seem then that a state legislature could proceed at once after
Congress has proposed.
To determine the legality of the acts of the state legislature in ratifying, one must first inquire into the nature of the
function of the legislature in performing the act of ratification. As in the case of Congress, resort must first be had to
Article Five. The entire extent of the power of the legislature
is to be found in that article, and anything in the state constitution to the contrary is void. 80 Thus the legislature may be
placed in the unusual position of having violated its own rules
of procedure and the state constitution, though this is not
theoretically incorrect since the Constitution of the United
States is supreme and the legislature is free to violate the state
constitution whenever it is inconsistent with the federal Constitution. The legislature in ratifying an amendment is not
exercising a legislative function, just as Congress, when it
proposes, is not legislating. 81 The state decisions also hold that
,. See the opinion of Brewer, J., later a member of the federal Supreme Court,
in Prohibitory Amendment Cases, ( 1 8 81) 24 Kan. 700.
80
The present Missouri constitution forbids the legislature's adopting any
amendment to the federal Constitution impairing the right of local selfgovernment. Mo. Const. (1875), art. 2, §3. The West Virginia constitution declares it the duty of the state government to guard the state from federal encroachments upon its "internal government and police." W.Va. Const. (1872),
art. z, §2. A Missouri constitutional convention proposed an amendment to the
state bill of rights forbidding ratification of any amendment affecting "the
individual liberty of the people of the United States."
81
Mr. Justice Day, writing the opinion of the court in Hawke v. Smith,
(1920) 253 U.S. 221 at 229,40 S. Ct. 495, stated: "Ratification by a state of a
constitutional ar;nendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of
the word. It is but the expression of the assent of the State to a proposed
amendment."
The Maine court in Opinion of the Justices, (1919) I18 Me. 544 at 546-

PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING CONSTITUTION

63

when the legislature proposes an amendment to the state
constitution it is not legislating. The provisions of the state
constitution and the rules of the legislature as to the passage of
statutes, bills, and other forms of legislation are not controlling in the adoption of an amendment. The legislature in
ratifying is exercising a ministerial or constituent function;
the ratifying process is equivalent to a roll call of the states.
The courts have asserted that the legislature acts as a federal
agent and exclusively under the federal Constitution. 82
Bearing in mind that Article Five is the source of the state
legislature's authority, one may proceed to inquire what is the
extent of this authority. In the first place, which legislature as
regards time may ratify? Article Five makes no express provision, but it would seem that the legislature existing at the
time of the proposal by Congress or any later legislature
existing during the pendency of the amendment may pass on
it. Congress probably could not forbid such action. 83 Any pro547, I07 A. 673, stated: "Here again, the State Legislature in ratifying the
amendment, as Congress in proposing it, is not, strictly speaking, acting in the
discharge of legislative duties and functions as a law making body, but is acting
in behalf of and as representatives of the people as a ratifying body under the
power expressly conferred upon it by Article V. The people through their
Constitution might have clothed the Senate alone, or the House alone, or the
Governor's Council, or the Governor, with the power of ratification, or might
have reserved that power to themselves to be exercised by popular vote. But
they did not." Contra: ( I9J8) I 8 BasT. U. L. REv. I 69 at I 73·
82
This question is distinguishable from that in Haire v. Rice, ( r 907) zo4
U. S. :t91, Z7 S. Ct. z8I, in which it was held that when Congress designates a
state legislature as an agency for carrying out a federal purpose, the legislature
must act in subordination to the state constitution since that is the source of its
powers. Similarly the state is engaged in ordinary law making when it regulates
the election of Representatives in Congress, hence the governor's veto is effective.
Smiley v. Holm, (1931) z85 U.S. 355, sz S. Ct. 397, noted (193z) I7 CoRN.
L. Q. 466; (I9Jz) z7 ILL. L. REv. 445; (I93z) 30 MICH. L. REV. 969, 1337;
(r9p) 16 MINN. L. REv. 85o. In the amending process, the state legislatures
derive their authority directly from Article Five, which supersedes anything
inconsistent therewith in the state constitutions. This seems to be the answer
to the theory advanced by Brown, "The Sixteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution," (I9:to) 54 AM. L. REV. 843 at 849, that the Sixteenth
Amendment is void because some of the legislatures ratifying had no power to
impose an income tax.
88
In the case of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, efforts were made
to provide that ratification should only be by legislatures elected subsequently to
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vision of the state constitution forbidding the existing legislature from doing so would seem to be unconstitutional. As a
matter of fact, in the case of the Nineteenth Amendment the
existing Tennessee legislature proceeded to ratify although
the state constitution definitely provided that ratification must
be by a subsequently elected legislature. 84 When it is recalled
that every amendment has so far been acted upon by existing
legislatures, there can seem little doubt of the propriety of
this procedure. It would also seem that a special session of the
legislature would have the power to ratify. 85
Another question is whether Congress or the states may
regulate the rules of procedure of the legislatures in ratifying
amendments. The constitutionality of Congressional regulathe proposal by Congress. See chap. VI, p. 1 89, infra. It was argued that
Congress had this power by necessary implication. In reply it was argued that
the Constitution referred to the then existing legislatures and any later legislatures
during the pendency of the amendment. Moreover, all previous amendments
had been ratified by the existing legislatures. The proposed Wadsworth-Garrett
amendment expressly provides for ratification by subsequently elected legislatures only. See chap. VI, p. 189 et seq.
"' The Tennessee Attorney General rendered an opinion that this was valid.
(1920) 24 LAW NOTES Sr. Chapter s6o of the Acts of 1920 of Massachusetts
declares it to be the policy of the state that the legislature should defer its
action on federal amendments until a popular vote has been taken. A commission
appointed by the governor of Virginia under an act of March 25, 1926, to
study revision of the state constitution recommended that it be the policy of the
state that only subsequently elected legislatures act on federal amendments.
Former Governor Alfred Smith of New York in his January 4, 1928, message
urged an amendment to the state constitution "that no future amendments to the
federal Constitution be acted upon by the Legislature before referendum by
State statute to the people." N.Y. LEG. Doc. (1928), No. 3, p. 90.
85

The decision in People ex rel. Attorney General v. Curry, (1900) 130 Cal.
82, 62 P. 516, that a special session of the California legislature could not propose amendments to the state constitution unless the subjects thereof were specified in the proclamation calling the special session, seems erroneous, and was
based on the theory that an amendment is a form of legislation. In Sweeney v.
King, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 92, 137 A. 178, an opposite result was reached and
the California decision was rejected. The child labor amendment was ratified
in Kentucky by the legislature when in special session, although the governor's
original proclamation did not mention the subject of ratification. His amended
proclamation did so mention. The Alabama court advised that the legislature
may not at a special session provide for a convention to pass on an amendment
unless the subject is included in the governor's proclamation. In re Opinions of
the Justices, (1933) zz6 Ala. 168, 146 So. 407.
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tion would seem exceedingly doubtful. The states cannot be
coerced into adopting an amendment. If they choose to remain passive and never so much as discuss the amendment,
there is nothing Congress can do to force them to act. Congress
has done its work when it proposes, and the matter of adoption is for the states. 86 On the other hand, the state legislature
is not bound by its ordinary rules of procedure in the ratification of an amendment. A federal amendment could not be invalidated for a breach of the rules, especially when they were
of such a nature as to impede the adoption of an amendment.
As a minimum power the state could provide for the time and
place of meeting of the legislature, whether it should be bicameral or unicameral, the number and election of its members, its organization and officers. The state could perhaps
even abolish its legislature altogether, at least as far as Article
Five is concerned, although such action might be regarded as
a failure to maintain a republican form of government. Ratification would then have to be by conventions, or the state
would lose its voice in the amending process.
It would seem improper that a mere majority vote of the
legislators taken in an individual poll at a time and place
other than prescribed in the state constitution would be sufficient. On the other hand, there would seem to be some doubt
'"' One of the most detailed plans for regulating the legislatures is that
proposed by Senator Morton as a result of the obstructive tactics in the Indiana
legislature to hinder the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. AMES, THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1909) 291. On the sixth
legislative day of the meeting of any state legislature, each house was to proceed at noon to act upon any amendment proposed; except that the legislature
must not have taken any action on the amendment at any of its previous sessions.
If a majority of the members of each house voted for it, it passed. If no conculsive
action was taken the first day, the houses were to meet at the same hour each
subsequent day until such action had been taken. In case of resignation, withdrawal, or refusal to qualify of a minority of either house, such action would
not affect the passage of the amendment. The governor was to forward
certified copies of the action of each house to the President of the United States.
This bill, like any other proposed regulation of the action of the state legislature, would seem to have no warrant in the terms of Article Five, but, failing
of passage, no issue was raised.
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that the state constitution could prescribe an excessive majority for its adoption. Article Five is silent as to the majority
of votes required in the state legislatures, so that it is not clear
what majority is necessary and whether Congress or the states
could determine what the majority shall be. Perhaps a simple
majority of a quorum of each house is suffi.cient. 87 The two
houses of the legislature will probably each vote separately
on the amendment. A state may permit the vote of the
lieutenant governor to count in favor of ratification when the
senate would otherwise be equally divided. 88 The approval of
the governor appears to be superfluous. In fact, even amendments to the state constitutions have only in exceptional instances required the signature of that official. 89
87
Leser v. Board of Registry, (r92.1) 139 Md. 46, 114 A. 840. When the
Fifteenth Amendment was proposed, the Indiana constitution required a quorum
of two-thirds of the legislature to transact business. The speaker of the House
of Representatives ruled, however; that a majority of the total membership
could act on the amendment. INDIANA HousE JouRNAL (r869) 6o:z.. See
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909) 63. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (192.1) 30
YALE L. J. 32.1 at 344, is of the view that the state may determine the quorum.
88
Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 39o, 71 P. (:z.d) 518; (1938) 18
BosT. U. L. REV. r 69 at I 73· The United States Supreme Court, being equally
divided as to whether or not this was a political question, left the decision of the
lower court undisturbed. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct.
972.·
89
In re Senate File No. 3I, (r889) 2.5 Neb. 864, 4I N. W. 981; State ex rei.
Morris v. Mason, (I89I) 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776; State v. Dahl, (I896) 6
N.D. 8r, 58 N. W. 4I8; Commonwealth ex. rei. Attorney General v. Griest,
(I9oo) 196 Pa. St. 396, 46 A. sos; Warfield v. Vandiver, (I9o8) 101 Md.
78, 6o A. 538; Murphy Chair Co. Attorney General, (1907) 148 Mich. 563,
IIZ N. W. I27; State v. American Sugar Refining Co., (I9I5) 137 La. 407,
68 So. 742; People ex rei. v. Ramer, (I916) 62 Colo. u8, I6o P. 1032;
Mitchell v. Hopper, (I92.2) 153 Ark. 515, 24I S. W. Io; (I931) 45 HARV.
L. REv. 355· Fullerton, J., dissenting in State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (I919)
I 07 Wash. I 67, I 8 I P. 920, asserts that the governor must sign a federal amendment when the constitution provides that legislative measures are subject to the
approval of the governor. In Hatch v. Stoneman, (r88s) 66 Cal. 634, 6 P. 734,
and Clements v. Hall, (I92.I) 2.3 Ariz. :z., :z.oi P. 87, it is asserted that the
governor must approve the submission as distinguished from the proposal. But
in the case of a federal amendment the legislature ratifies and does not submit
an amendment, so that such a distinction, at best a doubtful one, cannot be made.
The governor of New Hampshire vetoed the Twelfth Amendment, but enough
states ratified to make the state's ratification unnecessary. The governor of
Arkansas vetoed the Sixteenth Amendment, yet the act of the state legislature
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Other questions of procedure also arise. Under the rules of
some states, measures passed are open to reconsideration
within a prescribed period. 90 But where a federal amendment
has passed, whether the vote of adoption is irrevocable is
seemingly a "political question." 91 Question may also arise as
to the form of ratification. In most states it has been by joint
resolution, as in the case of its proposal by Congress, but there
seems to be no objection to employing the form of a bill.92
was transmitted to the Secretary of State and Arkansas was counted as a
ratifying state. When the Kentucky legislature rejected the Thirteenth Amendment the state governor refused to sign the resolution, as he regarded his approval as unnecessary. On the other hand, a state may require signature of the
governor to a bill regulating the election of representatives in Congress. Smiley
v. Holm, (I93I) :z.Ss U.S. 355, s:z. S. Ct. 397·
00
At the time the Nineteenth Amendment was submitted, under the rule of
the Tennessee House of Representatives a member voting for a resolution might
change his vote and move to reconsider. This suspends the passage of the measure
for two parliamentary days or until a new vote is taken. A move to reconsider
the Nineteenth Amendment was immediately made in the house after the legislature had accepted it, but the governor had sent in the ratification, although on
reconsideration the house rejected it.
In West Virginia the rules of the senate provided that after a measure is
defeated and a motion to reconsider is lost, it cannot be reconsidered at that
session. Although the senate had first rejected the amendment, it proceeded
to ratify it despite the rule, and the ratification was sent in. But in Leser v.
Board of Registry, (I9:Z.I) I39 Md. 46, II4 A. 84o, the court asserted that
this resolution, although identical in language to the former one, came from
the other house and hence was a different measure. In this case on appeal the
Supreme Court held that the violations of legislative procedure in the two
states were immaterial since two other states had later ratified and that official
notice to the secretary of state, "duly authenticated," from the state legislatures
was conclusive on the secretary of state, and being certified to by his proclamation is conclusive on the courts. Leser v. Garnett, (I9:z.:z.) 2.58 U. S. I3o, 42.
S. Ct. :z. I 7. The meaning of "duly authenticated" is not clear, since in many
states there is no official who has the power to make a certificate of any action
by the legislature which shall be conclusive on the courts. It perhaps means that
the enrolled bill rule is to be applied to the action of the legislatures on
amendments.
01
Coleman v. Miller, (I939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.. The converse
was there involved: Is a vote of rejection irrevocable? See (I939) I3 So. CAL.
L. REV. u:z. at 12.4.
82
There is a dictum in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (I9I9) I07 Wash.
I 67, I 8 I P. 92.0, that the legislature may act by joint resolution, though the
state constitution makes no provision therefor. Parker, J., dissenting on another
point, says, I07 Wash. at I9:z., that the act of ratification would ''be in substance identical in character, whether done by the legislature by a vote upon an
informal motion, by a formal resolution, or by a formal bill as in the enactment
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It would seem improper to attach conditions or reservations
to the ratification. Article Five makes no -provision for them,
so that it appears that the legislature must accept or reject
unconditionally. When the Constitution was ratified, serious
attempts were made to impose conditions, but it was objected
by such leaders as Hamilton and Madison that this would be
equivalent to rejection, and as a result each state accepted the
Constitution with no reservations, the obligation to adopt the
Bill of Rights being wholly moral. 93
The development of the initiative and referendum has resulted in attempts in some of the states to refer federal
amendments to a popular vote. 94 The referendum laws have
generally been couched in broad terms providing for a vote
on all measures approved by the legislature. The Ohio constitution expressly provided for a referendum on federal
amendments, so that the issue was squarely raised. Where
there was merely a general referendum law, the courts sometimes avoided the question by deciding that a federal amendment was not a measure of the kind to be referred. 95 The Ohio
of ordinary state laws." Fullerton, J., in a dissenting opinion, asserts that a
joint resolution is improper, and that an amendment must be passed in the
manner provided for enacting laws under the state constitution.
00
1 HAMILTON,. WoRKs, Lodge ed. (r885) 463, 465; r BuRGEss, PoLITICAL
SCIENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1891) 149; JAMESON,
CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. ( r8 8 7) 629.
•• In a recent case a state court held that a proposed initiative measure for
a popular vote in the state on the question whether its congressmen should be
requested to support an amendment repealing the Eighteenth Amendment was
invalid on the ground that Article Five gives the people no direct voice in the
amending process. Opinion of the Justices, (1928) 262 Mass. 6o3, r6o N. E.
439· There is a dictum in Ex parte Dillon, (1920) 262 F. 563, that Congress
also could not permit a referendum .
.. Whittemore v. Terral, (1919) 140 Ark. 493, 215 S. W. 686; In re Opinion of the Justices, (1919) ll8 Me. 544, 107 A. 673; Herbring v. Brown,
( 1919) 92 Ore. r 76, r 8o P. 328; Prior v. Noland, ( 1920) 68 Colo. 263,
r88 P. 729; Carson v. Sullivan, (r92o) 284 Mo. 353, 223 S. W. 5.71;
State v. Morris, (1920) 79 Okla. 89, 191 P. 364. Contra: State ex rel. Mullen
v. Howell, (r9r9) 107 Wash. 167, r8r P. 920. See also Barlotti v. Lyons,
(1920) 182 Cal. 575, 189 P. 282; Decher v. Vaughan, (r92o) 209 Mich.
565, 177 N. W. 388.
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Supreme Court held that a federal amendment was subject
to referendum, but the matter was finally put at rest on appeal
when the Supreme Court of the United States held the
referendum unconstitutional. 96 When the framers of the
Constitution provided for ratification by the state legislatures,
they meant formal representative bodies who could not delegate these powers. Hence even though a state constitution
gives the people a right to legislate, they are not to be regarded as the legislature for the purpose of ratifying a federal
amendment. 97 Thus it appears definitely settled that the states
have no authority to permit the people to participate directly
in the amending process, but may perhaps call for an advisory
vote before the legislature finally acts. 98 However, the legislature would have power to ratify either before or after such
a vote, and the popular vote would have no binding force. A
Professor Noel T. Dowling believes that in the light of the recent cases
of Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, and Chandler v.
Wise, (I939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992, Congress could provide that all
amendments be submitted to state conventions, the delegates to be elected by
popular vote and to be bound by a popular referendum on the amendment.
Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (I 940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv.
215 at 222.
96

Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495; National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. Other cases taking
the same view are: Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563; Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86, and Barlotti v. Lyons, Decher
v. Vaughan, semble Prior v. Noland (one judge dissenting), Re Opinion of the
Justices, Carson v. Sullivan and State v. Morris, all cited supra, note 95· Contra:
Hawke v. Smith, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400, one judge dissenting; State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, supra, note 95, four judges dissenting.
117
The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Davis v. Hildebrant,
( 191 6) 241 U.S. 565, 36 S. Ct. 7o8, which gave a broader meaning to the word
"legislature" as used in Article I, sec. 4· In that case Congress had itself
recognized the referendum as part of the legislative authority for the purpose
of elections. The latter article allowed the state to legislate within the limitations therein named, but in the ratification of an amendment no legislation is
required, and only an expression of assent is desired.
'"'The legislature may call for an advisory vote before finally acting.
Parker, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) I07 Wash.
167, I 8 I P. 920. But see note 94, supra. A referendum on the subject of repeal
of the Eighteenth Amendment, the vote being advisory, is valid. Spriggs v.
Clark, (1932) 45 Wyo. 63, I4 P. (2d) 667, noted (I933) I8 CoRN. L. Q.
2.78, (I933) I GEO. WASH. L. REV. 27I, (I933) 10 N.Y. u. L. Q. REV. 395·
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ratification by the legislature would be valid despite rejection
by a popular referendum. Ratification by a popular referendum, unaccompanied by legislative ratification, would have
no legal effect.
A problem which has several times come up in practice is
whether a legislature may change its action with respect to
an amendment. One view with respect to ratification by state
legislatures is that the first action by the legislature of a given
state is conclusive and binds future legislatures, even though
the first action was that of rejection. This view, which has received but small support, was taken in Wise v. Chandler 99
by the highest state court of Kentucky. It was argued that a
convention ratifying a federal amendment could not change
its action; hence rejection by a convention would be final;
and that a state legislature had no greater power than a convention. It should be noted that treating both acceptance and
rejection as conclusive is logically consistent and insures protection of minority rights. 100
The Supreme Court of Kansas disagreed with the Kentucky court and held an original vote of rejection not conclusive, though stating an original vote of ratification would
be conclusive. 101 The Kansas view is supported by Congressional practice as to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 102 and by the legal theory that the Constitution creates
"'(I937) 270 Ky. I, Io8 S. W. (2d) I024, noted or discussed (I938) I8
BosT. U. L. REv. I69; (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 12oi; (I937) 26 GEo L. J.
I07 at II8; (I938) 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2I8; (I938) 26 KY. L. J. 364;
(I938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 269; (I938) I7 NEB. L. BuLL. 8I; (I938) II
So. CAL. L. REv. 472; (I937) 24 VA. L. REv. 194; (1937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q.
I 29; (I 9 3 7) 4 7 YALE L. J. I 48; Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (I940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2I5.
The same view was also taken by Cadwalader, "Amendment of the Federal
Constitution," (I926) 6o AM. L. REV. 389 at 393; Grinnell, "A 'Point of
Order' on the Child Control Amendment," (I934) 20 A. B. A. J. 448, reprinted in (I934) I9 MASS. L. Q.No. 5, p. 22.
100
101

(I938) II So. CAL. L. REV. 472.
Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan, 390, 71 P. (2d) 518.

""'(1938) rr So. CAL. L. REv. 472.
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only a power to ratify and not a power to reject. 103 It is also
supported on the ground of public policy in that less delay results and that it is less confusing than counting subsequent
reversals. 104 To allow a rejection to be final is to make the
amending process less deliberate. There might also be some
difficulty as to the meaning of rejection, as for instance, is
rejection by one house of the state legislature a rejection?
However, this difficulty might be readily resolved by adopting the view that only an affirmative vote of rejection by both
houses of the legislature is binding.
In declaring the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress counted two states which had first rejected and then
ratified. The Kentucky court sought to explain this by saying
that the rejections should not count as rejectiqns because they
were by illegal governments. 105 But it by no means follows
that an illegal government may not perform some valid acts,
such as ratification of a federal amendment. 106 The Supreme
Court has stated in a leading case: 107 "acts necessary to peace
and good order among citizens ... which would be valid
if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded
in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though
unlawful government .... "Action on a constitutional amendment may be included within such acts.
A third possible view is that a state should be able to reject, despite prior ratification, before three-fourths of the
103
Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (r9zr) 30 YALE L. J. 3zz;
(1940) z4 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 395-396. In opposition it was argued to the
Kentucky court that Van Devanter, J., had stated in Rhode Island v. Palmer
(National Prohibition Cases), (r9zo) z53 U. S. 350 at 386, 40 S. Ct. 486,
58 8: "The referendum provisions of state constitutions and states cannot be
applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it." See also the view of Senator Garrett
Davis, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., zd sess. (r87o) 1479-148o.
1
"' (r938) rr So. CAL. L. REv. 47z.
"'"This distinction is approved in ( 193 7) z4 VA. L. REV. 194.
100
See (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. rzor at rzo3, note z1; (1938) zz MINN.
L. REV. Z69.
107
Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 733·
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states had ratified. 108 Of course, such subsequent rejection
could not come after three-fourths of the states had ratified.
Under this view, both the Kentucky and the Kansas courts
were in error as to the effect of prior ratification. Ratification
should not be more final than rejection. Ratification by less
than three-fourths of the states is ineffectual. Such is the theoretical approach. But there are even stronger practical arguments. It is more democratic to allow the reversal of prior
action. A truer picture of public opinion at the final date of
ratification is obtained. No great confusion is likely to result
from such a rule. 109 Not to allow reversal of an acceptance
may cause a cautious legislature not to act. 110
It would seem to follow from the recent decision of the
Supreme Court that the fact of rejection by more than onefourth of the states does not bar ultimate ratification of an
amendment if Congress deems the amendment still open for
ratification. The view that rejection by more than a fourth
of the states destroyed an amendment has been taken by the
Kentucky Court. 111 The Kansas Court took the opposite
view. 112 Since rejection by a single state was not conclusive, it
logically followed that rejection by a group of states carried
no greater weight. Thus the fact that twenty-one states had
rejected the child labor amendment and notified the secre108
Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution," (1926) 10 MINN.
L. REV. 185 at 188; (I938) I8 BosT. U. L. REV. I69; (I938) 22 MINN. L.
REV. 269; (I9J8) I7 NEB. L. BuLL. 8I; (I937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. I29;
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, HEARINGS ON S. }. RES. IJ4, 75th Cong., 3d
sess. (1938) 4I-42; RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I939) 395· The
solicitor general in his brief in Coleman v. Miller at p. 26 admitted that ratification should be rescindable.
100
(1938) I8 BosT. U. L. REV. I69.
110
(1938) II So. CAL. L.REv. 472.
111
Wise v. Chandler, (I937) 270 Ky. I, Io8 S. W. (2d) I024. It had
earlier been claimed that rejection by more than one-fourth of the states would
defeat the proposal until it was resubmitted to the states by Congress. Statement
by Special Committee of the American Bar Association, "The Federal Child
Labor Amendment," (I935) 2I A. B. A. J. II at I2; Grinnell, "A 'Point of
Order' on the Child Control Amendment," (I934) 20 A. B. A. J. 448.
112
Coleman v. Miller, (I937) 146 Kan. 490, 71 P. (2d) 518.
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tary of state and four states had rejected without such notice
did not destroy the amendment. That the present Article Five
does not allow rejection by one-fourth of the states plus one
to defeat the amendment permanently was to some extent indicated by the Wadsworth-Garrett Joint Resolution in 1926
proposing an amendment which would expressly permit onefourth of the states plus one to kill the amendment. In the
case of the Fourteenth Amendment ten states out of thirtyseven, or more than one-fourth, had rejected, yet Congress
treated it as ratified. 113 Thus the prevailing view seems to be
that a rejection is not final, 114 but there has as yet been no
test of the finality of a ratification.
The Civil War created some new problems as to the amending process. The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by
Congress at a time when only twenty-five out of thirty-six
states were represented in: that body. Can Congress coerce the
states into ratifying an amendment? The action of Congress
in conditioning the readmission of some of the Southern States
to representation in Congress on the acceptance of the Civil
War Amendments was morally, if not legally, in the nature
of coercion. 115 In normal times of peace such a method of
113

FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (I 908) c. 4·

msee discussion in (I940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 395· Professor Noel
T. Dowling believes that much can be said for making it final. Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (I 940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2 I 5 at 222.
=Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas were required to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment as a condition precedent to readmission .. Mathews says: "Since they
ratified under duress, some question might be raised as to the validity of their
ratifications." MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND }UDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909) 75· See also, VON HOLST, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Mason translation (I887) 3I, note; 2 CURTIS,
CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (I896) I6I; I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed. (I929) 594·
"For some strange reason no one raised the contention that the Fourteenth
Amendment was itself unconstitutional. Legislatures of Southern states under
military government were chosen under regulations not of the state's own
choosing, and their coerced ratification of the Amendment was deemed sufficient, although the states were not sufficiently restored to the Union to have
representation in Congress." Powell, "Changing Constitutional Phases," (I939)
I9 BosT U. L. REv. 509 at 5u.
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amendment would doubtless be discredited. The Supreme
Court has intimated in a dictum that the validity of the Civil
War Amendments is a political question which may not be
inquired into. 116 In case of a rebellion the question may also
arise as to what is meant by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Does it mean simply three-fourths of the loyal states, or
does it mean three-fourths of the whole number? 117 Since the
Supreme Court has held that a state cannot take itself out of
the Union, it would seem to mean three-fourths of the whole
number. 118 This question might also arise when a new state
has been admitted after the date of proposal. Logically it
would seem that three-fourths of the number, including the
new state, would be necessary. In the case of the Eleventh
Amendment Secretary of State Pickering was doubtful, on
account of the admission of Tennessee, whether three-fourths
had ratified, but discovered that the required majority had
done so before Tennessee was admitted.
The most recent of the Supreme Court decisions concern
themselves with the question of the time limits for the ratifica110White v. Hart, (I87I) 13 Wall. (8o U.S.) 646. But in Feigenspan v.
Bodine, (D. C. N. J. I92o) 264 F. I86, it is asserted that the Thirteenth
Amendment was not the "decision of war." In Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258
U. S. IJO, 42 S. Ct. 2I7, it is denied that the Fifteenth Amendment was illegally
adopted.
111
von Holst believes that "it must be recognized as an anomaly that sta;es
which were actually at the time neither full members of the Union, nor entitled to equal rights under it, voted upon an amendment to the constitution."
VON HoLsT, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Mason translation ( I8 8 7) 3 I, note. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by six de facto
legislatures. Seward in his first proclamation of ratification, July 20, I868,
referred to these legislatures as "newly constituted and newly established bodies
avowing themselves to be and acting as the legislatures, respectively" of the
states. I5 Stat. L. 706 at 707; I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed.
( I929) 594·
118
This is the view in Calhoun v. Calhoun, (I87o) z S.C. 283. The view
of Burgess that the three-fourths majority should have been computed on the
basis of the loyal states, and the Southern states then readmitted as "states"
under the Constitution with the Fourteenth Amendment already a part of it,
seems out of harmony with the theory of the Supreme Court. BuRGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, I866-I876 ( I902) 202-206.
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tion of amendments. Five amendments proposed by Congress
never have been ratified by the states. Article Five makes no
provision as to time. In 1789 with the first ten amendments,
today known as the Bill of Rights, there was submitted one
dealing with the compensation of members of Congress. In
I 8 73 after Congress had passed the "salary grab act," the
Ohio Senate passed a resolution purporting to ratify this
amendment. 119 But as no other states ratified, the validity of
this belated attempt was not litigated. The question was first
litigated as to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.
In Dillon v. Gloss 120 the court held that Congress could prescribe a reasonable period and that a seven-year maximum
period was not unreasonable. The argument of the court was
that proposal and ratification are steps in a single process;
that since amendments may be proposed only when deemed
necessary, they must be presently disposed of; and that since
ratification is but the expression of the people's assent, it must
be sufficiently contemporaneous in all states to reflect the will
of the people in. all sections at relatively the same time. The
limited character of the holding should be noted. There were
four very old unratified amendments. The court did not assume to define a reasonable period. It held that Congress
could fix a definite period for ratification under its power to
designate the mode of ratification; but it could fix only a
reasonable period. Seven years was a reasonable period. The
court did not say that a period somewhat longer than seven
years fixed by Congress would be unreasonable; nor did it
lay down ~ny rule as to the situation where Congress had fixed
no period. Thus even though the child labor amendment
remained unratified after fifteen years it was not clear before
the recent decisions whether too long a period had expired.
119

Ohio Laws ( 1 8 73) 409.

,.. (t9ZI) zs6

u.s.

368, 41

s. Ct. 510.
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The dictum in Dillon v. Gloss that the states should ratify
during an interval when sentiment for the amendment really
existed was not conclusive, since on one side there was the
recent revival of interest while on the other side there was no
interest during the years from 1927 to 1933. 121
The child labor amendment was thought by the Kentucky Court, 122 and by a number of commentators,123 to have
been extinct because of the long period of failure to ratify by
three-fourths of the states. The Supreme Court concluded,
however, that a political question was involved, hence the
matter was left in the hands of Congress. 124 Under the earlier
rule Congress could prescribe a reasonable period when the
amendment was proposed. Under the new rule Congress
could prescribe such period at any later time.
Finally it remains to be inquired what it is that marks the
conclusive adoption of an amendment. The secretary of state
by statute is required to issue a proclamation of the ratification.125 It might therefore be supposed that it is his act that
completes the adoption. It has been held, however, that his
action is unnecessary in this respect, and that it is the approval
121
(193 7) 47 YALE L. J. 148. ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939)
393, note 17, puts this question: "Quere as to the effect upon this issue of the
fact that there was an intervening period during which the proposal had no
relation to the then prevailing sentiments and felt needs, where the total period
between the submission and purported ratification would be unreasonably
long by any ordinary standard?"
=wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. x, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024. Contra:
Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518.
123
Mitchell, "Methods of Amending the Constitution," (1932) 25 LAWY.
& BANKER 265 at 267; (1938) 18 BosT. U. L. REv. 169 at 185.
1

"'Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; (1940) 13
So. CAL. L. REv. 12.2 at 124; (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393·
""Rev. Stat.§ 205; 8 U.S. C (1934) § x6o: "Amendments to Constitution.
Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the
States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become
valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United
States."
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by the last state to make up the three-fourths majority that
makes the amendment law. 126 Article Five makes no mention
of the secretary of state, and his proclamation is based purely
on an act of Congress. When the state legislatures have completed their ratification, a certificate thereof is transmitted
to the secretary of state. Suppose it be alleged that a state
legislature has not actually ratified. Could the courts go back
of the certificate of ratification and inquire into the legislative
proceedings? Or would they be bound by the certificate? It
appears that the certificate would be regarded as conclusive.127
The same question might arise as to whether Congress had in
fact proposed an amendment. The Supreme Court has held
on at least two occasions that it will accept the enrolled bill as
128
Fairchild v. Hughes, (r9:u) 258 U.S. 126, 42 S. Ct. 274; Dillon v.
Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368,41 S. Ct. 510, aff'g Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal.
I 920) 262 F. 563; United States ex rel. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C.
1920) 265 F. 998, aff'd (1921) 257 U.S. 619, 42 S. Ct. 169. In Ex parte
Dillon the court said (p. 565): "Congress might perhaps provide that the
Department of State should ascertain and determine the fact of ratification,
and that an amendment should not take effect until due promulgation of that
determination by proclamation or otherwise; but Congress has not so provided."
The constitutional rule laid down in the amendment may become operative at
a later date specified in the amendment. This was the case as to the Eighteenth
Amendment.
The dictum in Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433 at 451, 454,456,
59 S. Ct. 972, that Congress can implement its decision on political phases of
the amending power through its control of the action of the Secretary of State
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths of the states, the
time arrives for promulgation of the adoption of an amendment, appear inconsistent with the earlier view that the date of consummation rather than of
promulgation is determinative. (1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 401. Professor Noel T. Dowling also suggests that the earlier cases have been overruled.
Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (1940) I WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2I5 at 220.
127
Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217; Chandler v.
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992. In Dillon v. Gloss, (I92I) 256
U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, the court took judicial notice of the fact of ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures. For a good discussion of judicial
notice with reference to amendments, see Gottstein v. Lister, ( r 9 I 5) 8 8 Wash.
462, I53 P. 595· RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 399, states:
"It should be noted that the conclusive effect of the official notice to, and the
certification thereof by, the Secretary is based on certain assumptions. How
far a court would reach its own independent conclusions on the matters thus
assumed cannot be definitely stated." See also Quarles, "Amendments to the
Federal Constitution," (I940) 26 A. B. A. J. 6I7 at 6I8,
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final as to the passage of a statute, and will not examine the
legislative j ournals. 128 The state courts are divided, but the
recent tendency has been to adopt the enrolled bill rule. 120
D.

VALIDATION OF AMENDMENTS THROUGH
ACQUIESCENCE

The discussion up to this point has described the procedural
requirements for the validity of an amendment. Suppose,
however, that a federal amendment has been proclaimed as a
part of the Constitution after the apparent ratification by
three-fourths of the states and that it has been long regarded
as a part of the Constitution. Would it later be open to attack
on the ground that there had been some defect in the procedure, or that the amendment was void in substance? Concretely, would the first fifteen amendments, which date back
a half a century and more, be subject to being declared null
and void by the courts?
In considering the application of the doctrine of acquiescence, it is well to bear in mind that the validity of the original
Constitution itself cannot be assailed. This is a political question, so that perhaps the doctrine of acquiescence may be regarded as unnecessary, or as only an added proof of its validity. The validity of an amendment, however is only in
part a political question, so that the applicability of the doctrine of acquiescence is likely to be asserted by those who
would oppose any attack on amendments long regarded as a
part of the Constitution. 130 It should be noted, however, that
128

Field v. Clark, (1891) 143 U.S. 649,12 S. Ct. 495; Harwood v. Wentworth, (1896) 162 U.S. 547, 16 S. Ct. 890. Both are cited as controlling in
Leser v. Garnett, supra, note 127.
"'"Boyd v. Olcott, (1921) 102 Ore. 327, 202 P. 431. The Montana court
took the peculiar view that while< an enrolled statute was conclusive, the legislative journals would be resorted to in the case of an amendment. Tax Commission Case, (1923) 68 Mont. 450, 219 P. 817.
""'Curtis is of the view that although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted through compulsion, they have become valid partly through
acquiescence. 2 CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ( 1896) 161; see Marbury,
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whether the doctrine of the political question or that of acqui. escence be applied, the result arrived at amounts to much the
same thing.
Several factors lead to the conclusion that amendments
may not become valid through acquiescence. In the first place,
of the first seventeen amendments only the validity of the
Eleventh has been adjudicated in the courts. It may be alleged that such want of adjudication is an argument to the
effect that any test of their legality is now impossible. In reply
it should be pointed out that the courts have simply assumed
their validity, since the parties have failed to raise the issue.
The Supreme Court has several times stated that it decides
only the points before it. 131 The fact, therefore, that it had
held laws passed under various amendments valid would not
preclude it from inquiring into their validity when the issue
is squarely raised. If, then, some party should expressly argue
that an amendment, either old or recent, is invalid, the courts
would in all probability pass on the matter. 132 The federal
Supreme Court and other courts passing on the validity of
federal amendments have given but little comfort to the
protagonists of the doctrine. 133 However, the doctrine of the
"The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 223
at 232. See also Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," ( 1934) 3
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 17 at 31; (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 1201; Yawitz, "The
Legal Effect under American Decisions of an Alleged Irregularity in the
Adoption of a Constitution or Constitutional Amendment," (1925) 10 ST.
Louis L. REV. 279 at 283; Dodd, "Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of
Constitutions," (1931) SoU. PA. L. REv. 54 at 73; Willis, "The Doctrine of
the Amendability of the United States Constitution, (1932) 7 IND. L. J. 457
at 468; (1929) 23 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 920.
=Boyd v. Alabama, (1877) 94 U. S. 645 at 648.
182
Knight v. Shelton, (C. C. Ark. 1905) 134 F. 423 at 433-437; Machen,
"Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 169 at 187190; Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution," ( 1909)
189 No. AM. REv. 82. But in Leser v. Board of Registry, (1921) 139 Md. 46,
114 A. 84o, it is asserted that it cannot be assumed that the courts, in passing on
cases arising under amendments, decided on the basis of amendments adopted
in violation of the Constitution.
,.. "The suggestion that the Fifteenth [Amendment] was incorporated in
the Constitution, not in accordance with law, but practically as a war measure,
which has been validated by acquiescence, cannot be entertained." Brandeis, J .,
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1939 cases as to political questions might ultimately be applied as to acquiescence.
The strongest support for the doctrine of acquiescence
comes from the decisions of the state courts concerning the
validity of amendments to the state constitutions. Most of the
decisions on the precise point appear to favor the doctrine. 134
The whole number of decisions is so small, however, that their
weight may be doubted. Moreover, mere unqualified acquiescence is not sufficient. Two or three limitations seem to have
been laid down. The acquiescence must have been for a considerable period. All the branches of the government and the
people must have acquiesced in the legality of the amendment. Probably the acquiescence of the people would be implied where the government has acquiesced, and perhaps by
the government is meant the legislative and executive, and
in Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. qo, 42 S. Ct. 217. See also State of Ohio
ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334; United States
ex. rei. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C. 1920) 265 F. 998; Leser v. Board
of Registry, (1921) 139 Md. 46, 114 A. 84o. Contra: Smith v. Good, (C. C.
R.I. 1888) 34 F. 204; Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, (1920)
253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
On the other hand, Professor Thomas Reed Powell, "Changing Constitutional Phases," (1939) 19 BosT. U. L. REv. 509 at 512, states: "There must
be a doctrine of prescription for the acquisition of impeccable constitutionality
as there is for the acquisition of title to land."
,.... Niblack, J., dissenting on another point, State v. Swift, ( 18 So) 69 Ind.
512; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, (x881) 24 Kan. 7oo; Secombe v. Kittelson, (1882) 29 Minn. 555, 12 N. W. 519, Mitchell, J., rendering the opinion; State ex rei. Torreyson v. Grey, (1893) 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190; Nesbit v.
People, (1894) 19 Colo. 411,36 P. 221; Weston V; Ryan, (1903) 70 Neb. 2II,
97 N. W. 347, but, semble, that could attack if not ratified by the constitutional majority of the popular vote; McCulloch, J., dissenting in Rice v. Palmer,
(1906) 78 Ark. 432,96 S. W. 396; State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, (1907)
78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113; Jones v. McClaughry, (1915) 169 Iowa 281,
151 N. W. 210; O'Neill, J., dissenting in State v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
(1915) 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742; Armstrong v. King, (1924) 281 Pa. St. 207,
126 A. 263, when the popular vote has been taken, but could attack for insufficient popular vote. Semble, State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, (1914) 49 Mont.
387, 142 P. 210; Marshall, J., in State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, (1915) 160
Wis. 354 at 376-379, 407; State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, (1918) 44 N.D.
459, 171 N. W. 213. Contra: semble, People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, (1903)
31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, one judge dissenting; McBee v. Brady, (1909) 15
Idaho, 761, 100 P. 97, disaffirming Holmberg v. Jones, (1910) 7 Idaho 752,
6s P. s63.
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not necessarily the judiciary. In the third place, the amendment must be fundamental in character, and affect the framework of the government.
E.

DESUETUDE OF AMENDMENTS

A final question which suggests itself is whether the Constitution may be indirectly altered through the desuetude of
an amendment. It may perhaps be accurately stated that the
Fifteenth Amendment has never been enforced according to
its true spirit. 135 The status of the Eighteenth Amendment
has been asserted to be comparable to it. If an amendment remains a dead letter on the books over a long period of years,
may it be contended that it is no longer a part of the Constitution? The idea of enforcement seems to be an essential ingredient in the conception of law. In Rome before the Imperial Era, in Germany, Scotland, and South Africa custom
may abrogate statute. In France, Spain, and Italy a contrary
view prevails. 136 Similarly under the Anglo-American common law a statute remains in force until it is repealed. 137 The
135
"It [the Fifteenth Amendment] has been despised, flouted, nullified,
evaded. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States, the lawful guardian
of the Constitution, has in no single instance held any state or federal statute or
the act of any state or federal officer to be in conflict with the Amendment: and
no case in that court can be found in which [it] would have decided differently
if the Amendment had never existed. • . •
"Confronted by these remarkable circumstances, the student of constitutional
law not unnaturally asks himself: 'Can it be that an enactment which has thus
borne the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune for nearly forty years and
yet during that time has never affected the result in a single case in the court
of the last resort-can it be that such an enactment is indeed part of the fundamental law of the United States?'" This question was raised by Machen, "Is
the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REV. 169. Since this
article the Supreme Court in two cases has held state legislation void as contrary
to the amendment. Guinn v. UnitedStates, (1915) 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct.
926; Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932·
""PoUND, READINGS IN RoMAN LAW, 2d ed. (1915), Part I,§ 2, "Forms,"
pp. 5-14.

""GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 419 and Appendixes VII and IX.
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Constitution of the United States is of course superior to the
common law and to statutes. Since statutes do not lose their
validity through nonenforcement, it would seem a fortiori
that an amendment of the Constitution would not. When an
amendment has once become a part of the Constitution, it remains a part until repealed by a later amendment.

CHAPTER

IV

The Scope of the Federal Amending Power
NE of the most recent problems which has arisen
with respect to the process of amending the federal
Constitution and, next to justiciability, the most important, is the scope of the power to amend. 1 The early case
of Hollingsworth v. Virginia 2 simply went to the question
of procedure. The Supreme Court never considered the matter
in its opinions until the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was assailed, among other grounds, for defects in substance. 3 The briefs in the cases on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments contained extensive discussions on the
subject, and the court rendered decisions disposing of the
question. The contention of the opponents of the amendments
was that there are certain implied limitations on the power
to amend. Before analysis of this contention, it seems proper
first to deal with the express limitations, if any, on the power.

0

A.

EXPRESS LIMITATIONS

Article Five contains three express restrictions, two of which
have now expired by their own terms. One states "that no
Amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the
first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article."
The former clause provides: "The Migration or Importation
of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
1

In I 899 George T. Curtis wrote: "One of the most important subjects that
can engage the attention of the statesmen and people of this country is the
extent and scope of the power to amend the Constitution of the United States." z
CuRTis, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I 896) I sz.
• (I798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378.
8

National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
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proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax
or Duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding
ten dollars for each Person." The latter provides: "No Capitation, or other direct Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion
to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken." After I 8o8 these clauses of course became obsolete
as limitations on the power to amend. 4 During the two decades
they were in force, however, it seems that there was no constitutional authority reposed in any body whatsoever to change
the Constitution contrary to the purport of the clauses, since
they are stated as unconditional prohibitions. Even though
not only three-fourths of the states, but every one of them,
and even though Congress and the then people unanimously
desired such changes, it would seem that under the authority
and control asserted by the judiciary today over the entire
amending process, such changes could have been brought
about only by revolution. However, if these limitations had
been permanent, perhaps they might have been ignored as
making the Constitution unworkable. 5
At present there is only one express limitation, "that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." This restriction, it is to be noted, is not
absolute, however, inasmuch as if a state consents it may 'lose
its equal suffrage. Thus, this clause is a restriction on the
method rather than the scope of amendment. The clause itself
• The Supreme Court seems to have slipped into error in a dictum in Dodge
v. Woolsey, (1855) 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 348, when it refers to the slave
trade exception as a "temporary disability to amend, and the other two permanent and unalterable exceptions to the power of amendment." The explanation of this ambiguity seems to be that the slave trade clause in the first clause
of section 9 of Article I in itself limits its operation to the year 18o8, while
the direct tax clause does not. Otherwise the Sixteenth Amendment would be
open to attack as void. Strictly speaking, the court is not correct in calling
even the equality of the Senate clause unalterable inasmuch as all the states
might repeal it. See infra, pp. 84 et seq.; 96 et seq.
• RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 9-1o.
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could be repealed by an amendment ratified by all the states.
Or if every state ratified the amendment, any given state or
any number of states could be deprived of their equality. The
same result would be reached if the state or states whose representation was reduced, together with enough others to make
the necessary three-fourths, adopted such an amendment.
On the other hand, if one or more states had their representation increased, all the others would have to consent since they
no longer had equ~l suffrage. If the states were divided into
three groups, the first of which got an increase of two senators,
the second of one senator, and the third no increase at all, the
second and third groups would have to consent to the increase
of the first group. Consent by a state to one reduction in equality would not be consent to a still further reduction. Theoretically, states which got greater representation would not have
to consent. It has been suggested that even this express limitation might be disregarded directly, or if not directly, indirectly by first repealing the clause and then depriving a state
of its equal representation. 6 Professor Rottschaefer states:
"There has been found no case in which the power to amend
has been employed to directly or indirectly modify a constitutional provision expressly excepted from that power. The
issues that such an attempt would raise could not be settled by
any reasoning derived by logical processes from prevailing
conceptions of sovereignty, and those based on considerations
of convenience and expediency point to the solution that such
attempts to limit the power of amendment should be held
6
Burgess says that "in dealing with the great questions of public law, we
must not, as Mirabeau finely expressed it, lose the grande morale, in the petite
morale." 1 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1891) 154; VON HoLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1887) 52, note. See also the suggestion of DODD, THE REVISION AND
AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) 236; Sandelius, "National
Sovereignty versus the Rule of Law," (1931) 25 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1 at 4·
See contra: Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," (1934) 3 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 17 at 26, 40; STIMSON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1908) 357; WOODBURN, AMERICAN
POLITICS: THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1903) 209.
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futile. The necessities of orderly government do not require
that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter
all future generations." 7
The 1939 decisions of the Supreme Court may ultimately
have serious effects on the application of the equality of suffrage in the Senate proviso. The Supreme Court may conclude that this is the type of procedural problem which should
be treated as a political question. Or it may decide that this is
an issue of substance and a fortiori involves a political question. In either event the proviso would not effectually limit
the scope of the federal amending power.
Although there is thus at present only one explicit limitation, attempts have been made at various times to add other
express limitations. Comprehensive limitations were proposed
at the Constitutional Convention itself, but failed of adoption. 8 Gerry moved to reconsider a proposed draft permitting
Congress to call a convention to amend the Constitution on
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states.
The effect of this provision, he asserted, would make the
Constitution paramount to the state constitutions, since a majority of the convention could "bind the Union to innovations
that may subvert the state constitutions altogether." 9 Hamilton thought that the latter result was entirely proper. Sherman
moved that Congress should be authorized to propose amendments to the states, but that the proposed amendment should
not be valid until consented to by all the states. Mr. Wilson
favored Sherman's proposal, except that he would allow ratification by two-thirds of the states to be sufficient.· On' the last
day that Article Five was discussed by the convention, Sherman reiterated Gerry's view as to the dangers of an unrestricted power to amend. He favored restricting amending
power so "that no state should be affected in its internal police,
(1939) 9-1o.
See 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
TION, (1937 reprint of 1836 zd ed.) 530-53z, ssr-ssz.
0
Ibid. 531.
'CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw
8

CoNSTITU-
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or deprived of its equality in the Senate.'no Thus a clear and
comprehensive limitation would have been placed on the
amending process as relating to interference of any kind with
the powers of the states. He again moved to amend Article
Five so as to require ratification by all the states. Gerry proposed to limit ratification to the legislature only. Sherman
put his proposed limitation in the form of a motion, but Madison objected that if such special provisos were appended every
state would demand them for their boundaries, exports, and
other matters. After this motion failed, Sherman moved to
strike out Article Five altogether. On the motion of Gouverneur Morris the "equal suffrage of the Senate" clause was
adopted at the urging of the smaller states. It is significant
that the restriction against affecting a state in its internal police
proposed together with it by Sherman was not adopted. During the time just preceding the Civil War the Corwin amendment forbidding any amendment abolishing slavery was proposed by Congress, but failed of ratification. 11 While there
has since that time been an increasing number of proposals
to change the amending process, these have related to the procedure rather than to the nature and substance of amendments.
B. ALLEGED IMPLIED LIMITATIONS

The major controversy as to the scope of the amending
power has not been concerned with the meaning of the express
limitations, but as to the existence and nature of so-called
implied limitations on the power to amend. All sorts of surmises have been offered as to specific things which may not be
done. 12 Many of the discussions in legal periodicals have
lJ)

11

Ibid.

ssr.

AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) z86.
Dissolving the federal Union, abolishing the state governments, or lodging all power in Congress, so that it would resemble the British ParliamentMachen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) z3 HARV. L. REV. 169
at 171; repealing the Bill of Rights--JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS
12
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taken the view that there are certain implied limitations,
though there has been considerable disagreement as to their
underlying bases. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the rationale of these views and a
statement and exposition of the arguments in favor of the
contrary view that there are no such restrictions whatever on
the amending power.
Is there an implied guarantee of continued existence of the
states? Perhaps the basic argument advanced in favor of imDEsTRucTroN BY ALLEGED DuE PRocEss OF LAW (I 9 z 7) ; repealing the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments-z CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I 8g6)
I 6o; destroying alleged inalienable rights of personal liberty, or nationalizing women-Abbott, "Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment,"
(Igzo) zo CoL. L. REV. I83 at I86; departing from the scheme and purpose
of the original Constitution-Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of
Constitutional Amendment," (I9I9) I8 MICH. L. REV. ZIJ at zz3; abolition
of republican form of government, office of President, the Supreme Court, prohibition of intoxicating liquors, forming several new states within· other states,
or uniting two existing states, changing Article Five so as to allow ratification
by a majority of the state legislatures, or a minority, or none at all-Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, (Igzo) Z53 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486,
588; abolition of the Senate or House of Representatives, setting up a hereditary
monarchy, abolition of slavery-Representative Pendleton of Ohio, CoNG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist sess., pp. zg9z-z993; negro suffrage in the states,
allowing the Northern states to determine the question of suffrage and not
allowing the Southern states to do so-Senator Dixon of Connecticut, CONG.
GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess., p. 707; woman suffrage in the statesAppellant's Brief in Leser v. Garnett, (Igzz) Z58 u.s. IJO, 4Z s. Ct. ZI7;
national income tax-Brown, "The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution," (Igzo) 54 AM. L. REv. 843; deprivation of the power of the
states to tax-Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (I 9 I 9)
33 HARV. L. REv. ZZ3 at zz6; election of President and the Supreme Court
by the people, reenactment· of laws by Congress after Supreme Court decision
holding them void-Child, "Revolutionary Amendments to the Constitution,"
(I9z6) IO CoNST. REV. z7 at 34; national referendum on acts of Congress or
on treaties, destruction of Senate's equal legislative power, transfer from the
Senate to the House of the power to confirm appointments, make treaties, and
try impeachments-Brown, "The Perpetual Covenant in the Constitution,"
(I9Z4) ZI9 No. AM. REV. 30 at 33; encroachment on states' police power,
prescribing what people wear, eat, or drink-Holding, "Perils to be Apprehended from Amending the Constitution," (I9z3) 57 AM. L. REv. 481 at
48 6; the Twelfth Amendment-Senator Tracy of Connecticut, ANNALS OF
CoNGREss, 8th Cong., Ist sess. (I8o3) 163; hereditary monarch, Radin"The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 5I4 at sz5. For a rather
full list, see Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of
the Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771.

SCOPE OF FEDERAL AMENDING POWER

89

plied limitations is the contention that the Constitution guarantees the existence of the states, or, stated less emphatically,
that under its aegis the states can not be destroyed, or even deprived of important powers. 13 The inherent sovereignty of
the states has been asserted with varying stress ever since the
Constitution was adopted. It was the essential doctrine of the
Secessionists. 14 Even today it survives in a much mutilated
form in the views of those who assert "states' rights." The
Civil War seems to have settled by force of arms that secession
is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court from earliest times
has repeatedly said that the people of the United States are
sovereign and that they adopted the Constitution. However
much historical strength the view of state sovereignty may
have had, the court decisions seem to have been in the opposite
direction. It is true that the Court has spoken of an "indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." 15 But
18
Marbury's Brief in Myers v. Anderson, (I9I5) 238 U. S. 368, 35 S.
Ct. 9 32 ; Brief of Elihu Root, Amicus Curiae, p. 53 :ff., N ationa! Prohibition
Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Appellant's Brief in Leser v.
Garnett, (I922) 258 U.S. I3o, 42 S. Ct. 2I7; Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations
on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," (I92o) I8 MICH. L. REv. 2I3 at
220; Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (I9i9) 33
HARV. L. REv. 223 at 225; White, "Is there an Eighteenth Amendment?"
(I92o) 5 CoRN. L. Q. II3 at II4. The objection was raised in the Senate and
in several of the state legislatures when the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed. CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess., p. 988 (Hendricks), 995 (Davis),
I639 · (Buckalew), Appendix 15I (Doolittle), I58-I65 (Saulsbury);
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (I909) 57-75.
"" • • • if it [an amendment] come fairly within the scope of the
amending power, the State is bound to acquiesce, by the solemn obligation which
it contracted, in ratifying the constitution. But if it transcends the limits of the
amending power,-be inconsistent with the character of the constitution, and
the ends for which it was established,-or with the nature of the system,.....:.
the result is different. In such case, the State is not bound to acquiesce. It may
choose whether it will, or whether it will not secede from the Union." Calhoun,
"A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," WoRKS,
Cralle ed. (I 854) 3oo. Hayne seems to have taken the same view. 9 DANE, A
GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (I829), Appendix I7. See also the arguments in State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (I834)
2 Hill L. (S. C.) I. But see I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed.
(I929) 6oo.
10
Texas v. White, (I868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 725; Lane County v.
Oregon, (I868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 7I.
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by this would seem to be meant that such destruction may
not be brought about by the simple statutory action of either
government, for the court did not mention the amending
process.
It may be conceded that perhaps the most fundamental
parts of the Constitution are those dividing the powers of
sovereignty between the states and the nation. It is undoubtedly true that a substantial redistribution of powers is the
most significant change which could be made in our constitutional organization. The Preamble speaks of the Constitution
as being ordained and established, among other reasons, "in
order to form a more perfect Union." Yet it is remarkable
that there is no exception set out in Article Five against
amendments which would abolish or greatly diminish the
powers of the states. The sole exception is "that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate." This clause merely preserves equality of the
states in the Senate, and not the existence of the states themselves. If the preservation of the states were so tremendous
a desideratum, it would seem from a logical, if not historical,
point of view, that a proviso would have been inserted expressly guaranteeing their continued existence. As a matter
of fact, an exception intended effectually to preserve the existence of the states was offered and rejected at the Constitutional Convention. Sherman proposed that "no state shall
without its consent, be affected in its internal police." This
does not say in so many words that the states may not be
abolished, but since the existence of a state is virtually identical with the existence of its police power, the effect was to preserve the states. In fact, Mr. Sherman in making his proposal
expressed his fear "that three-fourths of the States might be
brought to do things fatal to particular states, as abolishing
them altogether. . . ." 16 Since the amending power is placed
18
5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION
(1937 reprint of 1836 zd ed.) 551. See also supra, p. 4 et seq.
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in the hands of three-fourths of the states and since they can
bind the other one-fourth, it is difficult to see why, if they
so choose, they cannot abolish a single state, or a minority of.
states, or the entire number of states. 17
To assert that the amending power extends to the destruction of the states is scarcely necessary, however, to meet the
arguments generally set forth in favor of implied limitations.
Few serious persons propose to abolish the states at present,
and there is no popular sentiment desiring such a change.
The question is thus largely academic. The proponents of limitations have been prone to assert that every amendment which
diminishes the power of the state constitutes an annihilation
of the states. In the case of the Nineteenth Amendment, it
was argued, for instance, that allowing women to vote in state
elections so completely changed the composition of the state
as virtually to result in the abolition of the old states and the
setting up of new ones. The same criticism has been made of
the Fifteenth Amendment. The courts have held, however,
that a mere change in the composition of the electorate of the
state is not a destruction of the state. 18 A state is not composed
'simply of the existing electorate, but of the people, territory,
and government. 19 A real destruction of a state would seem
to consist in abolishing its constitution and the branches of its
17

"There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United
States. By their authority, the state constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had the
power to change or abolish the state constitutions, or to make them yield to
the general government, and to treaties made by their authority." Ware v.
Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 198 at 236.
"The people of all the States, or the constitutional majorities can transfer
power from one or more states to the General Government, even against the
consent of a constitutional minority-as where a state opposes, or even six
states oppose eighteen states, and constitutional majorities in Congress, and
states can, on the sth Article, transfer power from the one or six states to
the Union, or take back power." 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix n-zz.
18
"States, like individuals, retain their identity, though changed to some
extent in their constituent elements." Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (74
U. S.) 700 at 728-729. See also Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U. S. qo, 42
S. Ct. 217.
'"Texas v. White, (x868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 721.
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government, seriously altering its boundaries, or adding it
to another state. Not until these facts existed could the court
properly be said to be in position to pass on the question
whether a state may be destroyed by constitutional amendment.
The view that the states may be destroyed is not a mere
corollary of the proposition that the nation is sovereign and
indestructible. It would seem that the same three-fourths of
the states which could destroy the states could also dissolve
the Union. 20 Should the time ever come when the existence
of a united nation was thought undesirable, there seems to
be no legal objection to the states proceeding by amendment
to destroy the nation. It has sometimes been claimed that a
nation may not destroy itself. Yet such things have occurred
too often in the past to support such a belief. In contemplation of law almost anything is possible. Confederations and
federations have existed in the past, and have dissolved.
That they could not do so legally would seem to involve an
unworkable conception of the law. It is submitted that if an
amendment were adopted providing for the annexation of
the United States to Great Britain or some other country,
such amendment would be constitutional, though the effect
""Attorney General Lee said in his argument in Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
(1798) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 378 at 38o: "The people limit and restrain the
power of the legislature, acting under a delegated authority; but they impose
no restraint on themselves. They could have said, by an amendment to the
Constitution, that no judicial authority should be exercised, in any case, under
the United States; and if they had said so, could a court be held, or a judge
proceed on any judicial business, past or future, from the moment of adopting
the amendment? On general grounds, then, it was in the power of the people,
to annihilate the whole, and the question is, whether they have annihilated a
part of the judicial authority of the United States?"
"The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the
creature of their will, and lives only by their will." Marshall, C. J., in Cohens
v. Virginia, (18:u) 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 389.
"He [Senator Rowan in Foote's Debates] says the States have power of
right, that is constitutional power, to control and limit the General Government, in all its branches, by amending the Federal Constitution, as provided for
in the sth Article in it. To this I entirely assent." 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix 16.
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of the amendment would mean the destruction of our national
existence. 21 Thus it seems that the amending power is no more
favorable to the continued existence of the nation than it is to
that of the states. 22 But perhaps the best answer to those who
fear the destruction of the states is the fact that the whole
power of ratification is left to the states as such. The whole
power vested in Congress is to propose, and if the states are to
be destroyed, it will be because they acting as states desire
their own destruction. It would seem that they may be trusted
to perpetuate their own existence.
Is there an implied guarantee of police power of the states?
One of the most frequently voiced arguments for implied
limitations is the view that the police power and the rights
of local self government of the states may not be impaired. 23
This contention may be disposed of at the outset by the reply
that since the states themselves may be destroyed, it logically
follows that their police power may be taken from them.
Moreover, since the Constitution itself was a scheme to shift
21
Bliss attacks the view that sovereignty may not be ceded, pointing out
that it contradicts the facts of history,-the fact that states have voluntarily
united with, have become merged or subordinate to other states. BLiss, OF
SOVEREIGNTY (I88s) IIO,
22
"The Federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designated for
different purposes." Madison, in THE FEDERALIST, No. 46.
Article Five "equally enables the general and the state governments to
originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience
on the one side, or the other." Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43·
""Root's Brief, p. 53 ff., in National Prohibition Cases, (I920) 253 U.S.
35 o, 40 S. Ct. 486, S88; STEVENSON, STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PRoHIBITION (I927) 79-96; Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of
Constitutional Amendment," (I 920) I 8 MICH. L. REV. 2 I 3 at 220. It is
sometimes broadly asserted that only the states have police power and that
such power is unlimited. But the federal government itself exercises a considerable degree of it indirectly through the taxing, commerce, and postal powers.
A list of such powers is set out in Shawnee Milling Company v. Temple, (C.
C. Iowa, I9Io) I79 F. 5I7 at 524. Even apart from amendments to that end,
the police power of the states is limited by the Constitution itself in the view
of Holmes, J ., in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (I 9 I o) 2 I 9 U. S. I 04, 3 I S.
Ct. I 86.
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some of the powers formerly held by the states to the federal
government, there seems no convincing reason why subsequent transfers of power may not occur. 24 An express proviso
safeguarding the police power of the states was rejected by
the Constitutional Convention. 25 The equal suffrage in the
Senate proviso indicated that the framers of the Constitution
contemplated other deprivations of states' powers as valid.
The police power when broadly defined means all the powers
of the state. 26 To say that this power may not be infringed
is thus equivalent to asserting that no change affecting the
powers of a state may be made by amendment. Such a view
would confine amendments to changes in the federal government, changes moreover which would take away powers from
that government. This is true because all powers not prohibited to the states are reserved to the states and to the people. Hence all powers conferred on the federal government
are conferred at the expense of the states, except in the case
of those reserved to the people, whose consent is implicit in
the amending process.
The critics of the Eighteenth Amendment asserted, rightly
it appears, that it impaired the police power of the states.
From this they concluded that it was invalid. They pointed
24

"The extent of the encroachment upon the police powers of the states is
a political matter, to be determined by the people. That the exercise of the
amending power granted by article V may encroach upon some of the state
rights is true; but that is inevitable, and was necessarily contemplated when
the power to amend was granted." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920)
2.64 F. 186 at 192..
"Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds, or three
fourths of the state legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points
which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We
may safely rely on the disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers against
the encroachments of the national authority." Hamilton, in THE FEDERALIST,
No. 85.
""Supra, p. 4 et seq. That such provision was thought unnecessary, just as was
the Bill of Rights, see Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth
Article of the Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771 at 773·
""In Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 192.0) 2.64 F. 186 at 191, the court
concedes that "the police power in a very large sense is the state itself."
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out that the previous amendments had not encroached on
the police power, or if reminded of the Civil War Amendments, asserted either that they do not affect the police power
or that the question of their validity is a political question
on the ground that they were adopted as war measures. The
first ten amendments, it is true, are limitations on the powers
of the federal government only. 27 The Eleventh Amendment
protects the states from suit by individuals in the federal
courts. The Twelfth Amendment merely changed the mode
of electing the President and Vice-President of the United
States. Thus until 1865, when the Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified, no amendment had been adopted interfering
with the powers of the states. This is perhaps the explanation
of the belief that the states' police power was exempt from
constitutional diminution. The three Civil War Amendments, however, clearly infringed upon the powers of the
states. 28 Slavery had formerly been a purely domestic institution which only the state itself could regulate. The effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to bring into the federal
courts a tremendous number of cases arising out of the due
process clause, and to vest the Supreme Court with a wide
27

But it is a significant fact, noted in the early case of Jackson ex dem.
Wood v. Wood, (1824) 2 Cow. (N.Y.) 819 at 82o, that the House of Representatives at the first session of Congress adopted an amendment providing
"that no state should infringe the right of trial by jury, in criminal cases, nor
the right of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press." Cf. ANNALS
OF CoNG., 1st Cong. 1st sess. (1789) 435·
28
In a dissenting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall.
(83 U. S.) 125, Swayne, ]., said: "These [reconstruction] amendments are a
new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of
the country. They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect
those bodies. They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven."
In referring to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Strong,]., said in Ex
parte Virginia, (188o) 100 U.S. 339 at 345, that "They were intended to be,
what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements
of the powers of Congress." The Fifteenth Amendment was held to be such a
limitation in Guinn v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926.
See also the Solicitor General's argument in the National Prohibition Cases,
(1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; United States v. Sprague, (1931)
282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. uo.
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supervisory power over state legislation. The Fifteenth
Amendment forbade the states to deny the right to vote on
account of race or color. Inasmuch as the power to determine
their electorate is fundamental, this clearly was a limitation
on the states. Since these amendments have never been held
invalid, it would seem to follow that the Eighteenth Amendment is valid though the states' police power is impaired. The
briefs against the Eighteenth Amendment fully set out the
argument as to police power, and the Supreme Court, nevertheless, held it valid. 29 In view of the nature of the Civil War
Amendments, and of the holding of the Supreme Court as to
the Eighteenth Amendment, it would seem conclusive that
the amending power may alter the police power of the states
at will. A final query for the proponents of implied limitation is: if the powers of the nation may be limited as they were
by the earlier amendments, why cannot the powers of the
states be similarly cut down? Unless the powers of both
may be altered, the utility of the amending process is greatly
weakened.
Does the proviso for equality of suffrage in the Senate
imply other restrictions? Resort is sometimes had to the clause
guaranteeing equality of suffrage in the Senate as an express
limitation, or as a basis for deducing implied limitations. 30 The
true character of the clause as simply a limitation on the procedure of amendment has already been pointed out. 31 This
.. Natiooal Prohibition Cases, (192o) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
Machen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv.
169 at 172-176, contends that the Senate cannot be abolished, or made an
advisory body; nor may the states be abolished, nor altered in their composition
as by adding negroes to the electorate, or by changing their boundaries. He also
asserts that by "state" is meant the people of the state, not the physical territory
thereof. See also Appellant's Brief in Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 1301
42 S. Ct. 217; Appellant's Brief in Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S.
368, 35 S. Ct. 932; Marbury, "The Limitations Upon the Amending Power,"
(1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 223 at 228; White, "Is There an Eighteenth Amendmerttl" (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 113 at II6.
11
See supra, p. 84 et seq.
80
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clause provides simply for the equal representation of each
state in the Senate. It should be limited to its proper scope.
It says nothing about the continued existence of the state
itself, nor of the freedom of the state from a whole or partial
loss of its powers through amendment. That it was not intended to cover more than the single matter of equality in
the Senate is evident from the history of its adoption by the
Constitutional Convention. Sherman there expressed his fear
that the amending power might do two things: destroy the
states and deprive them of their equality in the Senate. He
therefore moved the adoption of a proviso that no state
without its consent should "be affected in its internal police,
or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." 32 Thus the
first part of the proviso would protect the existence of the
states, and the latter their equality in the Senate. His motion
failed, but immediately thereafter Gouverneur Morris' proposal of the present equality clause was adopted. It would
therefore seem reasonable that historically at least the clause
is confined to protecting the equality of the states in the Senate.33
Historical considerations aside, it seems that a logical
analysis of the words of the clause leads to a similar result. 34
The clause purports to deal with the equal suffrage of a state.
It makes no provision for the perpetual existence of the states,
or of the police power of the states, or of the Senate. Seemingly all three of these could be abolished. Theoretically,
32

Supra, pp. 4 et seq.; 86 et seq.
"'"The exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was
probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the
legislature; and was probably insisted upon by the states particular! y attached
to that equality." Madison, in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43· Iredell, however,
asserts that it was adopted "in order that no consolidation should take place."
4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1937 reprint of 1836 2d ed.) 177 •
.. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," ( 1921) 30 YALE L. J. 321
at 330.
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even though the states or the Senate or both were abolished,
a state would not be deprived of its equality as to suffrage in
the Senate. If all the states were abolished, the relation of
equality would be undisturbed, although the states themselves no longer existed. If simply a part of the states were
abolished, it would scarcely be appropriate to speak of them
as losing their equality in the Senate for they would lose their
very existence. The possibility of equality of a state would
seem to flow from the existence of the state, and not the existence of the state from the characteristic of equality in the
Senate. In other words, the existence of the state seems to be
the primary matter, and equality only a secondary possibility.
Similarly, if the Senate were abolished, the equality of
suffrage would not be disturbed, as each state would have no
senators at all. 35 If the next step were to abolish the states
themselves, it would seem absurd that reliance could be placed
on the equality clause to prevent their abolition. Inasmuch
as the equality clause had lost any subject-matter on which
to operate with respect to its chief purpose, namely, the preservation of equality in the Senate, it would appear far-fetched
to maintain that it continued to operate in such a way as to
preserve the states themselves.
The chief objection to a broad interpretation of the clause
is that so much is made to hinge on so little. Not only are the
states to continue to be equally represented in the Senate,
but they themselves are to continue in perpetuity, and, on
the same logic, the Senate is also to go on forever. It seems
only reasonable that had the framers intended to guarantee
the existence of the states and to impose similar implied limitations deduced from the clause, they would not have left
such weighty matters to implication. The conclusion seems
inevitable that the implied limits deduced from the equality
15

364.

Lee, "Abolishing the Senate by Amendment," (1930) 16 VA. L.

REV.
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clause are hung on too small a peg. The stretching of this
seemingly innocent and insignificant exception offends the
intuitive sense of the limits of legal casuistry.

Do the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
limit other amendments? To the layman, the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment may be thought so fundamental in their nature as to be limitations on the amending
power. 36 But however significant they may be, they were not
parts of the original Constitution. They may be repealed just
as any other amendment and are no more sacred from a legal
standpoint than any other part of the Constitution. As one
authority has said:
"Even these constitutional limitations, however, do not deny
the group's right to revise the scale of values handed down
to it from the past; they merely restrict the legal methods
of their revision. The argument sometimes advanced that
there are implied limits on the power to amend the federal
Constitution is clearly untenable. There is, perhaps, no politically organized society whose legal system does not assume a
right of such revision vested in some one or more of its organs.
The only method which it would be at all logical for the law
to deny is that by revolution." 37
It is sometimes argued that the Bill of Rights was in reality
a part of the original Constitution and was intended to constitute a limitation on Article Five. 38 But the states adopted
the Constitution unconditionally, and the obligation to incorporate the Bill of Rights was entirely moral, not legal.
Even if it had been a part of the original Constituti'on, it
would not necessarily limit the amending power. It contains
86
}ESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW (1927).
""Rottschaefer, "Legal Theory and the Practice of Law," (1926) 10 MINN.
L. REv. 382 at 393·
38
Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 213 at 22.1; JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1927).
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no express, nor even any reasonably implied, reference to
Article Five. No other clauses of the original Constitution
have ever been construed to limit the power. In the state decisions no attempts have been made to construe a state bill
of rights as a limit on the state's power to amend its constitution, except in a single Arkansas case, and this case simply
holds that the legislature, which was vested with the amending power, could not so amend. 39 In dictum it declared that
the people in Convention might do so. An Oregon decision
expressly held that the bill of rights might be altered. 40 In a
recent decision of a federal circuit court it was argued that the
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was to require the submission of all future amendments to the people, but the court
rejected the contention. 41
Does the Tenth Amendment limit other amendments?
In the opinion of many, 42 a conclusive argument in favor of implied limitations is the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not
30
Eason v. State, ( I85 I) II Ark. 48I, overruling State v. Cox, ( I848) 8
Ark. 436, which had held the bill of rights subject to the ordinary amending
process. The case is explicable by the peculiar wording of the Arkansas Constitution and the nature of the amending process.
"'Ex parte Kerby, (I92.2.) I03 Ore. 612., zos P. 2.79. See also Woods' Appeal, ( I8 74) 75 Pa. 59> holding that a constitutional convention could propose a constitution repealing the state bill of rights. Jameson sees no reason
"why, in the absence of constitutional restriction, the legislature should not be
at liberty to propose amendments to either part of the Constitution, the frame
of government, or the Bill of Rights." JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (I887) 580.
"'Peter Hand Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, I92.4) 2. F. (zd) 449·
In Root's argument in the National Prohibition Cases, (I92.o) 2.53 U.S. 350, 40
S. Ct. 486, 588, it is suggested that the due process clause is unalterable.
'"z CURTIS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I896) I 54, I6o-I6z; STEVENSON,
STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PROHIBITION (I92.7) 37-57; Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," (I9I9) I8
MICH. L. REV. 2.I3 at 2.I9; Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases,
(I92.o) 253 U.S. 350,40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment
Affected the Fifth Article of the Constitution," (I930) I6 VA. L. REV. 77I.
Contra: Taft, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution," ( I930) I6 VA. L. REV.
647. Governor Haight of California recommended rejection of the Fifteenth
Amendment, asserting that "It was clearly understood that a 'reserved power'
was one withdrawn and excluded entirely from the operation of any and every
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
First of all, it should be noted that the provision is not a
part of the original Constitution. It is one out of several
amendments and is itself subject to repeal. It is not a part of
Article Five and makes no reference to that article. It did
not reserve the amending power; it reserved only the nondelegated powers, whereas the amending power had been
previously delegated. 43 The first ten amendments have invariably been interpreted as limitations on the federal government. The federal government is to be distinguished from
the amending body, which is made up not only of Congress
but of the state legislatures or state conventions. The distincclause of the Federal Constitution, including the clause in reference to amendments." CALIFORNIA SENATE JoURNAL, 1869-70, p. 144 at 149, cited in
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909) 73· But see Feller, "The Tenth Amendment Retires," (1941)
27 A. B. A. J. 223.
"'The Tenth Amendment "disclosed the widespread fear that the National
Government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to
exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determination the
framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification in the
organic act, and that if in the future further powers seemed necessary they
should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending
that act." Brewer, J., in Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U.S. 46 at 90, 27
S. Ct. 655.
"Reserved powers are so called because they have never been surrendered.
When the requisite number of states concur, the people surrender to the United
States additional power." State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C.
Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334 at 342.
"The tenth article of amendment, if not merely declaratory of what was
necessarily implied in the Constitution as originally adopted, established that
the undelegated powers were reserved to the several states or to the people.
However, this residuum was not a fixed quantity, but would change, becoming
less or greater, as an amendment increased or diminished the powers of the
United States government." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F.
186 at 192.
"It is evident that among the rights which are neither given to the federal
government nor reserved to the separate states is the weightiest of all, yes, the
one which embraces all the others, i. e., the right to change the Constitution
and to partition power in whatever way is desired, between the federal government and the states." VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Masoned., (1887) 51.
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tion is fundamental. The federal government is limited,
while the amending body, which is the highest agent of the
people and exercises sovereignty/4 is unlimited/5 except by
the equality in the Senate clause. If the Tenth Amendment
were to be construed as affecting the amending body, it would
be a limitation on the states, which perform the most important part of the amending process, namely, ratification.
A very practical argument against construing the amendment as a limitation on the amending body is the fact that
such a construction would operate to nullify the grant of the
amending capacity or to seriously impair its usefulness. No
change could be made in the national government except such
as left it with its previous powers, or with less powers than it
had before. That is, no new powers could ever be conferred
on the national government, since any such powers would
have to come from the residuum reserved to the states. New
powers could be conferred on the states alone, and no powers
could be taken from them. In view of the apparently natural
growth of the activities of the national government not only
in recent years but from the very beginning, a serious crisis
might be developed if no new powers could be given it. The
fact that since the Civil War the amendments have limited
the states and given new powers to the national government
clearly indicates the trend of the growth of the living Constitution. Even if the Tenth Amendment were interpreted
as an "invisible radiation" limiting the amending power, it
should be noted that the powers not delegated or prohibited
by the Constitution are reserved to the states, "or to the peo" See infra, chap. VI.
'" "A fundamental error running through all these provoking essays is the
confounding of government with sovereignty, a failure to distinguish between
a political society or state and the active agencies or governmental organs which
that society creates and endows with power." McGovney, "Is the Eighteenth
Amendment Void Because of its Contents?" (1920) 20 CoL. L. REV. 499 at
soo.
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pie." By the people is meant the people of the United States. 46
Since the people when acting in their highest capacity do so
through the amending process, it would seem that their agent,
the amending body, can redistribute the powers of the states
and the nation at will.
Is there a restriction that an amendment may not be legislative in character? The amending process is not the regular
legislative process of the federal government. Ordinarily it is
the business of Congress to legislate for the nation, and of the
state legislatures for the respective states. The Constitution
confers all legislative powers on Congress. From this it has
sometimes been deduced that an amendment may not be legislative in character. 47 In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one
of policy, not of law. 48 It would indeed be peculiar if the
"'"The preamble of the Constitution declares who framed it, 'We the people
of the United States,' not the people of one State, but the people of all the
States; and Article X reserves to the people of all the States the powers not
delegated to the United States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the
States not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, and all powers of a national
character which are not delegated to the National Government by the Constitution are reserved to the people of the United States." Brewer, J., in Kansas v.
Colorado, ( 1907) 206 U. S. 46 at 90, 2 7 S. Ct. 6 55.
von Holst says that if the phrase were intended to mean the people of the
individual states the word "thereof" would have to be added. VON HoLsT,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Masoned. (1887) 51,
note; see also }AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 87,
note I. Contra: CoOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
3d ed., (1898) 29; and 2 CuRTIS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1896) 16o,
note. The latter two say the phrase means the people of the individual states.
"State ex rei. Halliburton v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 689;
Root's Brief, p. 3 ff., in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350,
40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power,"
(1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 223 at 230; Holding, "Perils to be Apprehended
from Amending the Constitution," (1923) 57 AM. L. REV. 481 at 488; State
ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920.
48
As between the three departments of government "the power to legislate
is exclusive in the Congress; but there is no warrant here for the assumption
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authority which can delegate to Congress the authority to
legislate, could not itself legislate. The framers of the Constitution seem to have contemplated amendments of a legislative nature when they wrote in the twenty-year limitations
as to the slave trade and the imposition of direct taxes without
apportionment. It may be impolitic to write clauses which are
legislative in their nature into the Constitution, but the legality of so doing apparently is not open to question. The wisdom
of the Fifteenth and the Eighteenth Amendments may well
be open to serious criticism, but their legality seems unassailable.
Moreover, if the Eighteenth Amendment be invalid as being legislative in nature, it would seem that a number of
earlier amendments must fall on the same ground. The Thirteenth Amendment legislated slavery out of existence, the
Fourteenth Amendment legislated on several subjects, such
as citizenship, the exclusion of rebels from office, and the repudiation of debts of rebelling states. Yet it has not been seriously pretended that these amendments are void because of
their legislative content.
A practical argument against differentiating between legislative and non-legislative amendments is the fact that there
is no satisfactory and clean-cut distinction between the two.
Until the Supreme Court had put the stamp of approval. on
each proposed ~mendment, there would be no way of ascertaining its legislative character. Power of a despotic nature
would be vested in the Supreme Court, and the court might
that, as between Congress and the people, in whom the ultimate right of sovereignty resides, only Congress could legislate.
"The limitations upon the people's power to change their Constitution are
no more than they have chosen to make them. In so far as article I of the Constitution is concerned, there is no limitation upon the sovereign right of the people
to legislate a rule, act, or principle into their organic law." Feigenspan v.
Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 191. See also Appellant's Brief in
State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 4o8, 130 S. W. 689. But
see JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNvENTIONs, 4th ed. (1887) 429.
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be drawn into partisan controversy. It may perhaps be alleged
that by a true amendment is meant a change in the structure
of the government, or a change of extraordinary importance
in the life of the nation. Perhaps the former test would not
be impossible of application. Under it the first twelve amendments, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth, which permits Congress
to impose taxes on incomes without apportionment, the Seventeenth, providing for the popular election of Senators, and the
Nineteenth, providing for woman suffrage, would all be valid.
But the Thirteenth, parts of the Fourteenth, and Eighteenth Amendments would all be invalid. Moreover, the difficulties of applying this test are greater than at first appears.
Almost every change in the structure of government involves
some redistribution of power and is partially legislative in
nature. On the other hand, almost every change of a legislative character directly or indirectly involves a change in the
structure of the government.
The difficulties of the second test are even more manifest.
When the inertia of the amending process has been overcome, it is scarcely possible to say that the proposed amendment is not of constituent importance. 49 When the Prohibition
Amendment was adopted, despite some contrary beliefs,
there seems to have been a tremendous public sentiment which
had long favored it. The same may be said of the Civil War
Amendments. In the United States, where the dogma of
popular sovereignty is so firmly rooted, there would seem
to be no valid legal objection to the people's writing their
convictions into the Constitution on any subject they choose
49
"There being no express inhibition in the Constitution of the United States
against ordaining a final permanent law, what authority is there for implying
one? ••. I fail to perceive anything in any part of the organic law that would
justify a judicial interpretation forbidding the people to do so when they are
convinced that on a given subject the time has come to prevent perennial changes
in respect thereto." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F.
186 at 193.
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in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. Many of
the state constitutions are a standing witness of this fact, and
the decisions seem to uphold amendments of every nature.
Is there a restriction that an amendment must be germane?
It has sometimes been suggested that an amendment must be
germane. 50 That is, a proposed amendment must relate immediately to some specific clause in the Constitution, or must
be in harmony with the "spirit" of the Constitution. Article
Five gives no hint of such a limitation. The first twelve
amendments and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth doubtless
meet the test. But the Civil War Amendments and the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are not necessarily germane as respects any previous articles in the Constitution. As
long as they are permitted to remain on the books it seems that
little attention can be paid to any such objection.
But assuming for the sake of argument that germaneness
is a test of validity, it is difficult to see what would not be germane to the Constitution. The Constitution assumes to deal
with all political power whatsoever, giving specific powers to
the federal government, providing for changes by an amending power, and reserving all other power to the states or to the
people. The general spirit and purpose of the Constitution,
whatever they may be, cannot be isolated with scientific accuracy. Perhaps the best statement of the purpose, though
having no legal force, is that to be found in the Preamble:

"We the People of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
""Root's Brief in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40
S. Ct. 486, 588; Campbell, C. J., dissenting in People ex rel. Elder v. Sours,
(1903) 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167; speech of Uriah Tracy in the Senate on the
Twelfth Amendment, ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, 8th Cong., xst sess. (1803) 163;
Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution," (1909) 189
No. AM. REV. 82; Emery, "The 18th Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States," (April, 1920) 13 ME. L. REv. 121 at 122.
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Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America."
The statement of purposes is thus very broad. Among them
is the promotion of the general welfare. If an amendment is
conducive to the general welfare, it is then germane. 51 It
would seem that a court could not set up its own notion of
what the general welfare was, and would have to assume that
what Congress and three-fourths of the states have approved
promotes the general welfare whether or not in reality it actually does. With such a broad test it would seem that no
amendment can be annulled for not being germane. 52 That
its makers entertained broad views of the purposes of the Constitution there can seem little doubt. 53 Realizing the imperfections of their work, it is not reasonable to surmise that they
intended that future generations should not make such alterations as they thought best. Today, at a time when absolutes
are discredited, it must not be too readily assumed that there
are fundamental purposes in the Constitution which shackle
the amending power and which take precedence over the general welfare and needs of the people of today and of the future.
111

State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334·
"When the people place limitations upon their power to modify the Constitution, these limitations cannot be extended by what others may think or believe to be a purpose. Purpose or no purpose, the way to amend is pointed out;
that way must be followed, and, when followed is sufficient. Whatever may be
the result, or however confusing or perplexing, or even useless may be the
consequences, the Constitution becomes the will of the people when it is adopted
by their vote in the method provided." Crane, J., concurring in Browne v. City
of New York, (1925) 241 N.Y. 96 at u6, 149 N. E. 211, See also, Miller,
"Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More Difficult?"
(1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 185 at 199.
03
" . • • the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people,
is the supreme object to be pursued . • • no form of government whatever has
any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were
the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would
be, Reject the plan. Were the union itself inconsistent with the public happiness,
it would be, Abolish the union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the
state cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter." Madison, in THE
FEDERALIST, No. 45·
50
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Is there a restriction that an amendment cannot add but
only alter? An argument very much like the foregoing
is that an amendment may alter, but may not add. This contention is largely a quibble on the definition of the word
"amendment." It is asserted that' by amending the Constitution is meant the changing of something that is already in
the Constitution, and not the addition of something new and
unrelated. Cases prescribing the very limited meaning of
amendment in the law of pleading are cited as authoritative. 54
It would seem improper, however, to accept such a definition,
as amendments to constitutions have always been construed
more liberally and on altogether different principles from
those applied to amendments of pleadings. A mere glance at
the Civil War and the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, as well as at many amendments made to state constitutions, is enough to show that by an amendment is meant an
addition as well as an alteration. 55 The United States Senate
.. For example, Machen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (I9Io) 23
HARV. L. REV. I 69 at I 70, note, cites the following cases holding that an
amendment to a pleading cannot substitute a new case: Shields v. Barrow,
(I854) I7 How. (58 U.S.) I30 at I44; Goodyear v. Bourn, (D. C. N.Y.
I855) 3 Blatchf. 266, F. Cas. No. 556I; Givens v. Wheeler, (I882) 6 Colo.
I49· He also cites 2 MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d ed. (I 886)
§ I096, which merely states that a reserved power to amend a charter of incorporation does not extend to the substitution of a new charter. In Livermore
v. Waite, (I894) I02 Cal. II3, 36 P. 424, the court says that an amendment
must not fundamentally alter the Constitution, and must improve, or better
carry out its purpose. See also Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution," (I909) I89 No. AM. REV. 82; Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
·
55
McKenna, ]., dissenting on other issues in the National Prohibition Cases,
supra, 253 U.S. at 40I, states that the references in Article Five and in Article
Six, sec. 2, to "this Constitution" do not forbid an amendment inconsistent with
a clause in the Constitution before amended, and are not a limitation on the
amending power. "What other purpose could an amendment have?"
"The Constitution is the organic and fundamental law, but that law may be
changed, added to, or repealed, if that is done by the states and the people themselves in the way provided. Their power to better it, as they think, is not to be
hamstrung by mere rigidity of definition of words. Adding something new to
the organic law is an amendment of the organic law, in the judgment of this
court." State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenhrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257
F. 334 at 343·
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under its power to amend revenue bills may substitute entirely new bills. In fact, the amending process would be largely
futile if no additions could be incorporated. The fathers of the
Constitution neither expressly nor by reasonable implication
gave ground for any such understanding of the process. Perhaps the best evidence of contemporary construction is to be
found in the heading of the joint resolution of Congress submitting the first ten amendments commencing, "Articles m
addition to and Amendment of the Constitution." 56

Is there a law above amending power and the Constitution?
In surveying the arguments as to implied limitations, it seems
necessary to consider a doctrine which has proved peculiarly
attractive to some, namely, that there is a law higher than
the written Constitution which is inviolable and constitutes
a limitation on the power to amend. Strange bedfellows are
to be found adhering to this view. It is likely to be urged by
the most naive man in the street and also by learned lawyers
and philosophers. Large masses of the people of the United
"The Constitution is a mere grant of power to the federal government by the
several states and any amendment which adds to or in any manner changes the
powers thus granted comes within the legal and even within the technical
definition of that term." Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563 at 567
a1f'd Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510.
"'Words in the Constitution of the United States do not ordinarily receive
a narrow and contracted meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a
broad sense with a view to covering all emergencies.' . . . The definitions of
the word 'amendment' include additions to, as well as correction of, matters
already treated; and there is nothing in its immediate context (article V) which
suggests that it was used in a restricted sense." Feigenspan v. Bodine,
(D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 19o, quoting from In re Strauss, (1905) I97
U. S. 324 at 330, 25 S. Ct. 535·
"A Constitution has an organic life in such a sense, and to such a degree
that changes here and there do not sever its identity." Cardozo, J., in Browne
v. City of New York, (I925) 24I N.Y. 96 at III, I49 N. E. 2II.
56
"An amendment to the Constitution, which is made by the addition of a
provision on a new and independent subject, is a complete thing in itself, and
may be wholly disconnected with other provisions of the Constitution; such
amendments for instance as the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. These were therein referred to as articles in addition to and
amendment of the Constitution." State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, (1919) 99
Ohio St. 168, I24 N. E. I 72.
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States view the Constitution as something sacrosanct and protected from serious alteration. The language of the Declaration of Independence as to inherent and inalienable rights is
unhesitatingly accepted by many as having a legal as well as
a political and ethical significance. 57 Seward, Secretary of State
under Lincoln, once said that "there is a higher law than the
Constitution which regulates our authority," but he was careful to add that he would "adopt none but lawful, constitutional and peaceful means to secure even that end."
The view of unlimited internal sovereignty of the state
has undergone serious criticism during the last century at the
hands of the political pluralists, who deny the absolute and
indivisible sovereignty of the state, as viewed internally and
apart from international law. Since the state is not supreme,
neither is the amending body, for the amending body is virtually the state, or at least its most powerful agent. The theories
of pluralism of the last century were mainly developed by
Gierke in Germany, and by Maitland, Figgis, and Laski in
England, by Duguit in France, and by Krabbe in the Netherlands. Krabbe, like many of the other pluralists, views the
state as the creature of law, and law alone is sovereign. Perhaps their whole position is best summed up in the words of
Duguit:
"The more I advance in age and seek to penetrate the problem of law, the more I am convinced that law is not a creation
of the state, that it exists without the state, that the notion of
law is altogether independent of the state, and that the rule
rn Abbott, "Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment," (I92o) 20
CoL. L. REv. I 83 at I 84, says that "the question is not whether we can take a
drink now and again, but whether in this federal Union of ours there resides
any power which is literally absolute, that is, without even those ultimate
limitations which we are accustomed to speak of as the constitutional guarantees
of our liberties••.. For the first time in the history of the American Union
an amendment to the Constitution has been adopted, or claimed to have been
adopted, which attempts to limit the personal liberties of the people. • • •
There are a number of constitutive principles of private rights which have been
so wrought into the fabric of our institutions that they cannot be abrogated."
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of law imposes itself on the state as it does upon individuals."58
The theories of pluralism have found little support in the
United States among the political scientists and scarcely any
among the lawyers. 59 Professor Mcilwain states that pluralism is "equivalent to a repudiation of all control over the individual citizen except that which he voluntarily imposes upon
himself." 60 Many pluralists concede the legal sovereignty of
the state. Our legal views are of course traceable to those of
the English common law. The analytical view of the law as
a body of rules laid down by the sovereign or recognized and
enforced by the courts runs back to Hobbes, Blackstone,
Bentham, and Austin. Their views and those of Holland and
Salmond, and of John Chipman Gray in the United States,
are representative of the prevalent view of the law held by
lawyers in this country. It is true that in the United States the
strictly analytical view is considerably modified by the large
proportion of the law to be found in the cases rather than in
statutes, and also by the doctrine of judicial review. The Supreme Court of the United States has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but of the Constitution itself, and if it laid down implied limitations on the
amending power, such limitations would doubtless be accepted as constitutional. Theoretically, however, the Constitution is supreme over all, including the Supreme Court,
whose members take an oath to support it. In looking for
limitations on the power to amend, it is therefore the duty
118
1 DucuiT, TRAITE DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed. (1921) 33·
"" "The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes
law." Holmes,]., in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213
U.S. 347 at 358, 29 S. Ct. 511.
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (r886)
118 U.S. 356 at 370,6 S. Ct. 1064.
80
"A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Scr. Q. 94 at 105.

112

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

of the Court to look to the Constitution itself. The Constitution does not recognize any such type of law as Natural Law,
or the Law of God, or the Law of Reason. 61 The medieval
sovereigns were regarded as being subject to Natural Law
and the Law of God. The Law of God has since been relegated
to theology. The growth of the modern independent nations
of Europe meant the emergence of a national law governing each nation, and the disappearance of natural law. In England some isolated cases decided or intimated that an act of
Parliament "contrary to common right and reason" was
void. 62 Blackstone at times suggests that all laws are subject
to natural law and at other times maintains that there is nothing superior to an act of Parliament. Since his time Austin and
Bentham quite definitely gave the bent to Anglo-American
legal theory, so that today natural law is regarded as non61 "The theory that laws may be declared void when deemed to be opposed
to natural justice and equity, although they do not violate any constitutional
provision, has some support in the dicta of learned judges, but has not been
approved, so far as we know, by any authoritative adjudication, and is repudiated by numerous authorities. . • . no law can be pronounced invalid, for the
reason simply that it violates our notions of justice, is oppressive and unfair in
its operation, or because, in the opinion of some or all of the citizens of the
State, it is not justified by public necessity, or designed to promote the public
welfare." Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (I878) 74 N.Y. 509 at 5I4-5I6.
In Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. I87I) I Dill. 248 at 25I, F. Cas. No. 2098,
it is said, however, that there are no limitations on the sovereign people of the
United States, "if we except those imposed by the Deity." To the same effect,
see 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (I829),
Appendix 64. In Booth v. Town of Woodbury, (I864) 32 Conn. II8 at I27,
it is asserted that the people are "under no restraint except that imposed by the
principles of natural justice."
62
"Is the right of the people of the United States to do this thing questioned?
It could be questioned only on the grounds advanced by Lord Coke, in Bonham's
case, that the common law controlled acts of parliament, and adjudged them
void when against common right and reason. But all the judges since his time
have said that it was for parliament and the king to judge what common right
and reason was; and Lord Campbell styles what was said by Lord Coke in this
case, 'nonsense still quoted by silly people .••. ' A stronger epithet than that
applied by the Lord Chancellor to those who quote Lord Coke's dictum in
Bonham's case as authority, might justly be applied to those who question the
power and authority of the people of the United States, by amendment of their
constitution of government, to abolish slavery •••." Buckner v. Street, (C. C.
Ark. I87I) I Dill. 248 at 255, F. Cas. No. 2098. But cf. Plucknett, "Bonham's
Case and Judicial Review," (I926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 30.
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existent or as ideal law and is relegated to ethics and political
philosophy. While there are ever-recurring revivals of a belief in natural law, and while sound philosophic reasons may
perhaps be offered in its behalf, it seems that such a view of
the law has little chance in the interpretation of American
constitutional law. In the words of one, both judge and philosopher:
"If there is any law which is back of the sovereignty of the
state, and superior thereto, it is not law in such a sense as to
concern the judge or the lawyer, however much it concerns
the statesman or the moralist. The courts are creatures of the
state and of its power, and while their life as courts continues,
they must obey the law of their creator." 63

Is there an implied limitation that amendments taking away
individual liberties must be ratified by state conventions? In
the decade of the thirties there were some interesting developments with respect to the scope of the amending power.
The first of these was in 1931 in the case of United States v.
Sprague. 64 There the assailants of the Eighteenth Amendment, instead of asserting that such amendment was beyond
the scope of the amending power, took the narrower ground
that there were limitations on the scope of amendments which
could be ratified by state legislatures. That is to say, while
63 CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (I 92.4) 49· McGovney says: "Against
a sovereign organized political society an individual member of it has no legal
rights. That, at least, is the situation under the present state of organization or
unorganization of the human race into separate, independent, sovereign societies.
There is no law superior to their wills governing their relations with their own
members. On the other hand, as against government, in the United States, our
political society has secured to the individual many privileges and immunities.
What society has thus created, cannot society take away or alter? Legally certainly society may do so." McGovney "Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void
Because of its Contents?" (192.0) 2.0 CoL. L. REv. 499 at 501.
"Certainly no successful attempt has been made to indicate why a constitution might not originally command or prohibit anything physically possible."
Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 514 at 52.1 •
.. (1931) 2.82. U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 2.2.0, noted (1932.) 2.7 ILL. L. REV. 72.;
(1931) 2.9 MICH. L. REV. 777; (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 8o7; Creekmore
"The Sprague Case," (1931) 3 MISS. L. J. 2.82..
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there were no limitations as to what might be ratified by state
conventions, there were such limitations as to state legislatures. The legislative ratifying power could not deal with an
amendment conferring upon the federal government new
direct powers over individuals. It could deal only with such
proposals as involved a change in the machinery of the federal government. It was argued that the original Constitution
had been ratified by state conventions because the legislatures
were deemed incompetent to surrender the liberties of the
people to the new government to be established by the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment, reserving to the states or to
the people the powers not delegated to the federal government, was alleged to have removed whatever doubt there
formerly existed under the original Constitution. 65 The trial
court rejected these theories, yet on the basis of a strange mixture of "political science" and "a scientific approach to the
problem of government," it held the amendment void because
not ratified by conventions. 66 But the Supreme Court gave
no weight to either of these theories and held unequivocally
that the choice of the method of ratification rested "in the
sole discretion of Congress." 67 Thus the scope of the amending process seems to be the same no matter what the method
of ratification. And though there are no cases on it, probably
the scope is the same no matter what the method of proposal,
whether by national convention or by Congress. In fact, reasoning backwards, since as seen in Chapter III, on the procedure of amendment, a national convention has very broad
powers of proposal, it follows that Congress also has. 68
""Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the
Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771. Contra: Taft, "Amendment of the
Federal Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 647.
""United States v. Sprague, (D. C. N.J. 1930) 44 F. (zd) 967 at 98z, 984.
e'1 z8z U. S. at 730.
118
See chap._ III, p. 44 et seq. To carry out the reasoning still further, since the
Sprague case holds that a state legislature has the same power as a state convention in ratifying amendments, Congress has the same powers as a national
convention in proposing amendments.
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In addition to the arguments against specific alleged limitations, there are a number of general arguments refuting
the existence of implied limitations altogether.
Expressio uniu.s· est exclusio alterius. Perhaps the most obvious and at the same time the most powerful argument
against the existence of any implied limitations is the presence within the amending clause itself of the explicit limitations which have previously been described. The existence
of these limitations shows that the makers of the Constitution
evidently gave some thought and consideration to limitations
on the power to amend. The slave trade, direct taxes, and
equality of representation in the Senate were all matters of
great controversy in the Constitutional Convention, and each
was settled by compromise. Three limitations were plainly set
forth in the same clause of the Constitution that granted the
amending power. Several proposed limitations offered at the
Constitutional Convention, one of them of vital importance,
in that it proposed to exempt the police power of the states
from interference, were rejected. 69 The makers of the Constitution seemingly intended to provide for a broad power of
amendment. 70 As Madison suggested, if limitations of one
kind were adopted, limitations of another kind would also be
demanded. 71 Certainly no power conferred in the Constitution is ultimately of more importance than the amending
power. If the fathers were careful in the drafting of any clause
09

Supra, p. 4 et seq.
"The rejection of most of the proposed limitations on this power and the
inclusion of but one permanent disability or restriction is strong evidence that,
save as to the included exception, it was intended that the legislative departments of the governments of both the United States and the several states, acting
in a special capacity for such purpose, should be practically unlimited in their
power to propose and adopt amendments." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J.
I 9zo) z64 F. I 86 at I 9 5· See also, Pillsbury, "The Fifteenth Amendment,"
(I909) .I6 ME. ST. B. A. PROC. I7·
n 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(I937 reprint of I836 zd ed.) ssz. See supra, p. 4 et seq.
70
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of the Constitution, it would seem that certainly nothing would
be left to implication concerning the bounds of the amending
power. The issue would seem to be a proper case for the application of the maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 72
This maxim admittedly is not of universal application. Instances may well be cited where it would be improper to apply it. As Chief Justice Taft said in a recent case: "This maxim
properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas
in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over
by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the
contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which
is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary
treatment." 73 The application varies with the circumstances.
The maxim is not limited to the law of property, or to contracts, or to statutory law. It may be and has been applied in
the construction of a constitution. 74 The setting out of the express limitations in Article Five with no suggestion or implication of any other limitations, and the grant of the power to
amend in broad and general terms would fairly seem to be
a case where the maxim may appropriately be applied.
View of framers of Constitution as to its imperfect nature.
Additional support for the broad view of the power to amend
72 In Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 at 191, Marshall,
C. J ., said: "It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions
from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except
from a granted power, that which was not granted . • • ."
'"Ford v. United States, (1927) 273 U.S. 593 at 6ll, 47 S. Ct. 531.
" It was applied to amendments of state constitutions in In re Constitutional
Convention, (1883) 14 R.I. 649 at 651; Carton v. Secretary of State, (19o8)
151 Mich. 337, ll5 N. W. 429; Tax Commission Case, (1923) 68 Mont. 450,
219 P. 817. Applied to other parts of state constitutions: Head v. Head, (1847)
2 Ga. 191; People v. Angle, ~I888) 109 N.Y. 564, 17 N. E. 413; State ex rel.
Banker v. Clausen, (1927) 142 Wash. 450, 253 P. 805. It has also been applied
to construction of a treaty: Matter of Washburn, (1819) 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.)
106 at ll4. Jameson advocates its use with caution. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL
CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 602-610. See also Barto v. Himrod, (1853)
4 Seld. (N.Y.) 483 at 493; Woods' Appeal, ( 1874) 7 5 Pa. 59; BROOM, LEGAL
MAXIMS, 7th Am. ed. (1874) 653.
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is found in the fact that the framers of the Constitution
regarded their work as far from perfect and consequently
anticipated a wide use of the power to amend. 75 The Constitution is the product of several great compromises. A considerable group in the Constitutional Convention and a large
minority of the people were opposed to the adoption of the
Constitution as submitted. Even those members of the Convention who favored it were lukewarm in their support, and
defended it solely on the ground of expediency. Such members
as Benjamin Franklin expressed their unenthusiastic opinion
75
Mason said at the Convention: "The plan now to be formed will certainly
be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments,
therefore, will be necessary; and it will be better to provide for them in an
easy, regular, and constitutional way, than to trust to chance and violence."
5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1937
reprintofr8362ded.) 182.
Iredell, later a Supreme Court justice, declared before the North Carolina
ratifying convention: "Mr. Chairman, this is a very important clause. . . .
The misfortune attending most constitutions which have been deliberately
formed, has been, that those who formed them thought their wisdom equal to
all possible contingencies, and that there could be no error in what they did.
The gentlemen who framed this Constitution thought with much more diffidence of their capacities, and undoubtedly, without a provision for amendment
it would have been more justly liable to objection, and the characters of its
framers would have appeared much less meritorious. This, indeed, is one of the
greatest beauties of the system, and should strongly recommend it to every
candid mind." 4 ibid. 176.
"In regard to the Constitution of the United States, it is confessedly a new experiment in the history of the nations. Its framers were not bold or rash enough
to believe, or to pronounce it to be perfect. . . . They believed, that the power
of amendment was, if one may so say, the safety-valve to let off all temporary
effervescences and excitements; and the real effective instrument to control and
adjust the movements of the machinery, when out of order, or in danger of selfdestruction." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 3d ed. (1857), § 1828.
"As to individual states and the United States, the Constitution marks the
boundary of powers. . . . If the Constitution is found inconvenient in practice
in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for
amendment." Cushing, J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, (r793) 2 Dall. (2 U.S.)
419 at 468.
"The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things
they could not foresee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the
circumstances which might call for the exercise of further national powers than
those granted to the United States, and after making provision for an amendment to the Constitution, by which any needed additional powers would be
granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not so delegated." Brewer, J.,
in Kansas v; Colorado, ( r 907) zo6 U. S. 46 at 9o, 27 S. Ct. 655.
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of it. One of the arguments asserted in its favor was that it
was capable of alteration. In fact, many state conventions
adopted it on the tacit understanding that a Bill of Rights
would be immediately incorporated. Altogether it seems unreasonable that its framers regarded the Constitution as exempt from alteration except when expressly so provided. As
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, the Constitution "is an experiment.m6 It is only in the generations since the Constitution
was adopted that a sort of halo of sanctity has been attached
to it. People have sought certainty in political affairs only
in a somewhat lesser degree than they have in religion. The
Constitution has come to have a significance to the people of
the United States such as has never become attached to the
written constitution of any other state. Gladstone's dictum
that "the American Constitution is the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man" is a shibboleth of American politics. Many appear to
have forgotten
"that the Constitution is not an end in itself, but rather a
means, or an instrument, if you please, adopted for the specific purpose of regulating the public affairs and preserving
the individual rights of the nation.
But it would
be asking the impossible to expect one generation to plan a
government that should endure through all time and through
revolutionary changes in every aspect of life." 77
Article Five as sui generis. A third important consideration
in favor of the view that the power to amend is unlimited except as to the equal suffrage in the Senate clause is the peculiar
status of Article Five. The article seems to be sui generis. 78
78

Abrams v. United States, (1919) 250 U.S. 616 at 6301 40 S. Ct. 17 1 dissenting opinion .
.,., Bates, "How Shall We Preserve the Constitution?" (I 926) 44 KAN. S. B. A.
PROC, 128 at 143.
18
The view of Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional
Amendment," (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 213 at 221, that Article Five is
limited by the provisions of the original Constitution, including in this the :Bill
of Rights, seems to have found little support.
..
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No other articles of the Constitution are to be looked to when
the legal status of an amendment is in question. This seems
to be true in the procedure of amendment. Congress when
proposing and the states when ratifying are not bound by the
rules of legislative action. 79A simple compliance with Article
Five is enough and no limitations are read in from other
clauses of the federal Constitution. The proponents of implied limitations forget that Article Five is as much a part of
the Constitution as any other part of it. Admittedly, limitations on the scope of an amendment are more fundamental
than those on the procedure. Since limitations gathered from
other clauses and from the general character and "spirit" of
the Constitution have not been generally implied as to procedure, it would seem illogical and a serious matter to imply
limitations as to substance. Article Five, the sole fountain
head of the power to amend, is silent and appears to confer
the power in broad and sweeping terms. Suggested limitations
must be critically viewed, and compared with its provisions,
and not the provisions of the remainder of the Constitution.
Danger of limiting the scope. An argument of tremendous
practical importance is the fact that it would be exceedingly
dangerous to lay down any limitations beyond those expressed. 80 The critics of an unlimited power to amend have
too often neglected to give due consideration to the fact that
79
Supra, pp. 48, 6z-63. But Congress may derive additional power from the
power under Article One to pass all necessary and proper laws. RoTTSCHAEFER,
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 387.
80
"The Constitution of any government which cannot be regularly amended
when its defects are experienced, reduces the people to this dilemma-they must
either submit to its oppressions, or bring about amendments, more or less, by
civil war." Iredell before the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 4 ELLIOT,
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1937 reprint
of I 836 zd ed.) I 76-I 77·
"If the plaintiff is right in its contention of lack of power to insert the
Eighteenth Amendment into the United States Constitution because of its subjectmatter, it follows that there is no way to incorporate it and others of like character into the national organic law, except through revolution. This, the plaintiff concedes, is the inevitable conclusion of its contention. This is so startling
a proposition that the judicial mind may be pardoned for not readily acceding
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alteration of the federal Constitution is not by a simple majority or by a somewhat preponderate majority, but by a
three-fourths majority of all the states. 81 Undoubtedly, where
a simple majority is required, it is not an especially serious
matter for the courts to supervise closely the amending process both as to procedure and as to substance. But when so large
a majority as three-fourths has finally expressed its will in
the highest possible form outside of revolution, it becomes
perilous for the judiciary to intervene. This may account for
the resort to the doctrine of political questions in the child
labor amendment cases of 1939. 82 In fact, the amending
process in the past has been so difficult that it may perhaps
be said that amendment in effect has been brought about by
judicial interpretation. 83 It is of course the business of the
judiciary to enforce the law. But it is, and probably always
has been, an unformulated ground of action in the judicial
mind never so to act as to come squarely in conflict with the
executive and legislature and a large group of the people.
In the last analysis, self-preservation is perhaps as basic a
motive in judicial action as in any other type of human acJ
tivity.
It would seem, however, that there is no necessity to resort to the ground of self-preservation as a reason for the
to it, and for insisting that only the most convincing reasons will justify its
acceptance." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 189-190.
When passing on the validity of amendments, "The court may, and should,
and must, on such great occasions, look to effects and consequences." Marshall, J.,
in State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, (1915) 160 Wis. 354 at 357, 152 N. W. 419.
In the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588,
Hughes points out in his brief that judicial construction has always been open
to change through amendment, but if the court itself limits the amending power,
the subject is taken beyond the reach of popular control.
81
Such critics assume "that the ultimately sovereign people have inferentially
deprived themselves of that portion of their sovereign power, once possessed
by them, of determining the content of their own fundamental law." RoTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 9· See also ibid. 398.
82
Chandler v. Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992; Coleman v.
Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. See supra, p. 18 et seq.
88
See Coudert, "Judicial Constitutional Amendment," (1904) 13 YALE L. J.
331.
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courts refraining from limiting the power to amend. As has
been iterated and reiterated, the court is bound by no express
limitations except the equal suffrage clause, which limits only
the method of amendment. If the judiciary in the absence
of such limitations go ahead and deliberately lay them down,
it would seem that they are positively courting disaster. 84
In refusing to lay down restrictions, the court is not affirmatively violating any express clause of the Constitution. It is
not violating any broad general provision, nor the "spirit" of
the Constitution. In the absence of any other express limitations and in view of the reasonable conclusion that there are
no other limitations, it seems that the court is merely doing
its plain duty in refusing to discover any new restrictions.
Considering the danger of implying such restrictions, and
the unreasonableness of any such implications, it would seem
that the onus is on the protagonists of the view of limited
power to demonstrate clearly the legal basis of their view.

Rejection of implied limitation by the courts. It is a fact of
no little importance that the Supreme Court of the United
States and the inferior federal courts have given no encouragement to the view that there are implied limitations. To be
sure, the Supreme Court has not categorically declared that
"'"Impressive words of counsel remind us of our duty to m~intain the integrity of constitutional government by adhering to the limitations laid by
the sovereign people upon the expression of its will . • . . Not less imperative,
however, is our duty to refuse to magnify their scope by resort to subtle implication . . • . Repeated decisions have informed us that only when conflict with
the Constitution is clear and indisputable will a statute be condemned as void.
Still more obvious is the duty of caution and moderation when the act to be
reviewed is not an act of ordinary legislation, but an act of the great constituent power which has made Constitutions and hereafter may unmake them.
Narrow at such times are the bounds of legitimate implications." Cardozo, J.,
in Browne v. City of New York, (r925) 241 N.Y. 96 at ru, 149 N. E. zrr.
"Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for
niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning
or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. • • • The
people make them; the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read
them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them
any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss." r STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 3d ed. (r8s8) § 451.
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there are no such limits. 85 But it has either expressly or tacitly
rejected every limitation urged upon it. The court did not
pass on the question of restrictions in an opinion until the
validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was adjudicated. The
Fifteenth Amendment seems to have been the first that was
ever attacked on that ground as exceeding the scope of the
amending power. Even that attack was made only in comparatively recent years. But though the briefs of the appellant
asserted the existence of limitations, the court completely
ignored the contention in its decision. 86 When the legality of
the Eighteenth Amendment was tested, the opinion was a
mere syllabus statement that the amendment was "within the
power to amend." Chief Justice White criticized the absence
of any reasoning, and Justice McReynolds expressed himself
as unable to come to any conclusion. 87 The scope of the power
of amendment was first discussed by the court at any length
in Leser v. Garnett 88 when the Nineteenth Amendment was
attacked. In that case, too, the court upheld the amendment
as against any implied restrictions. Manifestly the doctrine
of implied limitations will have to rear its structure on something else than court decisions.
"Abuse" of the amending power an anomalous term. The
proponents of implied limitations resort to the method of
80

The Supreme Court "has not • • . ever decided or stated that there are
no implied limits on the amending power. It is a practical certainty, that, if it
ever passes on that question, it will hold that there are no such implied limits
upon that power." RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 398.
88
Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932. The lower court,
Anderson v. Myers, (C. C. Md. 1910) 182 F. 223, expressly rejected the argument in favor of implied limitations.
87
National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
Other cases passing on the scope are Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. I 87 I) I Dill.
248, Fed. Cas. No. 2098; State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C.
Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334; Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. ]. 1920) 264 F.
I86; Carson v. Sullivan, (192o) 284 Mo. 253, 223 S. W. 571 •
.. (1922) 258 u.s. IJO, 42 s. Ct. 2I7.
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reductio ad absurdum in pointing out the abuses which might
occur if there were no limitations on the power to amend. The
Supreme Court might be abolished. A monarchy might be
set up. The women of the nation might be nationalized. In
reply it should be pointed out in the first place that the fact
that a power may be abused does not necessarily militate
against the existence of the power. 89 The Supreme Court has
declared over and over again that the possibility of abuse is
not to be used as a test of the existence or extent of a power.90
Thus the postal and taxing powers of the federal government
may be abused, but that does not affect their existence or their
scope. The possibility of abuse of intergovernmental taxation
has not prevented the Supreme Court from recently permitting it. 91 Moreover, there seems to be no consensus as to what
is and what is not an abuse of the amending power.
In the second place the amending power is a power of an
altogether different kind from the ordinary governmental
powers. If abuse occurs, it occurs at the hands of a special
organization of the nation and of the states representing an
extraordinary majority of the people, so that for all practical
80

"The fear that sustaining the right of the people to extinguish the traffic in
intoxicating liquors opens the door to a like prohibition of other business, therefore, is not well founded. But, if it were, it would be of little force in dealing_
with the question of power. The right to exercise power inevitably carries with
it the possibility of abuse, but abuse in the exercise of power is no argument
against its existence. The line between a proper use and abuse of power cannot
be settled in advance; but it may be said, and that is as far as the present inquiry
warrants, that whenever any other business produces like evils it may be disposed
of in the same way." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F. 186
at 192.
90
1n re Rapier, (1892) 143 U.S. uo, 12 S. Ct. 374; McCray v. United
States, (1904) 195 U.S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769.
"'James v. Dravo Contracting Co., (1937) 302 u.s. 134, s8 s. Ct. 208;
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, (1937) 302 U.S. 186, 58
S. Ct. 233; Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, {1938) 304
U.S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 98o; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., (1938) 303
U. S. 376, 58 S. Ct. 623; Helvering v. Gerhardt, (1938) 304 U. S. 405, 58
S. Ct. 969; Graves v. People ex rei. O'Keefe, {1939) 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct,
595·
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purposes it may be said to be the people, or at least the highest
agent of the people, and one exercising sovereign powers. 92
Thus the people merely take the consequences of their own
acts, whereas where the abuse of a governmental authority
occurs, there is abuse by a mere governmental agent of the
people, and the people suffer the consequences of the arbitrary acts of individuals. It seems natural that somewhere
there resides within the nation the power to do anything, and
logically this authority resides in the amending body. It
seems anomalous to speak of "abuse" by such a body. Unless
the view be adopted that the people of the United States are
not sovereign and that they are not to be trusted to alter their
fundamental institutions but are to be carefully safeguarded
by a small group of men who know or think they know what
is best for the people, it seems necessary to conclude that they
have a full capacity to amend, free from any implicit limits,
no matter what abuses may result.
The consequences of the view just stated are not as ominous
as they may appear at first blush. No abusive assaults on our
constitutional system have as yet been made by amendment.
92

"In this connection it should not be overlooked that the ultimate power to
amend the United States Constitution is not given to the federal government,
but to the people of the several states. The power of Congress in that respect
ends with its proposing the amendment to the states. The ultimate and controlling act is by the people themselves, acting through their chosen representatives."
Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86 at 195.
"Has it ever been pretended that the limitations of the power of the states
were also limitations on the whole people of the United States, when acting in
their aggregate, sovereign capacity in amending or altering their constitution
or government?" Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. r87r) r Dill. 248 at 249, Fed.
Cas. No. 2098.
"An amendment, which has the deliberate judgment of two thirds of
Congress, and of three fourths of the states, can scarcely be deemed unsuited to
the prosperity or security of the republic. It must combine as much wisdom
and experience in its favor, as ordinarily can belong to the management of
any human concerns." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, 3d ed. (r858) § 1830,
"I grant that if three-fourths should make the chief magistrate hereditary,
it would be a gross abuse of power. Against this, and other abuses, we have
provided, by requiring so large a majority as three-fourths, and this is the
only guard we have thought necessary. The right in the one-fourth to correct
the abuse, is revolutionary, not sovereign." Argument of Blanding in State ex
rel. McCready v. Hunt, (r834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) 1 at 172.
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The language used in attacking the Fifteenth, Eighteenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments has been much stronger and
more suggestive of violence than the occasion warranted.
However inexpedient negro suffrage and prohibition may be,
it cannot be seriously pretended that they have weakened or
seriously altered the general tenor of the Constitution. It may
be that serious abuses may occur in the future; it can scarcely
be said that they have occurred up to this time. It may be objected that the possibility of abuses in the future should be
provided for. In reply, it may be said that the nation has not
been threatened by the absence of such implied limitations
thus far, and that there have been no wanton abuses. The
generation of today cannot know the needs of the generation
of tomorrow. Any restrictions which might be laid down now
might easily turn out to be futile, while such as might prove
beneficial may not be known or suggested by the leaders of the
present era. 93 It seems best in this matter to permit each generation to take care of itself. In the last analysis, political machinery and artificial limitations will not protect the American
people from themselves. "The perpetuity of American institutions will depend not upon special mechanisms or devices, nor even upon any particular legislation, but rather
upon the good conscience and intelligence and the attitude
of the American people themselves." 94

Political questions. A recent development, though not directly dealing with the scope of the amending power, is the
doctrine of "political questions" developed in the cases deal98
"The framers of the Constitution could not foresee the form or character
of amendments which might become necessary in the future and wisely left all
such questions in the hands of those who might be charged with official duty
when the necessity for the change and the character of the change to be made
became apparent." Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563 at 567-568.
•• Bates, "How Shall We Preserve the Constitution?" (I 926) 44 KAN.
S. B. A. PROC. 128 at 147: "Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up,
but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances,
and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be done." See also
Holmes, J., in Blinn v. Nelson, (x9xx) 222 U.S. 1 at 7, 32 S. Ct. 1.
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ing with the child labor amendment. 95 If the time limit
for ratification and the effect of prior rejections by states and
possibly the right of the lieutenant governor of a state to cast
a deciding vote when the state senate was equally divided,
were political questions, why would not the scope of the
amending power be a political question? The practical dangers
of limiting the scope and the difficulties in laying down implied limitations might well justify the Supreme Court in disposing of the problem by calling it a political question. In the
opinion of the writer, however, it would be more straightforward and courageous and less confusing to rule that there are
no implied limitations .
.. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v.
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992.

CHAPTER

v

Sovereignty and the Federal
Amending Clause
A. DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVEREIGNTY

T has frequently been asserted that the most important
and at the same time the most controverted topic of political science is that of sovereignty. It is significant in constitutional law and in international law only in a somewhat
lesser degree. In fact, in its first development it seems to have
been a juristic conception. 1 Its first modern exponent, Jean
Bodin, was a French lawyer. 2 Its chief theorist of the common
law was John Austin, another jurist. 3 The problem is of peculiar importance in a federal state such as the United States,
since its location is not an obvious fact as it is in a unitary state.
The Civil War was fought largely over conflicting conceptions of sovereignty and its location. 4 Even today the question
of states' rights is not a merely speculative matter. The in-

I

1
For the history of the concept of sovereignty, see EMERSON, STATE AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928); HOLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS
FROM OuR LEGAL HISTORY (1928) u2-141; WARD, SovEREIGNTY (1928)
1-48; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE AUSTIN IAN THEORIES OF LAW AND
SOVEREIGNTY (1929) 38-61; CoHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SoVEREIGNTY
(1937) 7-128; Mcilwain, "A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL.
Scr. Q. 94·
• For the view that Bodin was not such an absolutist after all, but that he
supposed the sovereign to be subject to natural law, international law, and the
constitutional laws of monarchy, see Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Cross Roads: A
Study of Bodin," (1930) 45 PoL. Sci. Q. 580. Accord: Mcilwain, "A Fragment
on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Sci. Q. 94· For the more usual view of Bodin,
see Hearnshaw, "Bodin and the Genesis of the Doctrine of Sovereignty," TUDOR
STUDIES (1924) 109 at 124-125.
• For a short summary of Austin's theories, see Smith, "The English Analytical
Jurists," (1887) 21 AM. L. REV. 270.
• "For this question of loyalty to a sovereign is one which, more than any
other, has divided men in their political, social, and even domestic relations."
HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE (1881) 537·
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creased activities of the federal government have revived the
controversy over sovereignty, if in truth it may be assumed
that the issue had ever become obsolete. The I 93 9 cases
treating certain phases of the amending process as political
questions may further revive the question. 5 The problem in
the United States seemingly may be regarded as perennial.
Hence efforts at its reanalysis can never be regarded as superfluous or futile.
The problem of sovereignty may be approached from the
viewpoints of law, of political science, and of philosophy. It
is one of the chief technical terms of each of these fields of
knowledge. Each has given the term a meaning with a content different from that of the other sciences. In fact, the same
science has at different periods of time defined the word in
a varying manner. In the words of Bryce:
"As the borderland between two kingdoms used in unsettled states of society to be the region where disorder and confusion most prevailed, and in which turbulent men found
refuge from justice, so fallacies and confusions of thought
and language have most frequently survived and longest
escaped detection in those territories where the limits of conterminous sciences or branches of learning have not been exactly drawn. The frontier districts, if one may call them so,
of Ethics, of Law, and of Political Science have been thus
infested by a number of vague or ambiguous terms which
have produced many barren discussions and caused much
needless trouble to students.
"No offender of this kind has given more trouble than the
so-called 'Doctrine of Sovereignty.' " 6
Before plunging into one of the most fiercely controverted
subjects of both legal and political theory, it becomes necessary to make clear the purpose of this discussion and the attitude of the writer towards the concept of sovereignty. The
writer has no new definition of the term to offer. Nor does
• See Chapter II, supra.
6

BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (1901) 503-504.
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he subscribe to the views of any particular publicist or school
of legal philosophy. He does not believe that there is any one
specific, precise conception which undebatably deserves the
appellation of sovereignty. This discussion will accept as the
definition of sovereignty and as the list of its chief characteristics those which most authorities at the present time appear
to adopt. The writer thoroughly agrees with Dean Edwin D.
Dickinson, who says: "Probably nowhere in law, private
or public, is there to be found a more tyrannical phrase than
'the sovereignty of the state.' " 7 This discussion is not intended to give new emphasis to the importance of sovereignty.
But the subject has been so constantly discussed that a treatment of the federal amending process would be incomplete
without it. In the words of Professor Mcilwain:
"It requires considerable courage, or presumption, as some
might prefer to style it, to ask a reader's attention once more
to so well-worn a topic as sovereignty. Few political conceptions have been the subject of so much discussion amongst us
in the last hundred years. But this very fact is proof of its
vital importance in our modern world; and the wide variety
of the views held concerning its essence, as well as the conflicting conclusions to which these views still lead, may furnish
sufficient excuse for another attempt to clarify some of our
ideas touching this central formula under which we try to
rationalize the complicated facts of our modern political
life." 8
One is confronted also with Professor Mcilwain's challenge: "Our theory, such as it is, has been mainly a theory of
lawyers who were usually content to accept their explanation
of government as secondhand from later English legal sources
such as the Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone.... " 9
7

Dickinson, "New Avenues to Freedom," (1931) 25 MICH. L. REV. 6zz at
J. Friedrich is "inclined to discard for political science the concept
of sovereignty (as well as that of the state) as of no scientific value for a realistic
approach . . . ."Book Review, (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. z66.
8
Mcilwain, "A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Sci. Q. 94·
• Ibid. at 105•
623. Carl
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It is the purpose of this discussion to deal with sovereignty
from the point of view of law. It therefore becomes necessary
to distinguish between what have been respectively called
legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. A person or body
is said to have legal sovereignty when he or it has unlimited
law-making power, and when there is no person or body
legally superior to him or it. 10 Perhaps it would be correct to
say that the possession of unlimited law-making power is
enough, for it is difficult to see how there can be any superior
to a group which can make laws on all subjects since that group
could pass a law abolishing the powers of the supposed superior. In other words, sovereignty is legal absolutism. By
the political sovereign, on the other hand, is meant the group
within a state which in actual fact determines the bent of governmental action. Legal sovereignty is consciously exercised;
political sovereignty generally is not. In a normally peaceful
state the legal sovereign and the political sovereign will generally be coincident. But in time of disturbance political
sovereignty may rest in the army, or in the Church, or in
labor unions, or in other groups. The proper relation of the
10
"It should, however, be carefully noted that the term 'sovereignty,' as long
as it is accurately employed in the sense in which Austin sometimes uses it, is a
merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted
by any legal limit." DICEY, LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (r9r5) 70.
See also, r AusTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 226; BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) §§ 539, 545; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1901) 505, 509; Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty: I," (1927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 524 at 532; Harrison, "The English
School of Jurisprudence," (r878) 30 FoRTNIGHTLY REV. 475 at 492; LEWIS,
REMARKS ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SoME PoLITICAL TERMS (r8p) 40;
MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (1905) § 31; MERRIAM, HISTORY OF
THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE RoUSSEAU (r9oo) 155, 218; POLLOCK
A FIRST BooK OF JuRISPRUDENCE, 6th ed. (1929) 272; Ritchie, "On the Conception of Sovereignty," (r89r) rAM. AcAD. PoL. Sci. ANNALS 385 at 392;
WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 291; Mcilwain, "Sovereignty Again," (1926) 6 EcoNOMICA 253 at 256; COHEN, RECENT THEORIES
OF SOVEREIGNTY (1937) 36, 84; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE AUSTINIAN
THEORIES OF LAW AND SoVEREIGNTY (1929) 62, 67; EMERSON, STATE AND
SoVEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 255, 259; Chafee, Book Review,
(r919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 979 at 980.
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legal and the political sovereigns is one of the chief problems
of a sound legal system and of good government.
Much confusion might have been avoided if the term sovereignty had been treated as an exclusively legal conception.
It was first developed in the law. It has a genuine and, in most
modern governments, an indispensable utility in describing
the legal system of the state. It meets the need for certainty
and precision as to the authoritative source of rules of law.
Its use in political science has no particular value. The term
"public opinion" or some similar phrase would be fully as
descriptive, and would enable the student to grasp the meaning of the word without the careful reading of the context
which is now necessary.
Sovereignty as a legal conception has sometimes been
viewed as having two aspects: one external and one internal.
The external sovereignty is the independence of the state in
relation to other nations. The internal sovereignty is the relation of the sovereign within the state to the individuals and
associations within the state. The purpose of this discussion
is to consider the latter type of sovereignty. As a matter of
strict legal theory it seems hard to regard a mere internal or
external sovereignty as a full sovereignty. From the point of
view of constitutional law, the so-called internal sovereign
has unlimited law-making power. Hence as a question of
municipal law, the lawyer will concern himself only with the
rules laid down by the internal sovereign irrespective of their
compliance with international law. Only in a case before an
international tribunal would the lawyer look to the limitations on the so-called internal sovereignty laid down by international law. Viewed as a question of constitutional law,
the internal sovereign would be regarded as supreme both
externally and internally by the English and American lawyers. As Jellinek says, the so-called external sovereignty is
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merely a reflex of the internal sovereignty. 11 Thus from the
point of view of constitutional law an amendment relating to
territory outside of the nation would be valid.
As a matter of fact, it is sometimes confusing to admit the
use of the term sovereignty in international law. Etymologically the word means "superiority." Historically it is descriptive of the relation existing between a state and its subjects. "Properly interpreted, sovereignty is a term of constitutional law and political science and not of international law,
and it implies nothing more than the legal right of the state
to determine its own internal life, regulate its own purely
domestic affairs and make laws for its own subjects within its
own territory." 12
11
DIE LEHRE VON DEN STAATENVERBINDUNGEN (r 882) 23-24. Oppenheim
says: "Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the term implies, therefore, independence all round, within and without the borders of the country."
I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed. (1928) § 64.
As to the relation between municipal law and international law, most AngloAmerican writers assert the ultimate supremacy of the former as viewed from
the standpoint of constitutional law. PICCIOTTO, THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(1915) j WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1916). The Continental writers
are divided. See ANZILOTTI, IL D!RITTO INTERNAZIONALE NEI GIUDIZI INTERN!
(1905); KAUFMANN, DIE RECHTSKRAFT DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTS UND
DAS VERHALTNITZE DER STAATSGESETZGEBUNGEN (1899) j KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT UND DIE THEORIE DES VoLKERRECHTS (1928) 120 ff.;
KRABBE, THE MoDERN IDEA OF THE STATE, translation (1922) 233 ff.;
TRIEPEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT INTERNE (1920) 132-I52. A decade ago the German, Austrian, and Esthonian constitutions provided that international law should form a part of the national law. See also MATTERN, CoNCEPTS OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 71; COHEN,
RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (I937) 57-92.
12
Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations,"
(1925) I9 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. I at 6; Willoughby, "The Juristic Conception
of the State," (I 9 I 8) I 2 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. I 92 at 202, takes the same view.
Clark points out that "as a matter of juristic literature, independence ab extra
has often been confused under the same title with the notion of a permanent
internal superior, probably because of the practical indispensability of the latter,
which I have previously pointed out, to any lasting external relations whatever."
CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE (I883) I7J-I74· "As a substantive, sovereign is a term expressing the relation between part of a given political society,
or state, and the remainder. . . •" Ibid. I 74· "Indeed, the term sovereignty
altogether, as used to express external independence of a state, is going out of
use." Ibid. I75· Unfortunately, almost fifty years after the above statements were
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Legal sovereignty, or simply sovereignty, as it will hereafter be designated, it seems to the writer, has perhaps five
leading characteristics. In the first place, it is a matter of fact,
or of fact and law (although admittedly this tends to confuse
the distinction from political sovereignty). The law of a
state may expressly or impliedly recognize the sovereign as
such, but such recognition is not essential. The sovereign of a
state exists as such as a matter of fact, although in the long
run it also exists as a matter of law. For example, in England
Parliament is sovereign, although there is no law to that effect.
To say that sovereignty rests on law would be inconsistent,
since the sovereign is the creator of law.
A second characteristic ascribed to the sovereign by many
writers is that it is absolute. It can pass a law on any subject
it chooses, and such a law will be regarded as valid, in the
sense that the courts of the state will enforce it. From the
point of view of the lawyer, qua lawyer, it is sufficient that
the sovereign has passed the law, and he will look no further
as to its authority. If the body thought to be sovereign can
legislate only on a limited range of subjects, it is not sovereign.
In fact, the chief content of sovereignty is that its scope is unlimited.13 That is, the sovereign is distinguished from any
other legislative body in that it determines the limits of its
own competence. If there is any other superior body or group
written the term is still much used in international relations, as shown for
example in the objections raised in the Senate to the League of Nations and the
Permanent Court.
From the point of view of international law, an internal limitation on the
legal capacity of the state or its organ does not impair its independence in relation
to other states. But from the point of view of constitutional law, there would
seem to be a real limitation on sovereignty if the limitation is regarded as enforceable. As Salmond says, "all questions as to civil and supreme power are
questions as to what is possible within, not without, the limits of the constitution." SALMOND, JuRISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (1924) 531.
13
"The theory of sovereignty says nothing about the content of the command.
The only question is whether it issues from a proper source; an imperative issuing from an authoritative source is law." KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE
STATE (1922), p. xlvi of the Introduction by Sabine and Shepard.
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which can repeal or modify the laws it passes, or which can
take away or even alter the limits of its competence, it is not
sovereign, even though the superior group seldom acts. The
mere potentiality of its action is enough to strip the inferior
body of its claim to sovereign powers. Sovereignty is defined
as unlimited legislative power. If power is given to another
group to legislate with respect to certain topics, the original
sovereign no longer has absolute law-making powers. It can
legislate only in the fields which it did not give up, and this
violates the essence of sovereignty, that the extent of its action has no limits as to subject matter. 14 It may be that the
first group and the latter group each has a range of powers
which the other cannot disturb. But that alone is insufficient.
What each group has is simply governmental power, and not
sovereign power. Otherwise it would be proper in certain
cases to speak of municipal corporations as being sovereigns,
when the Constitution provides for "Home Rule," as in some
state constitutions in the United States.
In the third place, sovereignty is generally asserted to be
indivisible. There is no inherent reason why this should be the
case. It is a unit merely by definition. Sovereignty is an abstract conception and not a universal found in all countries at
all times.
The fourth characteristic of sovereignty is that from the
point of view of the lawyer the law passed by the sovereign
need not be enforced, in particular cases at least. Looked at
from a strictly juristic standpoint, the promulgation of a rule
by the sovereign is enough to make the rule good law. Austin
seems to have made obedience a prime factor in his definition
of sovereignty: "If a determinate human superior, not in the
habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedi"Willoughby seems to have underestimated the distinction between governmental and constituent power when he says that they are "two classes of functions that differ not as to kind, but only as to the subject matter with which they
deal." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 206. Yet he later
admits that "the amending clauses may fairly be said to be the most important
clauses of any constitution." Ibid. 40 I.
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ence from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including
the superior) is a society political and independent.m·5 But
jurists since Austin seem to have given less emphasis to enforcement, and regard it as a problem outside of the law. It
is indeed the chief distinguishing mark of the political sovereign, but only a postulate of the legal sovereign.16 In the
long run, the legal sovereign must receive obedience to be such,
but isolated violations of its laws do not detract from its character as sovereign.
The fifth characteristic attributed to the sovereign by most
writers is that it is determinate. Who the political sovereign
is, is generally not determinate, since public opinion is a force
which operates indirectly and circuitously. But unless the
alleged legal sovereign can be ascertained, it must be concluded that there is no such sovereign. To Austin must go
the credit for having made determinateness a requisite of the
sovereign. 17 The Anglo-American lawyer is accustomed to
viewing law as something commanded or permitted by the
"'1 AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 226.
16
"Sovereignty is authority, not might." Mcilwain, "Sovereignty Again,"
(1926) 6 EcoNOMICA 253 at 256.
The lawyer's "sole and ultimate standard of good law is the formal command
of sovereign force supposed to be irresistible and unlimited." Harrison, "The
English School of Jurisprudence," (1878) 30 FoRTNIGHTLY REv. 475 at 485.
"The consideration of the limits on the sovereign power carries us outside of
law courts, and therefore outside of law. If the sovereign be really sovereign,
it will be able to compel its own law courts to enforce its own laws. Therefore,
to t!te lawyer, and /or purposes of law, the sovereign is unlimited. Any limitations on this sovereignty lie wholly outside the lawyer's province." Ibid. 490.
John Dickinson says: "Legally a sovereign may well promulgate laws which
actually he is unable to enforce." Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty: II," (1928) 43 PoL. Scr. Q. 32 at 43· See also BRYCE, STUDIES IN HisTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (1901) 509; HARRISON, ON JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919) 24,
17
"But Austin not only serves us by presenting in a typical form one theory of
sovereignty, with its logical consequences worked out; he also, as it seems to me,
points in the right direction in his emphasis upon determinateness." Dewey,
"Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," (1894) 9 PoL, Sci. Q. 31 at 51, "Except
as sovereignty secures for itself definite and definable modes of expression, sovereignty is unrealized and inchoate, Constitutional development has consisted precisely in creating definite ways in which sovereignty should exercise its powers."
Ibid. 52.
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sovereign. Unless this sovereign can be isolated, one cannot
be sure that a law is valid, since it may turn out that it was not
prescribed by the sovereign. In the words of Frederic Harnson:
"But there are no limits to the absolute power of the sovereign
within the range of municipal law; or, in other words, to the
lawyer, there are none.
Law, for the purposes of
the lawyer, is a species of command issued by such a political
supreme authority, to its political inferiors or subjects habitually obeying it. Nothing that is not a command is law; and
nothing commanded by anything but the supreme authority,
as already defined, is law." 18
Sovereignty and law are thus inseparably linked. The sovereign having been located, the lawyer simply accepts his
orders as law, without further consideration. This makes for
simplicity and certainty in the law, and reduces sovereignty
to a comparatively simple proposition as it relates to the prob-·
lem of law.
The meaning of determinateness is not to be too narrowly
circumscribed. It may mean a single person or a group of
persons. Austin himself attributed sovereignty to a specific
person, or a specific group; or to the person or group which
comes within a certain class. Thus in England sovereignty
rests in the King in Parliament, that is in those persons who at
the time happen to be the King, the members of the House
of Lords, and the members of the House of Commons. Where
the sovereign is a single person, it is easier to understand the
18
Harrison, "The English School of Jurisprudence," (I 8 78) 3o FoRTNIGHTLY
REV. 475 at 484. Laski, "The Theory of Popular Sovereignty," (I9I9) I7
MICH. L. REv. 2oi at 2I4, says: "For the lawyer, all that is immediately necessary, is a knowledge of the authorities that are legally competent to deal with the
problems that arise. For him, then, the idea of sovereignty has a particular and
definite meaning. It does not matter that an act is socially harmful or unpopular or morally wrong; if it issues from the authority competent to act, and is
issued in due form, he has, from the legal stand-point, no further problems."
See also, Ritchie, "On the Conception of Sovereignty," (I89I) I AM. ACAD.
PoL. SCI. ANNALS 385; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (I928)
293-294·
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fact of his being sovereign. But a group, as long as it is definitely ascertainable, no matter how numerous, may also be
sovereign according to the writers. Although it is combined
for action according to artificial rules, it nevertheless is sovereign. When the group acts, it acts corporately. This would
seem to answer the objection of Dewey, who asks: "Admit, however, that sovereignty can be thus latent, then is
every individual who composes this possible electorate a
sharer in sovereignty?" 19 The sovereign may regulate the
individual members of the group at will, and still be sovereign, as each person when acting does not exercise an individual bit of sovereignty but the corporate sovereignty which
belongs to the whole group.
It has been seen that by sovereignty is meant unlimited
law-making power. There have been many who have asserted
that such a power must reside somewhere within every state. 20
Instead of being an abstract conception, applicable only to
certain types of modern states, it has been thought to be a
universal. Sovereignty has been placed in the King or Emperor. In England it is asserted to be in Parliament. In France
(up to I 940 at any rate) it has been thought of as being in
the Constituent Convention. In the United States it is con19
Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," ( r894) 9 PoL. Sci. Q. 31 at 39·
John Chipman Gray also seems to have overlooked the corporate nature of the
exercise of sovereignty. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909)
§ 176. And likewise, BLiss, OF SoVEREIGNTY ( r88 5) 125.
20
"However they began, or by what right soever they subsist, there is and
must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority,
in which the jura summa imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside." r BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ( r 7 56) 49· See also Ritchie, "On the Conception of
Sovereignty," ( 1891) r AM. ACAD. PoL. SCI. ANNALS 3 8 5; WILLOUGHBY, THE
NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 183, 195, 206.
John Dickinson rests sovereignty not on an imperative theory of law, but "on
the need for a single source of authoritative formulation." Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," ( 1927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 524 at 525, note. "Sovereignty in the legal sense is after all nothing more or less than a logical postulate
or presupposition of any system according to law." Ibid. 525· See also, MARKBY,
ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (1905) § 36; EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 272; CoHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (1937) 145•
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stantly reiterated that it is in the people of the United States.
A group of French publicists of the early nineteenth century,
Cousin, Guizot, and Constant, asserted the sovereignty of
reason. 21
Closer analysis reveals, however, that there is no inherent
necessity that a sovereign exist within a state. A study of early
civilization reveals that many states have existed where there
was no unlimited law-making power, and where custom or
religion furnished the chief sources of the law. The kings and
emperors of the Middle Ages regarded themselves as subject to the Law of God and the Law of Nature. With the
establishment of the modern independent states of Europe,
however, there came to be a real sovereign within each state.
But the federal or composite state still presented the possibility of there being no sovereign in the state. If the framers of
the Constitution had omitted any provision for amendment,
as they might have done, it is difficult to see that there would
be any sovereign in the United States. 22 Possibly an implied
power to make amendments in the same manner that the
Constitution was adopted would be inferred. But even this
possibility might have been anticipated by an express provision of the original Constitution that there should never be
any amendments. Under this state of affairs the federal government would be confined to the powers granted to it, and
the states to all other powers except those expressly denied
to the states or those reserved to the people. Thus there could
21
MERRIAM, HISTORY oF THE THEORY oF SovEREIGNTY SINCE RoussEAU
(1900) 75-79. Bliss would eliminate the concept of sovereignty altogether.
Buss, OF SovEREIGNTY (1885) 57 1 173, 175. Edwin D. Dickinson says that
sovereignty "has been an excuse for vanity, a subterfuge for selfish ambition, and
a screen for ignorance in international relations. Rarely if ever has it expressed
a legal principle or standard unmistakably relevant to the substance of the particular problem or controversy." Dickinson, "New Avenues to Freedom,"
(1931) zs MICHL. REv. 6zz at 6zs.
22
DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 143; BROWN, THE
AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) 157, note; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE
AUSTINIAN THEORIES OF LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY (192.9) 70.
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be no redistribution of powers among the states and the federal government and the people. Inasmuch as the essence of
sovereignty according to the usual definition consists in the
ability to fix the sovereign's own competence, and that of the
inferior groups, there would demonstrably be no sovereign.
B. LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED STATES

It is conceivable that there might be no sovereign in the
United States. But if there be one, it is a matter of the first
importance to the lawyer to locate it, since it lies within the
theoretical power of that sovereign to alter every rule which
he is accustomed to regard as law. In the United States,
powers are first divided between the federal government and
the states. These powers in turn are subdivided between the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of each government. Outside of all these are the powers forbidden to
the federal government, or to the state governments, and the
powers reserved to the people. Apart even from these is the
amending capacity itself, which can only be exercised by the
federal government and the states jointly.
A theory which seems to have been the prevalent one during the period immediately after the Constitutional Convention was that sovereignty was divided between the states and
the nation. 23 But sovereignty by definition is indivisible. The
states and the federal government simply had plenary powers
"" I STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
3d ed. (I858) §§ 207, 208; Cooley, "Sovereignty in the United States," (I892)
I MICH. L. J. 8 I. Willoughby refers to all the legislative organs of the state,
as well as the amending body, as exercising sovereign powers. He says that
"all organs through which are expressed the volitions of the State, be they
parliaments, courts, constitutional assemblies or electorates, are to be considered
as exercising sovereign power, and as constituting in the aggregate the depository
in which the State's Sovereignty is located." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF
THE STATE (I928) 307. See also BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND }URISPRUDENCE (I90I) 507. It would seem more accurate, however, to say that
ordinary legislative bodies merely exercise powers which have been delegated
·to them by the sovereign.
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as to specific matters, and neither party could interfere with
the powers of the other. Neither could determine its own
legal competence. Both were subject to the amending body.
Both the states and the federal government began later to
claim exclusive sovereignty, and in the end all the disputants
came to agree that sovereignty was a unit and indivisible.
A second theory, made popular chiefly through the efforts
of John Calhoun, was that sovereignty resides in the states.
So firmly was the theory held that it largely brought on the
Civil War. But when the tests of sovereignty described above
are applied, it becomes evident that the view has no sound
basis. The clauses of the original Constitution itself show the
limitations which were placed on the so-called sovereignty
of the states. Article One, section IO, forbids the states to make
treaties, coin money, emit bills of credit, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, to lay duties on imports or exports, to lay tonnage
duties, to keep troops or warships in time of peace, to enter
into any agreement with another state, or with a foreign
power, or to engage in war unless actually invaded. The Civil
War Amendments and the recent amendments stripped them
of further powers. A single state cannot amend the Constitution. The amending body is superior to it, and the state is
bound by an amendment even though it does not ratify it. 24
24

It has frequently been pointed out that the subjection of the states to the
amending power makes the United States a nation, instead of a confederacy.
State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (r834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) rat 171, 172, 179
(argument of Blanding); Madison in the debates of the Virginia Convention
ratifying the Constitution, 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION (1937 reprint of 1836 2d ed.) 93-97; r CURTIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (r899) 613; 2 ibid. 19,
note; 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW
( r 829), Appendix 38; r BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND CoMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1891) 144; HART, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
FEDERAL GovERNMENT (r89r) r8; JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNvENTIONS,
4th ed. (r887) §§ 38, 57; PoMEROY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, roth ed. (r888)
§III; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 263. The same
argument was made as to the status of the states in Germany. EMERSON, STATE
AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY (1928) 99·
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The state therefore fails as to both tests of sovereignty: it has
no unlimited law-making power, and it is subject to a superior, the amending body.
During and immediately after the Civil War, the theory
of sovereignty veered to the other extreme, and it was alleged
that sovereignty was in the nation or in the federal government. Assuming that there is such a thing as external sovereignty, it is perhaps substantially correct to say that it is vested
in the federal government. Yet the treaty-making power is
subject to limitations, so that the government does not have
even a complete external sovereignty. As to internal powers,
the federal government has only the powers expressly or
impliedly conferred on it, and all other powers not prohibited to the states are reserved to the states or to the people.
Thus from one point of view the federal government has
even less power than the states. Moreover, the federal government, like the states,-cannot amend the Constitution, and
is itself subject to the amending body. It should be noted,
however, that the recent decisions on the child labor amendment look in the direction of making Congress in effect the
sovereign by an application of the doctrine of political questions.25
The doctrine of the Supreme Court and of many of the
leading commentators on constitutional law has been, and
still seems to be, that sovereignty is located in the people. 26
This doctrine is ambiguous, perhaps conveniently so. As
someone has pithily remarked, its "only force lies in the reputation of its advocates." Savigny has pointed out that in gen.. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v.
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992.
"" ". . . the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the
present constitution. It is remarkable, that in establishing it, the people exercised
their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and conscious of the plenitude
of it, they declared with becoming dignity 'We, the people of the United States,
do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Here we see the people acting as
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it was their will, that the state governments should
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eral "people" may have at least four meanings. 27 It may in
its broadest sense include all the persons living within the
state during the whole time of the existence of the state. Obviously it is difficult to view a legal rule as proceeding from
such a group. In the second place, it may mean the sum of all
the individuals as an organized group living within the state
be bound, and to which the state constitutions should be made to conform." Jay,
C. J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 at 470-471. See
also the opinion of Wilson, J., at 454·
"The people of the United States, as one great political community, have
willed that a certain portion of the government • • . should be deposited in
and exercised by a national government; and that all matters of merely local
interest should be deposited in and exercised by the state governments." Bradley,
J., dissenting in Keith v. Clark, (1878) 97 U.S. 454 at 476.
"The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different
departments of its government; but in the people from whom the government
emanated, and who may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then, in this
country, abides with the constituency and not with the agent." Spooner v.
McConnell, (C. C. Ohio 1838) r McLean 337 at 347, F. Cas. No. IJ245·
"But in the last analysis the people are the sovereigns, and both the states and
the United States are only serving instrumentalities. \Vhatever limitations are
on such sovereignty are self-imposed." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J.
1920) 264 F. r86 at 191.
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, (r8r9) 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316; Cohens
v. Virginia, (r82r) 6 Wheat. (r9 U.S.) 264 at 413; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
(r886) 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. ro64. Sovereignty was asserted to be in the
people of the states and not of the nation by McLean, J., in Worcester v.
Georgia, (r832) 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 515; and Taney, C. J., in Ableman v. Booth,
(r858) 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 at 524. Jameson asserts that the view of
popular sovereignty is accepted by "nearly all the writers, judges and lawyers
who have expressed opinions on the subjects in the United States." Jameson,
"National Sovereignty," ( r89o) 5 PoL. Sci. Q. 19 3 at 194. This is also the
view of WooDROW WILSON, THE STATE (r9o6) 6ro. See also Willis, "The
Doctrine of Sovereignty under the United States Constitution," ( 1929) 15 VA. L.
REV.437·
If sovereignty be dropped as a legal term and viewed solely as a term of
political science and philosophy, the views of the Supreme Court and the writers
are doubtless correct. It has been asserted that state sovereignty "is primarily
not a legal, but a philosophical conception." Brierly, "The Shortcomings of
International Law," BRITISH YEAR BooK (1924) 4 at 12. Pittman B. Potter
says that it was a doctrine "which political scientists invented." Potter, "Political
Science in the International Field," (1923) 17 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 381 at 385.
Walter Thompson states that "it is doubtful if sovereignty can be retained as
a purely legal concept." Book Review, (1938) 32 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 128 at
129.

"'r SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN KOMISCHEN RECHTS (r84o) § ro; see
also Briggs, "Sovereignty and the Consent of the Governed," (r9or) 35 AM.
L. REv. 49·
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at the same time. The third view is that it means the latter
individuals with the exception of the government. In the
fourthplace, it may mean in republican states that particular
organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
Constitution, the highest power really exists.28 Possibly this
is what the Supreme Court has meant when it referred to the
people as being sovereign. But its language has been altogether too indefinite to make this clear.
With particular reference to the United States, by people
may be meant either the people of the United States or the
people of the individual states. The view of the Supreme
·Court has been that it means the former. Even accepting the
former as being correct, it is not clear whether that means
simply the electorate, or all citizens of the United States/9 or
the people as a politically organized mass, 30 or the people as
.
.
an morgamc mass.
The Constitution nowhere expressly refers to the people as
sovereign. The assertions in the Declaration of Independence
of the inalienable rights of the· people to liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the right to alter and abolish the government are nowhere repeated. Virtually the only mention
of the people is in the Preamble and in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. According to the Preamble the people of the
28
"In the United States, indeed, the 'people' are the one original source of law,
but it is the people in their entirely definite, aggregate, political, that is constitutional organization that is meant here." 2 VON HoLsT, CoNSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1879) 75·
"""The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the
power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are
what we call familiarly the 'sovereign people' and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty." Dred Scott v. Sanford,
(r8s6) 19 How. (6o U.S.) 393 at 404.
30
"But who are the people? In the true sense of the term, it means the
political society considered as a unit, comprising in one organization the entire
population of the state, of all ages, sexes, and conditions." }AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (r887) § 568.
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United States ordain and establish the Constitution. But it is
a remarkable fact that the Preamble as originally drawn
named each of the thirteen states individually and that a
change was made only because it was not known which states
would ratify the Constitution. 31 Moreover the Preamble has
no legal force. Even if the people were sovereign when they
drew up the Constitution, they must be regarded as having
given up their sovereignty when they provided for amendment by others than themselves. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The Tenth provides: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Neither amendment confers any
affirmative powers on the people, nor clarifies the meaning
of the word. Sovereignty or the power to amend can scarcely
be derived from them. The Supreme Court has recently denied the right of popular referendum on amendments. 32
It would seem clear that sovereignty does not lie in the
corporate mass of the people of the United States, or in the
organized citizenry. They have not the power to amend the
Constitution. They do not even participate in the election
of those who do have the amending power. The only sovereignty which they can be said to have is of a strictly nonlegal character, that of the force of public opinion and physical force. If such a test is adopted, there is no state now, and
there has been no time in history when the people were not
soveretgn.
It is, to be sure, somewhat closer to the truth to speak of the
electorate as sovereign. But even that group does not meet the
test of sovereignty. It cannot determine its own competence,
81

12

5 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1836) 376.
Hawke v. Smith, (19zo) z53 U.S. zz1, 40 S. Ct. 495·
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and it is subject to a superior power. It simply elects those
who do exercise the amending capacity. But election does
not take place by a simple majority of the nation, or by a
three-fourths majority. The election occurs within the limits
of each state, and it is three-fourths of the states and not of
the aggregate people that adopt amendments. The amending
body is not the agent or the trustee of the electorate. 33 Once
elected, the members of Congress and the state legislatures
are free to adopt what amendments they will. They are ultimately politically accountable to the people, but not legally
so. The mere act of voting for those who exercise the amending capacity is not the passing of a law. It is a mere ministerial
act at the most and does not bring into being a rule of law.
Even the exercise of the voting capacity occurs in most cases
biennially. 34 In the event of the proposal of amendments by
a national convention or ratification by state conventions, the
electorate would as a matter of fact exercise considerable influence on particular constitutional changes, since election
would be on the basis of the candidate's attitude towards the
proposed amendments. But when proposal is by Congress and
ratification by the legislatures, so many issues are involved
in the election that the candidate's attitude concerning proposed amendments is likely to be overlooked or ignored.
Only in the event that Article Five was amended so that the
33

DrcEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (I 9I5) 45; Ritchie, "On
the Conception of Sovereignty," (1891) I AM. ACAD. PoL. Scr. ANNALS 385 at
392; LEWIS, SOME REMARKS ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SoME POLITICAL
TERMS (I832) 43; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (I 9 oi)
510,538. D. 0. McGovney seems in error when he argues that sovereignty "resides in the whole people of the United States conceived of as one nation" since
the amending "machinery consists throughout of representatives of the people."
McGovney, "Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void Because of Its Contents?"
(I 920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 499 at 506. Bruce Williams adopts the same line of
reasoning in "The Popular Mandate on Constitutional Amendments," ( 192 I)
7 VA. L. REV. 28o at 283.
34
"How can a people be sovereign when, e. g., they may pass upon public
matters only once in four years, or may have their legislative acts revoked by
juristic review/" WARD, SOVEREIGNTY (I928) 32.
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electorate actually voted on a proposed amendment could it
be said that the electorate was sovereign; and if each state
were counted as a unit, as it is now, sovereignty would be regarded as in the electorates of the states and not of the nation.
Even then it would be necessary to say that sovereignty is
in the electorate together with the body which proposed the
amendment. Not until the electorate is given both the initiative and the referendum on amendments will it be strictly
accurate to speak of it as sovereign.35 Even then, if the other
modes of proposal and ratification are retained, there will remain the possibility of the exercise of sovereignty by other
groups besides the people.
The people of the United States as an aggregate mass may
perhaps be regarded as having been truly sovereign at only
one time. This was when they adopted the Constitution. 36
This act of sovereignty was, however, a revolution and had
no legal basis. Under the Articles of Confederation sovereignty was located in each state, and amendment of the Articles was valid only when every state concurred through ratification by its legislature after proposal by Congress. The
Constitution was proposed by a Convention, was ratified by
conventions, and was considered as established between the
ratifying states when nine states had ratified. The people of
the United States may be regarded as having acted in a sovereign capacity by having ignored the Articles of Confederation and perhaps their own state constitutions. When critically
"""The legal assumption that sovereignty is ultim.ately vested in the people
affords no legal basis for the direct exercise by the people of any sovereign power
whose direct exercise by them has not been expressly or impliedly reserved.
Thus the people possess the power of legislating directly only if their constitution
SO provides." ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8..
86
"The people themselves in their natural, inherent sovereignty, but rarely
interpose and decide,-never but in making or altering a constitution." 9 DANE,
A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix
65. It has been asserted that the true sovereign has acted only three times in the
United States: when it adopted the Declaration of Independence, the Articles
of Confederation, and the Constitution. Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign,"
(1930) 39 YALE L. }. 514 at 525·
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examined, however, their alleged acts of sovereignty dwindle
in scope. The electorate which participated in the elections
of the state ratifying conventions was perhaps about a twentieth
of the entire population. 37 Moreover, Congress and the state
legislatures gave their stamp of approval to the Constitution.
Thus the sole revolutionary act was ratification by less than a
unanimous vote. Even the effect of this violation was considerably mitigated by providing that the Constitution should
be binding only on those states which ratified it. It should also
be noted that the members of the Constitutional Convention
were elected by states and voted by states during its session.
Ratification also occurred by states, and not by an aggregate
popular vote or by a national convention of the people of the
United States.
If the people of the United States ever had sovereignty,
they must be regarded as having surrendered it by the adoption of Article Five. 38 All future changes were to be made not
by the people but by the amending body. The original sover37
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1935) 250. I AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 3293 3 o, says: "In a few societies political and independent (as, for example, in the
Anglo-American States), the sovereign political government has been determined at once, and agreeably to a scheme or plan. But, even in these societies,
the parties who determined the constitution (either as scheming or planning, or
as simply voting or adopting it) were merely a slender portion of the whole
of the independent community, and were virtually sovereign therein before the
constitution was determined; insomuch that the constitution was not constructed
by the whole of an inchoate community, but rather was constructed by a fraction
of a community already consummate or complete." See also BROWN, THE
AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) §_417,
08
The Constitution "is supreme over the people of the United States, aggregately and in their separate sovereignties, because they have excluded themselves
from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to it, and have
directed that amendments should be made representatively for them .• , ."
Dodge v. Woolsey, (r855) r8 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 348. When the people
adopted the Constitution, "they delegated the power of amendment to their
representatives, designating them and prescribing the function of each . . • •
This delegated power the people have never retaken. Having so delegated
the power of amendment, it cannot be executed in any way other than prescribed,
nor by any instrumentality other than there designated." Feigenspan v. Bodine,
(D. C. N. ]. 192o) 264 F. 186 at 199.
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eign created a minor sovereign, the amending body, somewhat lesser than itself. This amending body was subjected to
three limitations, two of which have expired, so that today the
only limitation on the power is the equal suffrage clause. On
the view that the power which may impose such a limitation is
sovereign, the people may be regarded as the sovereign and
the amending body as the agent of the original people. But
even this limitation may be destroyed by a unanimous vote
of the states, and in the case of the deprivation of a particular
state of equality in the Senate by the consent of that state.
Perhaps even this would not be necessary if the doctrine of
political question were applied. Thus it is difficult to see how
a body so powerful as the amending body can be regarded
as the legal agent of the people. Even on the assumption that
it can be regarded as the agent of the people, this can only
mean the agent of the original people, and as they are all dead,
the agency can have no practical importance. The present
amending body, which theoretically can strip the people of
any of the rights which they have, political, property, or
personal, must be regarded as an independent body, and the
people as mere subjects in strict legal theory.
It has sometimes been thought that sovereignty resides in
the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no question
that, except in the case of political questions, the acts of the
other branches of the federal government and of all branches
of the state governments are subject to ultimate review by it
when such acts are in conflict with the Constitution. The Supreme Court has been called the master of the Constitution. 39
It exercises a power not included within the jurisdiction of
the English courts, that of reviewing the acts of the legislature. But the alleged difference between the Supreme Court
and the courts of other nations is not so great as at first blush
appears. Congress is not sovereign; Parliament is. If an act
89

DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION,

8th ed. (1915) 170-171.
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of Congress violates a clause in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court may declare it invalid when a case is brought before it.
But when the amending body changes a clause in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has no power in the matter. True
enough, the amendment must have been adopted according
to the proper procedure. But where the proper procedure has
not been followed, it cannot be said that the sovereign has
acted. An alleged act of Parliament would not be regarded as
law by an English court unless Parliament actually adopted
it in its regular mode. The Supreme Court may also ascertain
the conformity of the amendment to the equal suffrage clause,
but this is probably its only power as to the content of the
amendment. It would not even have this power where every
state ratified, or when the state deprived of its equal suffrage
ratified the amendment so depriving it.
The amending body may nullify a decision of the Supreme
Court. Such was the effect of the Eleventh and the Sixteenth
Amendments. Such would be the effect of the child labor
amendment. It might even abolish the Supreme Court itself.
John Dickinson asserts:
"Should the Supreme Court declare a law unconstitutional,
it remains open to the amending power to reverse this result by so changing the Constitution as to bring the law into
conformity therewith. But even in case this is done, the last
word remains with the Court through its power to establish
authoritatively the validity and meaning of the amendment."40
Perhaps this is true in actual practice. But as a matter of legal
theory it is not. The justices of the Supreme Court take an
oath to support the Constitution. The court is a mere agent
of the United States like the President and Congress. It derives its being from the Constitution, and hence must con.., Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," (I 927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q.
P4 at 540-541.
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form its action to the terms of the instrument. An amendment
adopted according to the proper procedure and not in violation of the equality clause is as much a part of the Constitution as any other clause in the original document. An amendment in unequivocal terms abolishing the Supreme Court
would be as binding on it as any other amendment. It would
seem to be a case of clear usurpation should the court regard
as invalid an amendment which clearly came within the scope
of the amending power. The members of the Supreme Court
are subject to impeachment. The membership of the court
may be increased by Congress. Its decisions may be reversed
by a later court. It has greatly limited its own jurisdiction
by laying down the doctrine of "political questions." In fact,
it has recently done so as to certain phases of the amending
process in the child labor amendment cases. 41 As a matter
of fact, though not of law, the Supreme Court would be very
chary in running counter to the will of the amending body.
As yet it has never set up its view as against that of the amending body.
The tremendous prestige enjoyed by the Constitution may
lead some to think that the document itself must be regarded
as sovereign. Harrington's aphorism about "government of
laws and not of men" is almost a banality in the law of Great
Britain and the United States. But sovereignty, by definition,
must be vested in a person or in a group. Consequently, to say
that sovereignty is in the Constitution is equivalent to saying
that no sovereignty exists. The Constitution was not handed
down on a mountain top like the Ten Commandments. A
determinate group adopted it, and they must at the time, at
least, have been its superior and the then sovereign. The death
of its makers did not leave the Constitution sovereign, because
41

Coleman v. Miller, ( 1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v. Wise,
(1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992.

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AMENDING CLAUSE

151

it at once became subject to alteration by the amending body.
The Constitution itself cannot redistribute the powers of the
federal and the state governments, and being subject to a
superior power, fails in all respects to meet the tests of sovereignty. The Constitution by itself is incapable of action.
Just as the so-called unwritten constitution of Great Britain
is subject to change by Parliament, so the written Constitution
of the United States may be reviewed or abolished by the
amending body. Thus, in one sense, it is as proper to speak of
the Constitution of the United States as having only the force
of morality as it is to speak thus of the constitutional law of
Great Britain.
The development of the theory of the corporate personality
of the state has resulted in the location by some of sovereignty
in the state. W. Jethro Brown says:
"The possibility of the location of the sovereignty in the State
itself is implicitly recognized in all modern theories which
state legal limitations upon the power which ranks highest
in the hierarchy of State institutions. The sovereign is the
source of all law, and so cannot be limited by law; where a
legal limitation is held to exist upon a power claimed to be
sovereign, we are compelled to infer that legal theory looks
beyond the pretended sovereign to the State itself as true sovereign and ultimate source of law." 42
But this theory does not seem to be especially helpful. In the
first place it necessitates a definition of a ~tate. A bog of controversy must be waded through before agreement can be
reached on its juristic meaning. Austin says:
"The state is usually synonymous with 'the sovereign.' It denotes the individual person, or the body of individual per.. BRowN, THE AuSTINIAN THEORY OF LAw (1906) § 541. See also EASTwooD AND KEETON, THE AUSTJNJAN THEORIES OF LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY
(1929) 67, 76; WARD, SoVEREIGNTY (1928) 39-44; EMERSON, STATE AND
SovEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 51-59; Rockow, "The Doctrine
of the Sovereignty of the Constitution," (1931) 25 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 573 at

580.
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sons, which bears the supreme powers in an independent political society." 43
The state is thus made identical with the sovereign. But to
say that the state is the sovereign manifestly does not help
in the search for the sovereign, and merely begs the question.
Gray attacks Austin's definition, asserting that the sovereign is merely an organ of the state. 44 But to view sovereignty
as vested in the abstract conception of the state is, so far as
law is concerned, to make sovereignty an even more metaphysical conception than it now is. Sovereignty can only be
exercised through concrete organs. Unless there is some organ,
either in being or dormant, which can legally pass a given
measure, it is futile to look to a mere legal fiction to accomplish the result. It is not difficult to conceive of a constitution
with so limited an amending capacity that certain measures
can only be passed by revolutionary methods. Doubtless it
43
I AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (I873) 249, note. Burgess says that "in
the transition from one form of state to another, the point of sovereignty moves
from one body to another, and the old sovereign body, i.e. the old state, becomes,
in the new system, only the government, or a part of the government." I BuRGEss, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (I 89I) 68.
The amending clause has a very important bearing on the juristic theory of
the state from the point of view of constitutional law. It is sometimes maintained
by those who have viewed the state in its internal as distinct from its external
aspect that an essential characteristic of the state is that it have a sovereign.
Willoughby says: "But to speak of a State as not being completely organized in
its government, seems as much an absurdity as to say that a man is not completely
organized in his physical frame." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE
(I 928) 206. "An organized community of men either constitute or do not
constitute a State, according to whether there is or is not to be discovered a
supreme will acting upon all persons or other bodies within its limits." Ibid. 224.
The existence of the amending capacity thus supplies the sovereignty which is
necessary to the full and perfect existence of the state. As Burgess says: "The
state, however, was not organized in the confederate constitution; i. e., it could
not legally speak the sovereign command." I BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND
CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (I89I) Ioi.
44
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURCES OF THE LAW (I909) § ISO. Willoughby,
who stresses the juristic status of the state, almost concedes that the state and the
sovereign are identical. "In fact, it is almost correct to say that the sovereign
will is the State, that the State exists only as a supreme controlling will, and that
its life is only displayed in the declaration of binding commands, the enforcement of which is left to mere executive agents." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF
THE STATE (I928) 302,
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would be convenient to have a body which could legally adopt
any proposed measure according to legal forms. But from the
point of view of the lawyer this is not at all a necessity. In a
federal state such as the United States where it is so difficult to
ascertain what the state is, it seems better for the law to ignore
the conception of a state and to emphasize the existence of a
sovereign in the form of an amending body, which, if need be,
may possibly be viewed as the juristic state.
Another theory which once attracted considerable support
was the view that sovereignty is in the states united. By this
is not meant sovereignty in the states severally, nor sovereignty in the federal government, but sovereignty in the aggregate of the states. This was the view of Austin:
"And, lastly, I believe that the sovereignty of each of the
states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal
union, resides in the states' governments as forming one aggregate body: meaning by a state's government, not its ordinary legislature, but the body of its citizens which appoints
its ordinary legislature, and which, the union apart, is properly sovereign therein." 45
John C. Hurd has written a bulky volume in support of this
view. 46 The theory is, however, subject to two criticisms. It regards the electorates of the states united as sovereign. As has
been pointed out, this is a confusion of political sovereignty
with legal sovereignty, inasmuch as the voters have no direct
voice in the creation of constitutional law. In the second place,
it omits Congress from the sovereign power. It is a mistake
to regard the states as sovereign simply because amendments
are ultimately ratified by them. 47 The power of Congress in
'" 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. ( 1873) 268.
'"HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE (r88r), esp. 140, 374•
This book is "Dedicated in Homage to the Sovereign: Whoever He, She, or
They, May Be." The same view is taken by BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1866) zzo-221. See also Richman, "From John Austin to John
C. Hurd," (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv. 353·
17
Dicey omits to include Congress as a part of the Sovereign. DICEY, THE
LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 144-145·
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the matter is at least equal to that of the states. An amendment is never brought about without prior initiation by Congress. Even when a constitutional convention is applied for by
the state legislatures, the call must go forth from Congress.
Congress, moreover, has the power to select the mode of ratification. Looked at from one angle, Congress has a dual capacity in proposing amendments. It actually initiates the
amendment, while, at the same time, its vote in favor of it
is in a way a vote of ratification, inasmuch as, without it, the
amendment cannot even go before the states. It is in Congress
that amendments have been buried. The initiatory powers of
the state legislatures have never as yet been brought to a successful fruition. It thus appears that the powers of the federal
government with reference to amendments are fully equal to
those of the states. A true sovereign must therefore embrace
both governments. The states are sovereign neither individually nor aggregately.
In the last analysis, one is brought to the conclusion that
sovereignty in the United States, if it can be said to exist at
all, is located in the amending body. The amending body has
often been referred to as the sovereign, because it meets the
test of the location of sovereignty. 48 As Willoughby has said:
"In all those cases in which, owing to the distribution of
governing power, there is doubt as to the political body in
48
"In a government controlled and limited by a written Constitution as is ours,
the test of actual sovereignty is to be found in the power to amend the Constitution. When you ascertain where, and how, and by whom that power is exercised, you have located the source of sovereignty." Potter, "The Method of
Amending the Federal Constitution," (1909) 57 U. PA. L. REv. 589 at 592. See
also State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (1834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) 1 (an early case
with a valuable discussion of the relation of sovereignty to the amending power)
at 61 (argument of Grimke), 127 (of M'Willie), at 165, 166, 169, 172 (of
Blanding), at 108 (of Smith, Attorney General), at 221 (opinion of O'Neall,
J.), at 259, 26o1 263 (dissenting opinion of Harper, J.); BLiss, OF SovEREIGNTY (1885) 114, 124 ff.; Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty,"
(1894) 9 PoL. Sci. Q. 31 at 39; DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th
ed. (1915) 51 I44-I45; HART, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF FEDERAL
GoVERNMENT (I 89 I) 12; Lansing, "Notes on Sovereignty in a State," (I 907)
I AM. J. INT. LAW I05 at 126, who says, however, that the English doctrine
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which the Sovereignty rests, the test to be applied is the determination of which authority has, in the last instance, the
legal power to determine its own competence as well as that of
others." 49
In Germany, where the problem of the location of sovereignty has also been complicated by the existence of a composite state, the publicists have similarly developed what is
known as the Kompetenz-Kompetenz theory. 50 Hobbes, the
first Englishman with whom the theory of sovereignty is
prominently associated, expressed the same view when he
said that "the legislator is he, not by whose authority the law
was first made, but by whose authority, it continues to be a
law." 51
Applying the criteria of sovereignty which were laid down
at the beginning of this chapter, the amending body is sovereign as a matter of both law and fact. Article Fiveexpressly
creates the amending body. Yet in a certain manner of speaking the amending body may be said to exist as a matter of fact
since it could proceed to alter Article Five or any other part
of the Constitution. While it is true that the sovereign cannot
act otherwise than in compliance with law, it is equally true
that it creates the law in accordance with which it is to act.
of sovereignty is incapable of "being usefully applied" to constitutions like that
of the United States; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (1924) 531, note k;
PoLLOCK, A FIRST BooK OF JuRISPRUDENCE, 6th ed. (1929) 278; SIDGWICK,
THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS ( 1891) 17, 6o2; Williams, "The Popular Mandate
on Constitutional Amendments," (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 28o at 293, who asserts
that the implication of Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495,
is "that legal sovereignty in the United States rests in those bodies which are
capable of altering or amending the Constitution"; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE
OF THE STATE (1928) 260 :ff., 304.
'"'WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 197· See also Radin,
"The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 514 at 523, 526; Pennock, "Law and Sovereignty," (1937) 3I AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 617 at 632;
Uhl, "Sovereignty and the Fifth Article," (I 9 3 6) I 6 SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL
SCI. Q., No.4, p. I at IS·
150
MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU
(1900) 19o-196. See also EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN
GERMANY (19z8).
01
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), C. xxvi, par. 9·
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And the doctrine of political questions in effect lessens the
legal restraints on sovereignty. In practice most sovereigns
come into being as a matter of fact. Thus originally the Constitution was adopted as a revolutionary act, and the amending body, resting as it does on a part of the Constitution, was
at first a de facto sovereign. The passage of time has made
people forget that the Constitution was in its origin anything
but legal, so that today the amending body may be viewed
as sovereign in law and in fact.
In the second place, the amending body has absolute lawmaking power, unless factual limitations be also viewed as
legal limitations. At any rate it is possible to go as far as
Bentham, who says that the sovereign has indefinite lawmaking power. 52 The amending body may strip the federal
government of all its powers, or it may consolidate all the
states into a single unitary state. It may place the powers of
all three departments of government in a single department.
It may legislate, as by passing a prohibition amendment. It
may act as a court, as by overruling a decision of the Supreme
Court. It may add to or subtract from the powers reserved to
the people. It may alter the very amending body itself. It may
revise not only the rules of constitutional and criminal law,
but those of property and contract. It may strip the individual
of personal liberty which he may have regarded as inalienable.
That it will attempt to do all or even a small part of these
things is unlikely. The outcome doubtless would be a revolution. But that it has an indefinite power to do any particular
one of these things cannot be denied. As DeLolme says of
Parliament, so it may be said of the amending body, that it
"can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a
woman."
112

BENTHAM, A

par. xxiii.

FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT,

1st ed.

(1776), c.

iv,
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From one point of view, the power of the amending body is
even more despotic than that of the British Parliament. The
common view is that one Parliament is not bound by the laws
of a previous Parliament. That is, in actuality, there is an
implied limitation on sovereignty with reference to time. But
in the United States the amending body might arguably by
express provision forbid any future change of a clause in the
Constitution. For instance, the Corwin amendment provided
that the Constitution should never be amended so as to abolish
slavery. 53 However, this, like the equality provision, could
probably be repealed by a unanimous vote of the states. The
original Constitution forbade any amendment with reference
to the slave trade or the imposition of a direct tax without apportionment prior to I 8o8. The equal suffrage clause is still
a limitation on the ordinary amending power. The amending
body might amend the amending clause or might arguably
abolish itself, so that legally there would be no possibility of
amendment. It might provide for an altogether different type
of amending body, so that an entirely different kind of sovereign would come into being. Sovereignty, viewed in the broadest sense, may be regarded as the power to make a law on any
subject binding for all time in all places. This capacity theoretically exists in the amending body. However inexpedient
such an amendment might be, it would seem that that would
be the view of many American lawyers. 54 There are not many
who assert that the ordinary amending body could abolish
the equal suffrage clause. It would seem that under the prevailing legalistic interpretation of the Constitution an absolute
prohibition against amendment could be overcome only by
revolution. 55
03

H. J. R. 8o, CoNG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., zd sess. (I 86I) 12.63.
"'Austin, however, is of the view that the sovereign cannot bind its successor.
I AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 5th ed. (I88s) 2.63-2.64.
56
But Professor RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I939) 9-Io, states:
"There has been found no case in which the power to amend has been employed
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From a legal standpoint it is not a necessary concomitant
of this absolute law-making power that every amendment be
enforceable. The lawyer is interested only in the source of the
act, and that source being authoritative, he will ask no more
questions. The lack of enforcement of the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments did not detract from their legal character.
Of course, if the whole Constitution was ignored over a considerable period, there would probably be a change in the
sovereign. But for ordinary purposes, when the amending
body has acted, the lawyer accepts its command as law.
The amending body is determinate. It has been pointed out
that sovereignty may reside in a group as well as in a person.
Moreover, this group need not be a single organized body
meeting at one place, but may be composed of several groups
viewed as a corporate unit. As John Dickinson says, "sovereignty can be exercised by a system of organs properly geared
together no less than by a single organ." 56 Hence it is that
sovereignty may be regarded as being in the amending body
though that body is composed of both federal and state units
meeting at forty-nine different places. All the units are viewed
as one single corporate or collegiate body, and each when it
acts does not exercise its own sovereignty but exercise_s the
corporate sovereignty. Doubtless the three-fourths majority
of the states that combine to adopt one amendment will be dito directly or indirectly modify a constitutional provision expressly excepted
from that power. The issues that such an attempt would raise could not be
settled by any reasoning derived by logical processes from prevailing conceptions of sovereignty, and those based on considerations of convenience and
expediency point to the solution that such attempts to limit the power of
amendment should be held futile. The necessities of orderly government do
not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all
future generations."
50
Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," (1927) 42 PoL. Sci.
Q. 524 at 539· This would seem to meet the objection of Bliss, who argues
that an amendment requires "the action of the federal State and of the several
local States, each in its own sphere. There is no one sovereignty, or one sovereign
people, or aggregate of peoples, that can make the change." BLiss, OF SOVEREIGNTY (188 5 ) 114.
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vided as to another. But this does not detract from the sovereign character of the amending power any more than in the
case of Parliament, which also acts by a majority. 57 Sovereignty is not in any specific three-fourths of the states, but it
is clear that it always is in any three-fourths of them that unite
in ratifying an amendment. Similarly it is never clear whether
proposal of amendments will be by Congress or by a convention, nor whether ratification will be by the state legislatures
or by conventions. Yet when these have acted, it appears that
the sovereign has acted. The sovereign is a real sovereign,
though one fluctuating in its composition. It is known only
after it has acted. The groups in whom the possibility of
amending resides are the potential sovereign, and in that sense
it may be said that sovereignty resides in the full quota of all
possible amending groups. But the exercise of sovereignty,
which is of more interest to the lawyer than its residence, is by
the actual amending power at a given time. The larger group
is merely a container of the smaller, and there is no difference
as to the legal effects of their acts. The larger group is merely
the political group from which over a long period every state
at some time or other will be a part of the amending power.
There· is one type of situation where prima facie it seems
that a minority is sovereign in the United States. A minority
of the states may block an amendment. A single state may
defeat the abolition of the equal suffrage clause. But a true
sovereign must have no superior and must have affirmative
law-making power. A minority is superior only in a negative
way. As Gray admits, "this minority cannot be called Sovereign; except as an obstacle to amending the Constitution, it is
powerless." 58
57

"The Austinian sovereign acts only by a majority, never in fact by its
total membership. . • ." Jameson, "National Sovereignty," (189o) 5 PoL.
SCI. Q. 193 at 200. See also MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1888)
J51-J52.
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GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 177.
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It is a peculiarity of the American sovereign that who it is
can never be known precisely until it has acted. 59 This does
not detract from its sovereign character, as it is enough that it
is definitely known when it has acted. There are four possible
combinations of the amending body in the United States. In
every instance except one the power has been made up of
Congress and the state legislatures. In the case of the TwentyFirst Amendment it was made up of Congress and the state
conventions. It may also be made up of two-thirds of the state
legislatures applying for a convention, Congress in calling the
Convention, the Convention, Congress in selecting the mode
of ratification, and the state legislatures in ratifying. A fourth
possible combination is of the legislatures in applying for a
convention, Congress in calling it, the Convention, Congress
in selecting the mode of ratification, and state conventions in
ratifying. Congress thus must participate in any amendment,
and has the power of selecting which group shall be the ratifying part of the sovereign. The group within the group that
acts as part of the sovereign may also fluctuate. The twothirds of Congress which proposes one amendment will vary
from the group which proposes another. Similarly the threefourths majority of the states which ratifies one amendment
will differ from the majority which ratifies another.
The amending body as a corporate unit is responsible to no
one. But the groups of which it is composed have no such
freedom. The amending body may abolish or strip any of the
groups of its powers. The result of abolishing either the federal or the state groups would, however, be to destroy the
federal character of the United States. If the state groups were
destroyed, the United States would in effect become a unitary
state. On the other hand, if the federal group were abolished,
.. "We come here, as before to an insoluble contradiction; sovereignty is not
determinate until after it has been exercised-until the vote has been taken."
Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," (x 894) 9 PoL. Scr. Q. 3 x at 40.
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the Union would be on its way to a mere confederation. While
it would be legal to change the composition of the sovereign,
the suggested changes would mean the destruction of the
federal status.
It has sometimes been thought that the sovereign must be
constantly in session or must act frequently. 6° From a legal
standpoint this is not necessary. A latent potential sovereign is
enough. The dissolution of the House of Commons makes
Parliament nonetheless the sovereign. An Asiatic despot is
sovereign even when asleep. A half a century elapsed between
the passage of the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Amendments,
so that the amending power was regarded as so dormant a
sovereign as not to be worthy of the name. The three Civil
War Amendments were adopted within a five-year span.
Forty years passed with no further changes. But within the
seven-year period from I 9 I 3 to I 920, four amendments of
outstanding importance were adopted, and a child labor
amendment was shortly thereafter proposed to the states.
The Twentieth and Twenty-First Amendments were adopted
in the early I 930's. The sovereign has become so vigorous that
there are now many who would seek to curb it. The formerly
prevalent view as to the weakness of the sovereign has now
either swung to the opposite extreme, or maintains that it has
just the proper degree of strength. During periods of nonaction it may perhaps be said, with some equivocation, that
"""Suppose a generation has passed away since any amendment has been passed,
or since any legislature has acted upon any amendment proposed by Congress;
where is the portion or class constituting the sovereign to be found?" Dewey,
ibid. at 39· "Under a federal as under a unitarian system there exists a
sovereign power, but the sovereign is in a federal state a despot hard to rouse.
He is not, like the English Parliament, an ever-wakeful legislature, but a
monarch who slumbers and sleeps. • . . But a monarch who slumbers for
years is like a monarch who does not exist." DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 145· See also BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF
LAW (1906) 148, note at 153; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND }URISPRUDENCE (1901) 539; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928)
305; EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY (1928) 271 1
note 6; Chafee, Book Review, (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 979 at 98o,
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the sovereign commands what it permits. 61 Legal sovereignty
may be in abeyance. The theory of sovereignty does not have
the same significance in the United States as it does in England, inasmuch as it is an organization behind that of the
regular government and because so large a majority is required for it to act. Under such circumstances it is easily explicable why so little thought is devoted to the alleged sovereign and why so much attention is given to the powers of the
organs of government as distributed under the existing Constitution. The events of recent American history are likely
to result in the study the subject deserves.
Perhaps the leading obstacle to the recognition of sovereignty in the amending body is the limitation imposed by the
equal suffrage in the Senate clause. 62 In reply it must be noted
that the proviso has no practical significance as to most amendments that might be proposed. Strictly speaking, it is doubtless correct to say that the existence of the clause precludes the
ordinary amending body from being regarded as sovereign.
But even that clause is not an absolute limitation on the
amending power, as has been pointed out in Chapter IV. The
two earlier absolute limitations which existed until r 808 are
61
S!DGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS ( 189 I) 6o2, says: "Suppose that
the body which can dismiss the otherwise supreme government does not dismiss
it and gives no directions. Is it still supremel-assuming that its inactivity
is not due to fear. I think we must say that the power of dismissal-or any
other power of giving orders--is still possessed though it is not exercised;
assuming that the inactive organ would be obeyed if it gave orders. • • • I
think we must attribute supreme power to any individual or body completely
capable of corporate action, which admittedly can withdraw power at will
from a government otherwise supreme." Markby says that though "the ultimate sovereign power was generally dormant, and was only called into active
existence on rare and special occasions," this is "not inconsistent with sovereignty,
or with our conception of a political society; but it is a peculiarity." MARKBY,
ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (I905) § 33·
82
BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (I 90 I) 540; GRAY,
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (I909) §§ I78-I8o; LASKI, THE
PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY (I 9 I 7) 267i Ritchie, "On the Conception of
Sovereignty," (I89I) I AM. AcAD. PoL. Sci. ANNALS 385 at 397; SALMOND,
JuRISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (I924) SJI, note k; State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt,
(I834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) I at 84 (argument of Finley).
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gone, so that today there is no limitation whatever on the
amending power when every state is included. 63 The requirement of unanimous consent makes the sovereign no less such. 64
Moreover, possibly the doctrine of "political questions" applies so that even the ordinary amending body could act without restraint. The provisions of Article Five as to procedure
are not to be regarded as limitations, since the sovereign cannot be said to be acting when the proper procedure is not
followed. 65 Here again the doctrine of "political questions"
applies, at least to some phases of the amending procedure.
In conclusion it seems well to consider what should be the
attitude of the lawyer to the sovereign in the form of the
amending body. First of all, it seems that the lawyer should
welcome its definite location, since he as much as anyone
should be interested in the body which has in its power the
ultimate determination of what shall be the law. At first blush
it may seem to hark back to the days of despotism to accept
a body with such unlimited power. But if there be such a
power it is desirable to know in whom it is vested. When the
force of public opinion can be focused on a body with definite
powers, it may perhaps be more readily held morally accountable.66 Moreover, as W. Jethro Brown points out, "one
63
Ritchie, "On the Conception of Sovereignty," (I 89I) I AM. AcAD. PoL.
Sci. ANNALS 385 at 398, says that "Austin, in his search for determinate persons,
must wander about till he finds George Washington, James Madison, and a
large number of other persons who (a Scotchman may be permitted, and expected, to remark) are now dead." But the possibility of amendment by all
the states avoids the necessity of imputing sovereignty to the makers of the
Constitution.
•• "But the fact that it is so formally limited does not mean that the power
does not exist, any more than it is claimed that the Polish assembly had not
the legislative power because of the existence of the liberum veto." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (I92.8) 2.64.
65
"Even the manner in which, or the determination of the person by whom,
the Legal Sovereign is chosen is a matter distinct from the nature and scope of
his authority. He is none the less Sovereign in the contemplation of law because
he reigns not by his own right but by the choice of others. • • ." BRYCE,
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (I90I) 5IO.
66
"It is much better that the law in all its harshness and its makers in all
their legal irresponsibility should stand out clearly before the eyes of those who
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of the great advantages of having a legal sovereign is to make
a revolution under the forms of law possible." 67
In the second place, there need be no fear of possible
tyrannical acts of the sovereign. An extraordinary majority is
required for it to act. Both the federal governments and the
states are represented in all its acts, and each holds an absolute veto over the other. Moreover, the electorate which
chooses Congress and the state legislatures has constantly increased in the ratio of its number to that of the people as a
mass. 68 Election takes place so frequently that while those
who exercise the amending capacity cannot be held legally
responsible, they are held politically accountable.
Finally it must be seen that the status of the amending
body has an important bearing on the controversy over the
nature and extent of the powers of the federal government
and the states, and on the general doctrine of sovereignty.
Sovereignty rests in neither the federal government nor in the
states, but, if it may be said to reside anywhere, in the amendare required to obey. For then there is most likelihood of the moral responsibility of the legal sovereignty being stringently enforced." Ritchie, "On the
Conception of Sovereignty," (r891) r AM. ACAD. PoL. Scr. ANNALS 385
at 401.
67
BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) 167, note at 168.
Willoughby says: "The value of constitutional government is not that it
places Sovereignty in the hands of the people, but that it prescribes definite
ways in which this sovereign power shall be exercised by the State." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 302. Radin states: "revolution is the sovereign act par excellence." Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign,"
(1930) 39 YALE L. ]. 514 at 526.
68
"Lawyers are apt to speak as though the legislature were omnipotent, as
they do not require to go beyond its decisions. It is, of course, omnipotent in
the sense that it can make whatever laws it pleases, inasmuch as a law means any
rule which has been made by the legislature. But from the scientific point of
view, the power of the legislature is of course strictly limited. It is limited, so
to speak, both from within and from without; from within, because the legislature is the product of a certain social condition, and determined by whatever
determines the society; and from without, because the power of imposing laws
is dependent upon the instinct of subordination; which is itself limited. If the
legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislature must go mad before
they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to
it." STEPHEN, THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS (r882) 143·
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ing body. The amending capacity demonstrates neither the
supremacy of the states nor of the federal government. At one
time it may operate in favor of the states, and at another in
favor of the federal government. That the rights of neither
will be impaired is guaranteed by their joint action in the
amending process. Both are but agents of the composite states.
In the amending body we discover both the sovereign and the
state.
The nature of the federal amending process demonstrates
the futility of the concept of sovereignty. It has been pointed
out that its use in international law is doubtful, and that its
use if proper at any time is only so in constitutional law. Its
use in constitutional law has resulted in great confusion in the
United States. It has been seen that the only body to which the
characteristic can logically be attributed is the amending body.
The chief time when the question of sovereignty becomes important is when the validity of the substance of an amendment
is challenged. It is this fact alone which has induced the extensive discussion of the subject. For other purposes it is sufficient to examine the powers which have been conferred on
the federal and state governments and their departments.
The involved explanations made necessary and the metaphysical difficulties encountered in ascribing sovereignty to
the amending body show the barren aridity of the term. The
equality in the senate clause prevents a strictly correct application of the term to the ordinary amending body. The original
limitations expiring in I 8o8 show that there was no sovereign
whatever up to that year, though possibly unanimous action
by the states would have sufficed. The excessive majorities
required for proposal and adoption of amendments prevent
frequent action by the sovereign. During two periods of approximately half a century each no amendments were adopted.
Until the amending body acts it can never be known in advance
who the sovereign will be. Forty-nine bodies meeting at dif-

r66 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

ferent places act on the matter, and each of these bodies in turn
is divided, except in Nebraska, into a lower and upper house.
Unless the procedure of amendment prescribed in Article
Five is pursued, the sovereign has not acted at all, and the
action of the amending group is mere brutum fulmen. The
recent doctrine as to political questions perhaps somewhat
alters this, however. Each part of the amending body is subject to law, and may be altered or abolished. The amending
body itself may be altered through the amending process, and
limitations on the future amending capacity may be imposed.
The amending body is an artificial sovereign deriving its
being from a law in the form of Article Five. The amending
groups hold office for but a short time, and may be supplanted
by others in the elections in which an increasingly larger
electorate participates. The theory of sovereignty, moreover,
presupposes the continued orderly existence of the government. In case of a revolution the commands of the sovereign
would be disregarded, and authority could not longer be ascribed to the amending body either in fact or in law. The
moral, religious, physical, and other factual limitations on the
supposed sovereign are so important that it may perhaps be
correct to say that they are also legal limitations, as there
comes a time when law and fact shade' into one another. Finally, when it is remembered that throughout all history,
American as well as European, there never has been a consensus as to the meaning of sovereignty, it seems that the term
should be used only with the greatest circumspection. 69
'"' Saying all this, we should still bear in mind the words of the great English
historian, W. S. Holdsworth: "The great achievements of the doctrine of
sovereignty were the mastering of the lawlessness of the mediaeval state, and
the provision, in the modern territorial state, of an organism which, by keeping
the peace, has made social and political progress possible. The measure of its
achievement is the contrast between the state of Europe in I soo and in 1700.
We are so 'accustomed to the efficient manner in which lawlessness and crime
are suppressed, that we are apt to forget that this result has been achieved
through the ceaseless efforts of the ministers of the state, using powers and
machinery which owe their origin and their force to the sovereignty of the
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state. I think that those who go about to deny or minimize this sovereignty
have forgotten this fact. They have forgotten that in the smaller matters of
government, which concern the daily intercourse of man and man, it is the
fact of the state's sovereignty which causes the machinery to run smoothly;
and that in a time of crisis they may have reason to be thankful for its existence.
As Dicey, writing in 1914, has well said, 'Crises arise from time to time in the
history of any great state when, because national existence or national independence is at stake, the mass of a whole people feel that the authority of the
At the present
nation is one patent and one certain political fact.'
day, when some have maintained that the doctrine of sovereignty should be
discarded as an outworn doctrine, English law firmly maintains the sovereignty
of the king in Parliament.'' HoLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS FROM OuR LEGAL
HISTORY (19z8) 137-I39, 140, quoting from DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION> 8th ed. (I 91 5) xliii.
Also to be remembered are the words of Rupert Emerson: "That actual
highest power may temporarily rest elsewhere than with the normatively defined
sovereign is a fact which is too obvious to require statement; but on the other
hand there can equally be no doubt that the modern constitutional State has
brought about a closer practical coincidence between the legal sovereign and
the actual possessor of and wielder of highest power than has ever before been
possible. •
To discard the principle of sovereignty is to accept the
contingent threat of chaos that appears whenever two or more formally equal
powers stand opposed to each other with no highest power authorized to decide
between them." EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY
(19z8) Z57> Z7Z•

CHAPTER

VI

The Reform of the Amending Clause
NCREASINGLY in recent years, culminating in 1938
in extensive hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 1 proposals have been made
to alter and improve the process of amending the federal Constitution. The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment stimulated much discussion concerning the ease or difficulty of
amendment. The proposed Wadsworth-Garrett amendment 2
of Article Five received much attention in the I 92o's. President Roosevelt's proposal in I 93 7 concerning an increase in
the size of the Supreme Court attracted attention to the
efficacy of the amending process. The uncertainties arising
from the doctrine of political questions laid down in the I 9 3 9
decisions of the Supreme Court may cause a movement for
clarification. 3 From I9I I to I928 eighteen amendments were
offered in Congress to change Article Five, and in the I937
sessions five such amendments were offered. 4
The various proposals may best be discussed as t~ey affect
the two methods of proposal and the two methods of ratification provided under Article Five of the Constitution and discussed in Chapter III.

I

A.

REFORM OF PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS

I.

Proposal by National Convention

There has been comparatively little discussion of the reform of proposal of amendments by a national convention. 5
1
HEARINGS ON S. ]. REs. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938) 1-85 ("Ratification of Constitutional Amendments by Popular Vote").
• See citations in note 72, infra.
8
(1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 406.
4
HEARINGSONS.J.RES.IJ4, 75thCong., 3dsess. (1938) 37·
• An account of the efforts up to 1889 to obtain a national convention is set
out in AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE
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Of the four modes of proposal and ratification this has seemed
the one most likely not to be used. While there has been agitation for individual amendments, and such individual amendments have sometimes been of great importance, there have
been no widespread tangible evidences of a desire for complete or even substantial revision of the Constitution. 6 It is
true that under the wording of Article Five such a convention might propose ordinary individual amendments. In fact,
Article Five provides for the call of a "convention for proposing amendments," and does not refer in express terms to
a revision or to the adoption of an entirely new constitution.
It has, however, been usual both in the experience of the states
and of the nation to view the initiation of specific amendments
as the function of a legislative body and that of revision as
the function of a convention. Moreover, because of the additional expense and because of the increased legal complications and delays involved, it is unlikely that the convention
method will often be resorted to for ordinary amendments.
Assuming, however, that there is a popular demand for
revision of the Constitution, is the present machinery adequate? Probably the true reason that there has been no national convention since the Constitutional Convention itself
is that there has been no real demand for it. But at least a
partial reason may be the difficulty of obtaining applications
from the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. It would
seem that the applications must be reasonably contemporaneous in time. It is by no means easy to obtain applications by
thirty-two legislatures for a convention within approximately
the same interval. Possibly, too, the applications must be adUNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY (1897) 2.812.84. The recent attempts are discussed by Wheeler, "Is a Constitutional Convention Impending/" (192.7) 2.1 ILL. L. REV. 782.; "How Long is a State Petition for a Constitutional Convention Goodl" (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 143,
embodying a report to the New York State Bar Association also appearing in 74
CoNG. REc. (1931) 2.92.4 and S. Doc. 78, 71st Cong. zd sess. 1930).
8
A somewhat plausible, though not convincing, argument is m~de in MAcDoNALD, A NEw CoNSTITUTION FOR A NEw AMERICA (1 9 2.1).
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dressed to the calling of a convention for general revision.
Hence if one application is for the purpose of securing an
amendment to abolish polygamy and another to achieve
woman suffrage, perhaps these applications cannot be counted
together, especially where, as has been the case, the latter is
afterwards obtained under the usual amending process. 7
The suggested number of reforms of this part of Article
Five has not been large. Most of them have looked in the
direction of making it easier to secure the call of a convention.
During the Civil War period and previously, although there
was much discussion of holding a convention, the constitutional difficulties of securing such a convention were too great.
It has been suggested that application by the legislatures of
a majority of the states should be suffi.cient. 8 Some have advocated an even lesser number of applications, such as those of
twelve states. 9 In defense of these changes it may be said that
whereas proposal by Congress is one important step of two,
involving the initiation of an actual specific amendment, the
application of the legislatures is simply one step of three, the
others being the call of a convention which really proposes the
amendment, and the subsequent ratification by the states.
Gouverneur Morris suggested at the Constitutional Conven- •
tion that Congress be permitted to call a federal. convention
whenever it chose. 10 Another change which might be desirable
7

See supra, chap. III.
Senator Henderson, of Missouri, S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864)
CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864) 145, 553 (committee report), 1313
(debated); Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 71, 62d Con g., 1st sess. ( 1911);
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoNG. REc., (1919) 57oo; Rep. Lea of California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929), and Tuller, "A Convention
to Amend the Constitution-Why Needed-How It May be Obtained," ( 1911)
193 No. AM. REV. 369 at 385; Rep. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. 18o, 42nd
Cong., 3d sess. ( 18 73) (or the application of legislatures of any number of
states embracing three-fifths of the enumerated population of the several states).
"Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1916),
one-fourth of the states.
10
5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION,
2d ed. (1937) (reprint of 1836 ed.) 498. It has been suggested that Congress
8

REFORM OF THE AMENDING CLAUSE

171

would be to provide some method to force Congress to issue
the call when the requisite number of states have applied, or
to drop out Congress and provide that some executive official
issue the call, since there seems to be no legal remedy if Congress fails to act. Under the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment,
the convention would also be empowered to select the mode
of ratification, whether by legislatures or by conventions,
whereas under Article Five this power is vested in Congress.
Burgess has proposed that in view of the tendency of legislative bodies to confuse matters of a statutory nature with
matters of fundamental constitutional law, the legislative
mode of proposing amendments should be done away with
entirely and only a national convention should be allowed to
propose. 11 It has been suggested that it might be desirable to
have federal conventions periodically to revise the Constitution.12 Former Attorney General Homer Cummings regards
the national convention method as too cumbersome for pracalready has this power. MACDONALD, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW
AMERICA (1921) 225. It was held, however, in Hawke v. Smith, (1920)
253 U.S. 221 1 40 S. Ct. 495, that the modes of ratification stipulated in Article
Five are exclusive, and the same reasoning would probably apply to the modes
of proposal. Rep. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. 18o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (1873),
proposed that a three-fifths majority of Congress should be empowered to call
a convention. Rep. Berger of Wisconsin would allow a majority of each
House of Congress to call a convention, H. J. R. 246, 68th Cong., 1st sess.
(1924); H. J. R. 274 1 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926), and H. J. R. 281 1 7oth
Cong., 1st sess. (1928).
11
BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
(1923) 107 and 112. The first proposal at the Constitutional Convention was
to leave Congress out of the process, for fear that it might ignore the wishes
of the people. 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1836) 128. The committee of detail, in
its first draft of the instrument, proposed that a convention should be called by
Congress upon application of two-thirds of the states. Ibid. 3 81. But nothing
was said as to whether the legislatures were to propose and the convention to
adopt, or whether the convention was to do the whole thing. Lincoln in his
first inaugural address stated that proposal by a convention was preferable to
that by Congress, since the people should have the power to originate as well
as to approve amendments.
12
Needham, "Changing the Fundamental Law," (1921) 69 U. PA. L. REv.
:i.23 at 236 (every ten years). Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315,
64th Cong., 2d sess. ( 1916), proposed that conventions be held every thirty
years.

172

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

tical service.13 Senator George W. Norris proposed in I 93 7
to abolish the method altogether, though considerable objection was taken at the hearings on his proposal. 14
2.

Proposal by Congress

Until recent years most of the amendments offered to
Article Five have been directed at the mode of proposing
amendments by Congress. This is easily understandable in
view of the fact that it is at this stage that most proposed
amendments have failed. 15 Of some three thousand amendments introduced in Congress only twenty-six were actually
submitted to the states and only five of these failed of ratification in the states. The obstacle of having to pass both houses
of Congress has resulted in the failure of comparatively few
amendments up to 1923, sixteen having passed the Senate and
not the House, and the same number having passed the House
and not the Senate. Relative to the total number of amendments adopted, however, this total is high. The criticism is
often made that the excessive majority required for proposal,
namely, two-thirds of each House, is an insuperable barrier.
In fairness, however, two things should be observed. In the
, first place, it has been held that only two-thirds of a quorum
and not two-thirds of the members elected is sufficient. 16 Of
even greater importance is the fact that many of the amendments offered would not command even a majority of Con,. Cummings, "Nature of the Amending Process," (I938) 6 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 247 at 250. Former Attorney General Mitchell suggests that a convention is suitable only for general revision of the Constitution. Mitchell,
"Methods of Amending the Constitution," (I932) 25 LAWY. & BANKER 265.
14
HEARINGS ON S. J. R. I34, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (I938) 3-4, 65, 79> 84.
15
The amendments proposed from I 7 8 9 to I 8 8 9 are set out in AMES, THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (I897), while those offered
after that date up to July 2, I926, are to be found in S. Doc. 93, 69th Cong.,
Ist sess. (I926) (Tansill, "Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States"). See Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (I924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PROc. 62 at 63.
16
National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588.
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gress. 17 That is to say most of the amendments offered have
been killed in committee and have never come to a vote of the
entire house sitting as such. Such liberals as Senator Norris
have found no objection to the present mode of proposaP 8
Nevertheless it is entirely conceivable that amendments
desirable in every respect will fail to obtain the necessary
two-thirds majority, although a simple majority might be
obtained. Certainly it is clear that, in the case of the ratification of treaties by the Senate and the overriding by Congress
of the presidential veto, there are numerous instances of
failures where there would have been approvals if only a
simple majority had been required. The matter of amending
the Constitution is not so fundamentally different from these
matters that, over a long period of time at least, the same
failures will not occur: Even under the Articles of Confederation apparently a majority might propose. It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been many proposals, both in
Congress and by commentators, that a lesser majority be
required. 19 Most of the alternatives offered have agreed on a
simple majority of each House of Congress as enough. 20 The
17
Of more than 1 8oo proposals introduced from 1789 to 1889 more than
half never got beyond their reception and reference to a committee. The rest
were either reported or received further discussion, but only a very small percentage of these were brought to a vote.
18
65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4942; letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this
book; S. J. R. 134, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937).
19
A simple majority in two successive sessions of -Congress:-Smith, "Shall
We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 194 No. AM. REv. 657 at 667;
Johnstone, "An Eighteenth Century Constitution," ( 1912) 7 ILL. L. REV. 26 5
at 283. A simple majority of Congress as an aggregate group in two successive
sessions: 1 BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1891) 152. See also Cummings, "The Nature of the Amending Process,"
(1938) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 247 at 253.
20
Senator Henderson of Missour4 S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864);
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 42, 62d Cong., 1st sess. (191I); Rep.
Crumpacker of Indiana, H. J. R. 375, 62d Cong., 3d sess. (1913); Senator
Thompson of Kansas, S. J. R. 9, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (I9I3); Senator Owen,
S. J. R. 20, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (19I3); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o,
63d Cong., ISt sess. (I9I3); Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. J. R. 24, 63d
Cong., I st sess. ( 19 I 3) (or upon application of ten states) ; Rep. Chandler of
New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I913) (or by one-fourth of the
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state constitutions generally permit proposal by a simple majority of each house of the legislature. Sometimes the proposition is that a simple majority of a quorum of each house shall
be the required majority, while at other times it is that it be a
majority of the members elected to each house. Possibly it
would be wise to safeguard the amending process by departing
from the rule governing the passage of ordinary legislation
that only a majority of a quorum is necessary, and laying
down the latter rule. 21 However, that might, on occasion,
make the amending process even more difficult than it now
is, since two-thirds of a quorum may be less than a majority of
all the members elected to Congress. To illustrate, two-thirds
of a quorum of the Senate would be thirty-three, whereas a
majority of the members elected to the Senate would be fortymne.
Under the present system each house of Congress votes
separately as to proposal. Burgess has suggested that the two
houses sit together as a single body when proposing amendments, a majority of the aggregate group to be sufficient to
adopt. 22 In France the constitution up to 1940 was actually
states having at least one-fourth of population of United States) ; Rep. Bryan
of Washington, H. J. R. 422, 63d Cong., 3d sess. (1915); Senator Owen,
S. J. R. 9, 64th Cong., rst sess. (r9r5) (or upon application of legislatures of
majority of states); Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315, 64th Cong.
2d. sess. (r9r6); Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 8, 65th Cong., rst sess.
(r9r6), S. J. R. 33, 66th Cong., rst sess. (1919), S. J. R. 14, 67th Cong., ISt
sess. (1921), and S. J. R. 27, 68th Cong., ISt sess. (I923). A proposal by
Senator Brookhart was voted down in the Senate, 65 CoNe. REc. (I924) 4929,
and see speech at 4556. See also, Potter, "The Method of Amending the
Federal Constitution," ( 1909) 57 U. PA. L. REv. 58 9 at 609; Thompson, "The
Amendment of the Federal Constitution," ( r 91 2) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PRoc.
6 5 at 75, with alternative of proposal by a majority vote of one house in two
successive Congresses; Edward S. Corwin, letter of May 27, 193I, to the
author of this book.
21
Senator Henderson of Missouri, S. J. R. I6, 38th Cong., rst sess. (r864);
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoN G. REC. (I 919) 5700; Senator Brookhart
of Iowa, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4564. Rep. Porter of Virginia introduced
an amendment for proposal by three-fifths of Congress-H. J. R. I 8o, 42d
Cong., 3d sess. (I87J). EdwardS. Corwin, in a letter of May 27, I9JI, to
the author of this book, favors the former rule.
22
I BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW
(r89I) I52.
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amended by such a joint session. The wisdom of adopting
such a plan in the United States, however, is questionable
because of the federal nature of our government. The states
are represented according to population in the House of
Representatives and as states in the Senate. Hence to combine
the two bodies for amending purposes would be to decrease
the influence of the less populous states. Moreover, Article
Five provides that no state shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. It is therefore arguable that such a provision would be in violation of the equal
suffrage clause. Since, however, Congress might be dropped
out of the amending process, since each state would still have
its two senators, and since under the Twelfth Amendment
the two houses sit jointly to count the electoral vote, this
argument is not thoroughly convincing. The more fundamental objection, then, is that already stated,-the violation
of the federal concept.
Because of the difficulties of obtaining the concurrence of
both houses of Congress, it has occasionally been suggested
that a proposal by one house should be effectual. These proposals almost invariably contemplate that the resolution must
pass the house proposing twice, in two consecutive sessions,
before the amendment can go to the states. 23 It prevents hasty
action, it permits an indirect popular referendum by requiring action by a subsequently elected house, and it prevents ·
the dominance of one house of Congress over another, especially where the house not concurring is affected by the amendment. For example, the Seventeenth Amendment providing
for the popular election of Senators passed the House of
Representatives several times before it was finally approved
by the Senate. As has been previously pointed out, sixteen
.. Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. zo, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (1913), and
58 Cong. Rec. (1919) 5700; Thompson, "The Amendment of the Federal
Constitution," (19xz) 3 AcAD. PoL. Scr. PRoc. 65 at 75; Carman, "Why and
How the Present Method of Amending the Federal Constitution Should be
Changed," (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. Ioz.
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resolutions have passed the Senate but failed in the House,
and a similar number have passed in the House but failed in
the Senate. Such a provision is not found in the state constitutions, but it is employed in another federal constitution, that
of Australia. Under the Australian Constitution if an amendment twice passes one house of Parliament and is twice rejected
by the other house, the second rejection occurring at least three
months after the first one, the amendment is then to be submitted by the Governor-General to the states. 24
Under the present Article Five, Congress is vested with a
considerable degree of power in connection with both the submission and adoption of amendments. As was seen in the discussion of national conventions, there have been a number of
suggestions looking in the direction of taking away some of
those powers. The seeming lack of any way to compel Congress to call a convention, even though there have been applications by the requisite number of legislatures, has been the
subject of strictures. 25 Objection has also been raised to the
power of Congress to select the mode of ratification even
though proposal is by a convention. It has been suggested
that the only mode of proposal should be by convention.
Under the decision of Dillon v. Gloss,26 Congress may prescribe a reasonable time limit for the ratification of an amendment by the states, although the decision of the court was
really dictum since the amendment there involved itself contained a time limit proviso. In Coleman v. Miller, 21 it was
held that the time limit involved a political question. There
have been numerous suggestions that Article Five be amended
24

Constitution of Commonwealth of Australia, § 128.
On Jan. 19 and z8, 1861, Mr. Florence of Pennsylvania proposed that
"the power of the people in three-fourths of the states to call and form a convention to alter, amend, or abolish the Constitution . • • shall never be
questioned." CoNG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., zd sess. (r861) 479, 598.
06
(1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, commented on by Freund, "Legislative Problems and Solutions," (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 656.
"'(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.
20
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so as to fix a definite time limit, such as six, eight or ten years.
A provision for automatic proposal of an amendment has been
made by Representative Doolittle of Kansas that whenever
any law of the United States be declared invalid by the decree of any court the law shall be submitted along with a proposed constitutional amendment covering the same, acceptance of the law and amendment to be by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the states. 28 It has recently been suggested
that the legislatures of the majority of the states be permitted
to propose an amendment. 29

3· Proposal by Initiative
While most of the suggestions looking toward direct popular participation in the amending process have been with
respect to ratification, there have been a number of proposals
that the people themselves should be allowed to initiate
amendments or that the legislatures should be allowed to
apply for specific amendments as well as for a national convention.30 It is claimed that the people participated, at least in28 H. J. R. 221, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (r914).
"" Carman, "Why and How the Present Method of Amending the Federal
Constitution should Be Changed," (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 102.
80
Senator Cummins of Iowa in r 9 r 3 suggested proposal by legislative resolutions of sixteen states, certified to the President of the United States, or on the
petition of fifteen per cent of the voters in twenty-four states. His proposal was
adversely reported to the Senate by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1914.
51 CoNG. REc. (1914) r56o; S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., xst sess. (r913). See
later proposal, S. J. R. 33, 64th Cong., rst sess. (r9r5). Senator LaFollette of
Wisconsin the same year advocated proposal on the application of ten state
legislatures, or by the application of ten states through a popular vote provided
a majority of the electors voting on the question favored the amendment or by
a majority of both houses of Congress, in addition to the existing modes of
proposal. S. J. R. 24, 63d Cong., rst sess. (x9q). Previously on Aug. s,
1912, S. J. R. qr, 62d Cong., 2d sess., he had advocated proposal on the
application of ten states. Rep. Jackson of Kansas suggested proposal on the
application of the legislature of one state, H. J. R .. 35o, 62d Cong., 2d sess.
(r912). See also Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., rst
sess. (1913) (one-fourth of the states having at least one-fourth of population
of United States); Rep. Doolittle of Kansas, H. J. R. 220, 63d Cong., 2d sess.
(1914) (legislature of one state); Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 9,
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directly, when the Constitution itself was proposed by a national convention instead of by Congress. The use of the
initiative among the states, not only with respect to statutes
but also constitutional amendments, has naturally resulted in
a demand for its use in national politics. It has been suggested
that a petition signed by some such number as soo,ooo voters
should operate as the proposal of an amendment to be voted
on at the next general election, while a petition signed by a
somewhat larger number, such as a million voters, should be
acted on even earlier. 31 This plan ignores the federal scheme
by neglecting to provide that such petitions must be somewhat
uniformly scattered throughout the states, though this is not
particularly serious since the amendment still remains to be
voted on. A number of other proposals require that the petitions be concurred in by a certain percentage of the voters in a
certain number of states. 32 It is notable that another federal
country, Switzerland, provides for the use of the constitutional
initiative; its experience has shown that, while the initiative is
not a universal panacea, on the other hand it has not been productive of serious ills. The experience of the states in our own
64th Cong., 1st sess. (1915) (legislatures of majority of states); Rep. Gray of
Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (legislatures of two-thirds
of states, or majority vote in two-thirds of states); Senator Owen, S. J. R. 27,
68th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority of state legislatures); Rep. Lea of
California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929) (majority of state legislatures).
81
Rep. Gray of Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority
vote in two-thirds of states); Senator Pomerene of Ohio, S. J. R. zz, 66th
Con g., 1st sess. ( 1919) (proposal on petition of 5oo,ooo voters) ; Rep. Emerson of Ohio, H. J. R. 6o, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919) (proposal on petition of
5oo,ooo voters), and H. J. R. 123, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919) (proposal on
petition of 5 oo,ooo voters, to be submitted at next congr!!ssional election, or
proposal on petition of 1,ooo,ooo voters to be submitted to voters at special
election); Rep. Morin of Pennsylvania, H. J. R. IIo, 67th Cong., 1st sess.
(1921), the same; Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 281, 7oth Cong., 1st
sess. ( 1928), the same .
.. Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 79, 62d Cong., 1st sess. (1911) (five
per cent of the voters in each of three-fourths of the states) ; Rep. Igoe of
Missouri, H.]. R. 319, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914) (ten per cent of voters of
rna j ority of states).
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country has not been such that one can lay down dogmatically
that the popular initiative is either desirable or undesirable. 83
Doubtless in some states at some times the use of the initiative
has resulted in hasty, ill-considered and excessive constitutional changes. Recent use in connection with labor legislation
has not been wholly satisfactory. 34 On the other hand, one can
point to many cases where it has been used but moderately and
in a deliberate way and for desirable reforms. Certainly no
state which does not provide for its use can claim to be truly
democratic. The possibility of a resort to it means that there
can be no real weight to the charge that it is impossible to
secure changes which the people really want, and may spur
Congress to act more promptly than it otherwise would. After
all the evidence is in, it seems hard to conclude that the experience of the states with the initiative has been so unsatisfactory that its introduction into the federal system would
work great mischief. In fairness it should be said, however,
that the problems of a nation as large and heterogeneous as
the United States may be so different that the experience of
the states, limited and controversial as it has been, may hardly
serve as a fair basis for recommending its introduction into the
federal system. 35 For instance, the federal initiative might result in lack of deliberation. Possibly recent world events indicate that there are practical limits on democracy. If the people
are given a vote on the ratification of amendments, it may be
argued that that is a sufficient degree of democracy for practi38

Donn, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONS (1910)
292: "The popular initiative is open to many objections, both theoretical and
practical, but the people should have power independently of the legislature,
to force changes in their constitutions when such changes are desired. Perhaps
the greatest value which the initiative will have is not the direct results which
may come from its use, but in its influence in causing legislatures to act upon
matters upon which action is desired by the people." See also Radin, "Popular
Legislation in California," (193.9) 23 MINN. L. REv. 559·
"' See Preliminary Report of Committee on Labor, Employment and Social
Security, (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 531 at 545, 568.
85
AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (18 9 7) 286.
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cal purposes. If Congress be given the power to propose
amendments by a simple majority, that, too, would seem
fairly to assure the submission of measures desired by the
people.
B.

REFORM OF RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

1.

Ratification by State Conventions

Next to proposal of amendments by a national convention,
the least discussed phase of Article Five is that providing for
ratification of amendments by state conventions at the option
of Congress. Congress thus far has but once chosen to select
this mode of ratification, though the original Constitution was
thus ratified. An Illinois constitutional convention sought to
ratify the Corwin amendment although Congress had submitted it to the state legislatures. 36 It has been asserted that
certain types of amendments, such as those impinging on the
police power of the state or impairing alleged inalienable individual rights, must be ratified by state conventions. The
Supreme Court, however, in I93I decided that all amendments are on the same basis with respect to the mode of ratification. 37 Hence it now is clear that conventions may ratify
only when Congress sees fit to select that mode of ratification.
There has until recently been no substantial criticism of the
convention mode of ratification. In fact, efforts were made
00
Senator Adams of Colorado, whose general conclusions are favorable, however, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4804, said: "The weakness is this, that the initiation of measures submitted under the initiative comes from small groups, groups
having no authority whatsoever. That is, one may sit down in his office and frame
an amendment to the Constitution, or a law, and then, through the process of
petition circulation, initiate it."
'"United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282 U.S. 716, so S. Ct. uo, overruling
(D. C. N. ]. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 967, noted in (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 72;
(1931) 29 MrcH. L. REv. 777, and (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 807. See also,
United States v. Panos, (D. C. Ill. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 888; United States v.
Thibault, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 169; speech of Rep. J. J. McSwain,
74 CoNe. REc. (1931) 3002; brief of Edmund B. Dunford, 74 CoNe. REc.
(1931) 5819·
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when the recent amendment's were submitted to induce Congress to make use of this mode. Likewise at the time when the
Civil War Amendments were proposed in Congress, attempts
were made to secure their submission to direct popular votequite clearly unconstitutional under Hawke v. Smith 38-or
at least submission to conventions. In all of these cases it
seems, however, that the reason prompting such demands was
not so much that of consulting the wishes of the people as of
securing the defeat of the amendments.
It seems desirable at this point to consider the arguments
in favor of and against the use of the state convention method
of ratification. First to be considered are the defects, for defects there admittedly are. Precedent is against its use, since
it has been used only once, namely, with respect to the
Twenty-First Amendment. It is more expensive than the
legislative mode since special machinery must be set up. It is
likely to involve more delay than the legislative mode for
the same reason. It is likely to involve certain legal complications not found in the legislative mode, as, for example,
whether the power to regulate the election, place of
meeting, procedure, etc. of state conventions is in Congress
or the state legislatures. It is not likely to secure such full and
careful deliberation as the legislative method; the experience
with respect to the Twenty-First Amendment showed that
convention members felt themselves bound by the popular
will. 39 It should be noted, however, that many persons feel
that legislators should vote the way they think the majority
of their constituents wish them to, and that in these days of
straw votes and mass writing to legislators, the legislators
do not need to wait for an election to find out what the people
back home think. Finally, if the object of reforming the
88

(I92o) 253 U.S. 22I, 40 S. Ct. 495·
BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
CoNSTITUTION (I 9 3 8) 6; Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (I 9 3 7) 35
MICH. L. REV. 1253 at 1284.
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182

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

amending process is to secure more democracy, the logical
procedure is to provide directly for a popular vo:te: the convention method is nothing but a step in that direction, and
if the convention merely follows the popular will, it is but a
futile ceremony.
I
On the other hand, there are a number of outstanding
merits in the convention method, at least in compari~on with
the legislative method. It is more likely to represent the
popular will, 40 since conventions are selected subsequent · to
submission of an amendment while frequently legislatures
are not. It is also more likely to represent the popular will
since it is selected for only one issue, while a legislature, even
though selected after submission, is likely to be selected for its
views on several and unrelated issues. The members of a convention are likely to vote more independently of wrongful
influences since they do not face the temptation of legislators
to vote with an eye to reelection. An abler group of persons is
likely to be chosen as members of the convention than of the
legislature, particularly if the convention is small in number.
Since a convention is unicameral, it may proceed more quickly
than the legislatures, which are bicameral except in Nebraska.
The convention method is deemed preferable to a popular
referendum by those who distrust the intelligence of the
masses, particularly if the popular referendum occurred at a
general election so as to confuse the voter, or if the referendum
were hastily taken after submission so that there was no adequate time for deliberation. On the other hand, where speed
was desirable a convention might be quickly summoned,
whereas many proposals for popular referenda contemplate
action only at general elections.
It has sometimes been argued that the present mode of ratification is entirely satisfactory because of the possibility that
40
Brown, "The People Should be Consulted as to Constitutional Changes,"
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 404; Needham, "Changing the Fun~amental I.aw1"
(t9z1) 69 U. PA. L. REv. :u3 at :u8ff.
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the convention mode may be used. 41 Experience thus far
scarcely justifies this belief since Congress has but once resorted to its use even though efforts were made both as to the
Civil War Amendments and the most recent amendments. 42
Because Congress itself is a legislative body, because of the
expenses and delay of using the convention mode, and because of the inertia due to usage, it seems unlikely that Congress will often resort to the use of conventions of its own free
will. If the convention mode is to be frequently used it will
probably be necessary to amend the Constitution so as to provide that Congress may submit amendments only to conventions. Burgess, who is opposed to the use of the regular
governmental machinery in the amending process, favors
such a rule. 43 Each convention under his plan would have the
relative weight that the population of the state bears to the
population of the nation.
2.

Ratification by State Legislatures

It is at the legislative mode of ratification that most proposals for the reform of the amending process have been
directed in recent years. The reasons for this are interesting.
The fatal step in the amending process for most propositions
has been that of proposal, a fact which is easily demonstrable
when it is realized that twenty-one of the twenty-six amendments which have been submitted by Congress have been
ratified, with the status of the child labor amendment still
"Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice."
(1924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PROC. 62 at 74·
.. Senator Dixon, CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (1869) 1040 •
.. BuRGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
(1923) 107, 112ff. See proposal of Senator Wadsworth, of New York, S. J. R.
109, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924), for ratification by conventions chosen by
the people or by popular vote; Senator Shields of Tennessee, 65 CoNG. REc.
(1924) 4801-4802; Rep. Garrett of Tennessee, 66 CoNG. REC. (1924) 2160.
See also Williams, "The Popular Mandate on Constitutional Amendments,"
(1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 280 at 298.
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in doubt. The proponents of an easier amending process are
scarcely pursuing the logical course of action, therefore, when
they urge the alteration of the ratifying process rather than
that of the process of proposal. The real reasons, however,
are not far to seek. Many of these proposals are for a direct
popular referendum on amendments. They are based on
the notion that the people should participate directly in
fundamental changes in law and government, both because
it is the truly democratic method and because measures thus
ratified are more likely to be enforced. Many of the proponents of this change have a more selfish motive, however.
They favor a popular referendum because they believe that
it will make the Constitution more difficult to amend. The
enemies of the Eighteenth Amendment, for instance, argued
that that amendment was railroaded through the legislatures
by the well organized propaganda of a minority. This pressure, it is argued, cannot in the nature of things be brought
to bear on the people themselves. It should be observed that
the most strenuous opponents of making amendment easier
have generally coupled their proposals for popular ratification with clauses providing for legislative participation as
well, thus really adding another step to the existing amending process. Manifestly the prime motive of such a scheme is
to impede the process rather than to consult the wishes of the
people.
One of the changes suggested in the legislative mode is to
require something less than the legislatures of three-fourths
of the states. Two out of five amendments submitted by Congress which failed of ratification failed by the vote of a single
state. One of the chief defects of the Articles of Confederation was the requirement of unanimity of the states in the
adoption of amendments. A single state could therefore veto
the wishes of all the other states and so the amending process
was rendered well nigh useless. The adoption of the Constitution hence became a revolutionary act, since it was made to
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go into effect when ratified by three-fourths of the states. The
present requirement of a three-fourths majority was one of
the compromises of the Constitutional Convention. Sherman
proposed that every state must concur in the ratification of
amendments. 44 James Wilson proposed ratification by twothirds of the states. 45 It is significant that Wilson's proposal
failed by a five to six vote. His later motion providing for a
three-fourths majority was then accepted. Patrick Henry,
in opposing the ratification of the Constitution by the Virginia Convention, argued that the negative power given to
one-fourth of the states made amendment impossible. 46 The
first proposal for altering the method of amendment was
made by the Rhode Island Convention when it ratified the
Constitution on May 29, I 790. The proposition was that after
the year I793 no amendment to the Constitution should be
made "without the consent of eleven of the states heretofore
united under the Confederation." 47 There seem to have been
two motives behind the proposals: to make it more difficult
to amend, and to insure the preponderance of the original
thirteen colonies.
The Rhode Island proposal seems to have been the only
one looking in the direction of increasing the majority of
states required. Subsequent proposals have all gone in the
other direction. On January II, I 864, in connection with
the resolution for the abolition of slavery, Senator Henderson of Missouri introduced a resolution allowing ratification
by two-thirds of the states. 48 The constitution of the Confederate States provided for a similar majority. 49 In I 873,
"5 ELLIOT, DEBATES, zd ed. (1836).
'"Ibid •
.. 3 ibid. 49·
•• FosTER, MINUTES OF THE RHoDE IsLAND CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION
OF 1790 (1929) 96-97•
'"S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., ISt sess. (1864).
48
Article V, § 1. Similar proposals were made by Rep. Crumpacker of
Indiana, H. J. R. 375, 6zd Cong., 3d sess. (1913), and Senator Cummins of
Iowa, S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., ISt sess. (1913).
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Mr. Porter of Virginia proposed that amendments were to be
valid, "when approved and ratified by a majority of the electors in the several states voting thereon and qualified to vote
for representatives in Congress." 5°
A number of proposals have suggested ratification by
simple majority of the states. 51 Such proposals, however, are
almost invariably accompanied by a provision for submission
of amendments to direct popular vote. In addition, it is generally provided that there be both a majority of the states
and a majority of the votes of the entire nation in favor of
the amendment. 52 That is the rule in both Switzerland and
Australia. Were only a majority of the popular vote in the
entire country required, less than a majority of the states
might approve. 53 This could scarcely be acceptable except to
those who are prepared to cast aside the federal concept of
governmental relations. On the other hand, to permit ratification by a mere majority of states might easily result in the
passage of an amendment contrary to the wishes of a majority
of the electors. 54 Indeed, even under the present system it
.. H. J. R. I8o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (I87J).
01
Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. J. R. IJI, 62d Con g., 2d sess. ( I9 I 2) and
S. J. R. 24, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9I3); Senator Thompson of Kansas, S. J. R.
9, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9IJ); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o, 63d
Cong., Ist sess. (I9I3) (or majority vote of electors in the several states).
"'Rep. Igoe of Missouri, H. J. R. 3I9, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914); Smith,
"Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (I911) '94 No. AM. REv.
657 at 668; Johnstone, "An Eighteenth Century Constitution," (1912) 7 ILL.
L. REv. 265.
""For such proposals, see that of Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 20, 63d
Cong., Ist sess. (19I3); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o, 63d Cong., Ist
sess. (19I3) (or majority of state legislatures); Senator Pomerene of Ohio,
S. J. R. 22, 66th Cong., Ist sess. (I9I9); Rep. Emerson of Ohio, H. J. R. 123,
66th Cong., Ist sess. (1920); Rep. Morin of Pennsylvania, H. J. R. I 10, 67th
Cong., Ist sess. (192I); Rep. Boylan of New York, H. J. R. 133, 68th Cong.,
xst sess. (1924); Rep. Dyer of Missouri, H. J. R. 229, 7oth Cong., xst sess.
(1928); Professor EdwardS. Corwin, letter of May 27, 193I, to the author
of this book.
"'For such proposals, see Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. ]". R. 24, 63d
Cong., Ist sess. (I 92 I) ; Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 3 I 5, 64th
Cong., 2d sess. (I 9 I 6).
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has been pointed out that it is possible to secure ratification by
the less populous states representing an actual minority of
the population. On the other hand, it is to be remembered
that an amendment may be defeated by the twelve least
populous states, and that the concurrence of such twelve,
while not likely, is fully as probable as the concurrence of the
thirty-six least populous states in ratifying. Moreover, the
amendment must have been previously concurred in by twothirds of Congress, the lower house of which is elected on
the basis of population. Senator Owen has proposed ratification by a majority of congressional districts and a majority of
the aggregate vote. 55 Most of the state constitutions provided
for ratification by a majority of the popular vote. Both of
these two last proposals would be out of harmony with the
federal principle, so that the farthest an adherent of the latter
principle could go in the direction of majority rule is to accept the Swiss and Australian plan of accepting a majority
of the states plus a majority of the electors of the entire
country.
Perhaps a more conservative plan would be to permit
ratification by two-thirds of the states. 56 It is noteworthy that
55

S. J. R. 9, 64th Con g., I st sess. (I 9 I 5). See also his other proposals:
S. J. R. 42, 62d Cong., ISt sess. (I9II) (acceptance by a majority of congressional districts and a majority of the states); S. J. R. 8, 65th Cong., Ist sess.
(I9I7), (majority vote in majority of congressional districts); S. J. R. I4,
67th Cong., Ist sess. (I 92 I) (majority vote in majority of congressional
districts) .
06
Senator Cummins of Iowa, S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9IJ), proposed adoption by two-thirds of state legislatures or by majority vote in twothirds of states; Rep. Bryan of Washington, H. J. R. 422, 63d Cong., 3d sess.
(I9I5); Senator Cummins, S. J. R. 33, 64th Cong., ISt sess. (I9I5) (same as
earlier proposal, supra); Rep. Lea of California, H. J. R. I68, 7ISt Cong., 2d
sess. (I929) (majority of people of the nation and a majority of the people in
two-thirds of the states ratifying); Senator Norris of Nebraska, S. J. R. I 34,
75th Cong., 3d sess. (I937).
"It seems evident, then, that where the check is sought in numbers, a majority
is too small, and a unanimous vote too large, for either practicability or safety.
A mean must be sought not liable to these objections, and that not from a priori
considerations, but from experience." JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed, (I887) 553•
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the more recent proposals, except that of Senator Norris in
1937/n have accepted the existing rule requiring the approval
of three-fourths of the states, and have stressed rather the
idea of a popular referendum. 58 In fact, under the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment an amendment might have to
be ratified not only by the legislatures of three-fourths of
the states but also by the popular vote of three-fourths of the
states. 59 And even under the Jones amendment to the latter
amendment the legislatures would still act as advisory bodies,
and would have to vote on an amendment before the popular
vote was taken. 60 In view of the comparative ease of securing
ratification after an amendment has been submitted, especially as seen in the cases of the last stx amendments, it is
•• S. J. R. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1937 ) .
.. Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (1913);
Rep. Gray of Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority of
electors in three-fourths of states or by legislatures in three-fourths of states) ;
Senator Fletcher of Florida, S. J. R. 182, 65th Cong., 2d sess. (1918); Rep.
LaGuardia of New York, H. J. R. 430, 65th Cong., 3d sess. (1919), and
H. J. R. 12, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R.
35, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Siegel of New York, H. J. R. 36, 66th
Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Senator Harrison of Mississippi, S. J. R. 48, 66th
Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, S. J. R. 126,
66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Johnston of New York, H. J. R. 306, 66th
Cong., 2d sess. (1920); Rep. MacGregor of New York, H. J. R. 332, 66th
Cong., 2d sess. (1920); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R. 12, 67th Cong.,
1st sess. (1921); Rep. MacGregor, H. J. R. 21, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921);
Rep. Siegel of New York, H. J. R. 29, 67th Cong., 1st sess. ( 1921); Rep. Kissel
of New York, H. J. R. II8, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); Rep. Cullen of
New York, H. J. R. 162, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); Rep. Vare of Pennsylvania, H. J. R. 34, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Rep. Griffin of New York,
H. J. R. 37, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Senator Ashurst of Arizona, S. J. R.
17, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R. 18, 69th
Cong., 1st sess. (1924); Rep. Griffin, H. J. R. 68, 7oth Cong., 1st sess. (1927);
Rep. Lea of California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929); Rep.
Andresen of Minnesota, H. J. R. 348, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930) (popular vote
or conventions as Congress shall prescribe) [and see 72 CoNG. REc. (1930)
10,930]; Rep. Griffin, H. J. R. 362, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930); see article
by Senator Ashurst, "Making Amendments," SATURDAY EvENING PosT,
April 25, 1929, reprinted in 72 CoNG. REc. 3066 (1930); Senator Norris,
in a letter of June 10, 1 931, to the author of this book.
•• See citations in note 72, infra.
80
65 CONG. REc. ( 1924) 4802. Argument of Senator Dixon of Connecticut,
CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (1869) 706.
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doubtful that there will be any reduction in the number of
states required to concur, however desirable that may be
theoretically.
Another change which has frequently been suggested in
the legislative mode is that ratification be only by legislatures
the more numerous branch of which have been elected after
the submission of the amendment. 61 Since state senators are
frequently elected for a longer term than state representatives, the principle of subsequent election is generally confined in the proposals to the House of Representatives. In
the case of some of the Civil War Amendments, it was suggested that Congress provide in its resolution of proposal and
submission that the amendment be submitted only to subsequently elected legislatures. Four or five states have constitutional or statutory provisions providing for ratification of
federal amendments only by such legislatures, but these provisions have recently been held unconstitutional. 62 All of the
recent amendments have been ratified by legislatures which
were in existence when they were proposed, and this was true
even of the Bill of Rights. An existing legislature might of
course of its own accord by a sort of self-denying ordinance
fail to act on an amendment. The pressure is generally so
61
Senator Buckalew of -Pennsylvania, CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess.
(I 869) 828 (as part of the Fifteenth Amendment); Senator Davis of Kentucky,
CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (I 869) 1309 (as part of the Fifteenth Amendment) ; Senator Hendricks of Indiana, CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess.
(I869) 543, IJII (as part of the Fifteenth Amendment); Rep. Woodward of
Pennsylvania, CoNe. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d sess. (I869) 1226; Rep. Garrett
of Tennessee, H. J. R. 69, 67th Cong., ISt sess. (I92I), and H. JR. 429, 67th
Cong., 4th sess. (I923); Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. J. R. 4, 68th
Cong., Ist sess. (I923)-; 65 CoNe. REc. 89, 3549, 3675, 3942, 4420, 4488,
4556, 4717, 48oo, 4929, 4995, 5009, reported with amendments, debated and
recommitted; Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 68, 68th Cong., Ist sess. (I923), debated,
reported back, 65 CoNe. REc. I0,4I4; Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. IS, 69th Cong.,
ISt sess. (I925); Senator Wadsworth, S.
R. 8, 69th Cong., Ist sess. (1925);
Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. I43, 7oth Cong., ISt sess. (I928); Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (I924) 63 AM. PHIL.
Soc. PROC. 62 at 74; Jacob Tanger, letter of June I7, I9JI, to author of this
book .
.. Leser v. Garnett, (I922), 258 U.S. I30, 42 S. Ct. 2I7.
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great, however, for immediate action, often involving even
special sessions, that the only way to secure ratification by a
subsequent legislature is to provide for it in the federal Constitution. 63 The chief argument of the proponents of this reform is that the sentiment of the people will be more directly
reflected, since the legislators will be elected on the basis of
their attitude towards the amendment. Moreover, greater
time for deliberation will be provided. The arguments on the
other side, however, seem more convincing. Doubtless to
some extent a subsequently elected legislature will better represent popular opinion. The chances are, however, that the
legislators are elected on their attitudes towards other issues.
If the popular will is to be truly reflected, this can be much
better accomplished by the use of conventions elected with
reference to the single issue involved. Or even better, why
not provide for a popular referendum if the real object is to
consult the people? As the late Senator Borah said, "Let us
not have homeopathic doses! " 64 The amending process is
already difficult enough. To require ratification by later legislatures is simply to add one more obstacle, as a delay of at
least one and generally two years will be required. Couple
this delay with a provision for a popular referendum in addition to the action of the legislature, as did the WadsworthGarrett amendment, and an almost insuperable barrier
against amendments is set up. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the proponents of action by subsequent legislatures
63
Senator Morton of Indiana introduced a resolution, S. J. R. p, 41st
Cong., 1st sess. ( 1869), prescribing the procedure to be followed by the legislatures in ratifying. See supra, chap. 3, note 86. And see AMES, THE PRoPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (I 897)
290. Mr. Shanks of Indiana introduced the same amendment in the House,
H. J. R. 57, 41st Cong., 1st sess. (1869). Mr. Juul of Illinois, H. J. R. 242,
66th Cong., 1st sess. ( 1919), introduced a resolution regulating voting strength
in state legislatures when ratifying amendments.
•• 65 CONG. REC. (1924) 4562.
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are more interested in preventing amendment than they are in
securing popular representation. 65
A problem that has arisen on several occasions is whether
or not a state may rescind its action on an amendment. If threefourths of the states have ratified an amendment, it then
seems clear that there can be no effective repudiation of prior
action. On the other hand, at any time prior to such ratification the rule is in greater doubt. 66 The Supreme Court has
recently ruled that a political question is involved. 67 Anumber of proposals have been made that until the necessary majority of acceptances have been obtained, a state should be
free to change its prior action whether such action was affirmative or negative. 68 This is one of the provisions of the
Wadsworth-Garrett amendment. But that amendment goes a
step further and provides that repudiation by more than onefourth of the states shall bar the further consideration of the
amendment by the legislatures. The latter provision seems
undesirable. It is designed to add to the difficulties of the
already existing process. To allow thirteen states to kill an
amendment will obviously mean that the opponents of an
amendment will concentrate on a small number of states early
in the fight and perhaps kill the amendment before it has had
a chance for consideration. 69 It is bad enough to allow thirteen
legislatures to hold up an amendment under any conditions.
It is simply making matters worse to let them destroy it at the
outset. At least until some provision is made permitting rati.. Senator Norris, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4941, said: "Some people want
to make it difficult to amend the Constitution. Others want to simplify it.
There is argument on both sides. I concede absolutely that there is good argument each way, but I can not conceive of any argument that simply calls for
delay, and that is what I think we have done with this amendment."
66
See supra, chap. III.
67
Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 453, 59 S. Ct. 972.
68
Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 143, 7oth Cong., xst sess. (1928).
60
See the argument of Senator Heflin of Alabama, 65 CoNe. REc. ( 1924)
4931·
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fication by a lesser majority of the states, it would seem that
the proposals should be rejected.

3· Ratification by Popular Referendum
The chief proposal for the alteration of the amending
process to receive serious consideration in the past two decades
has been that for a popular referendum. 70 It is felt that the
people themselves should participate at some stage in the
amending process. Some of the proposals go so far as to say
that the people should be allowed even to initiate amendments, as is done in Switzerland and in some of our states.
These proposals, however, have not been strongly pressed
and attention has been increasingly centered on securing confirmation by the people. Popular suffrage has been vastly
extended from what it was when the Constitution was drafted.
Although popular referenda were unknown in 1787, the states
have used the popular referendum as the exclusive mode of
ratification of amendments to and revision of the state constitutions ever since about r 830. The extension of suffrage to
the negroes by the Fifteenth Amendment and to women by
the Nineteenth Amendment, both under the federal Constitution, has kept the idea of popular participation in government in the public eye. The provision of the Seventeenth
Amendment for the popular election of senators more than
almost anything else has stimulated the demand for popular
participation in the amending process. The suggestions for
ratification only by subsequently elected legislatures is indicative of the trend, as is that for the abolition of the electoral
college. But perhaps the most immediate impetus which has
been given to the movement came from the adoption of the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, particularly the
70
The use of the popular referendum under the present terms of Article Five
was held unconstitutional in Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U. S. 221 1 40
S. Ct. 495· See Taft, "Can Ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution
Be Made to Depend on a Referendum?" (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 821.
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Eighteenth. It is argued with enough plausibility to convince
a great many people that the Eighteenth Amendment was
railroaded through the legislatures by means of powerful
lobbies and a species of intimidation. 71 It is asserted that, if the
legislators had really voted as they felt, the amendment
would never have been ratified. It is pointed out that anumber of legislatures ignored previous popular referenda rejecting the amendment, and that in a number of cases subsequent popular votes under what the courts later found to be
invalid or inapplicable provisions for referenda on federal
amendments showed that the popular will was not in accord
with that of the legislature. The Democratic party in I 924
adopted a plank advocating a popular referendum on federal
amendments. Certainly the tendency of the past century has
been towards more democracy in government. It is the frequently repeated doctrine of the Supreme Court that the
people are sovereign, that they adopted the Constitution and
may alter that document. If this doctrine is to be given anything but lip service, it would seem _that the time has come
when the people should be given the right to vote on whether
an amendment should be adopted.
In the effort to secure a popular referendum, one must be
careful to see that something else is not foisted upon one.
The substitute may be so bad as to make the continuance of
the present clause preferable. The provision for a referendum
may be so hedged about with clauses which clog the amending process as to merit the defeat of the entire proposaJ.72
Such was the situation with respect to the Wadsworth-Garrett
71
Senator Ashurst, 58 CONG. REC. (1919) 5694, said: "I believe that the
two amendments which were last proposed for ratification, viz., the one providing
for woman suffrage and the other for prohibition-and I am earnestly in favor
of both those amendments-were not forced upon the people, but that they
were submitted in response to a demand made by the people. At the same
time I·am not oblivious to the fact that there are millions of citizens of high
character who believe that lobbies intimidated the legislatures of the various
States and even intimidated Congress into submitting those amendments."
•• Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made
More Difficult?" (x9z6) xo MINN. L. REV. 185.
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amendment. 73 This proposal permitted in certain cases, but
did not require that an amendment be subjected to a popular
referendum. It provided "that any state may require that
ratification by its legislature be subject to confirmation by
popular vote." If the state failed to make such provision, there
could be no popular referendum. It was argued that the
states would immediately make such provision. This was effectively answered by pointing out that there was no good
reason why the amendment should not directly provide for
such ratification to make a popular referendum absolutely
certain. The legislatures themselves would scarcely feel disposed to give up their present exclusive right of ratification,
and it might take a great deal of time and effort to incorporate
such a provision into the state constitution. Moreover, there
was only to be a referendum if the legislature ratified the
amendment. If the legislature rejected, that ended the issue,
and the people were left entirely without voice in the matter.
Such a provision naturally made rejection very easy and acceptance even more difficult than it already is. Furthermore,
the then existing legislature might reject, but could not accept.74
A number of senators of more liberal views perceived these
objections to the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, and in
fact the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a revised
proposal by Senator Walsh of Montana, popularly referred
'"Rep. Garrett of Tennessee, H. J. R. 69, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (19z1);
Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. ]. R. 40, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (19z1);
Senator Wadsworth, S. ]. R. z71, 67th Cong., 4th sess. (19z3); Rep. Gar~ett,
H. J. R. 4z9, 67th Cong., 4th sess. ( 19z3}; Senator Wadsworth, S. ]. R. 4,
68th Cong., 1st sess. (19z3); Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 143, 7oth Cong., rst sess.
(19z8). See speech by Senator Wadsworth, 65 CONG. REc. (19z4) 4491 1
4495, and S. ]. R. z1, 67th Cong., rst sess. (19zt) 1 making both legislative
and popular vote mandatory.
"These arguments were very clearly brought out by Mr. Huddleston of
Alabama, 67 CoNG. REc. (19z6) 7zo3, who advocated ratification by popular
vote. See also Rep. Griffin of New York, 66 CoNG. REC. (r9z5) 4zo5.
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to as the Walsh substitute. 75 The principal feature of Walsh's
proposal was that amendments should be referred directly
to the people for ratification. The long delays and the increased difficulties of amendment under the WadsworthGarrett amendment were pointed out. Senator Jones of
Washington then offered an amendment to the Walsh substitute, taking a position intermediate between that of Senators Wadsworth and Walsh. 76 Unlike Wadsworth's proposal it provided for a referendum when the legislature
rejected an amendment as well as when it ratified. Also unlike
Wadsworth's proposal, this plan contemplated the mandatory
use of the popular referendum in all cases. It did agree with
Wadsworth's proposal, however, in the fact that the legislature still remained a part of the amending procedure. But
it became a purely advisory body. That is to say, no matter
how the legislature voted, a popular referendum automatically followed; the result of the legislative vote, whether
for or against the amendment, was immaterial.
The proponents of the Jones amendment argued that the
people would receive the benefits of the legislative discussions. If a popular vote alone were taken, such a vote might
come so soon after proposal by Congress that there would be
no time for deliberation. On the other hand, it was argued
that this plan turned the legislature into a mere debating society, and that since its action was mere brutum fulmen it
would not take its function seriously enough to make its discussions of any value to the people. In fact, it would strip
the legislature of its dignity to make it a mere advisory body.
There would be unnecessary delay involved since the people
•• S. Rep. 202 on S. J. R. 4, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924), 65 CoNG. REc.
(1924) 3675. For defenses of Walsh's substitute, see Adams, 65 CoNG. REc.
(1924) 4497, 4802, 4804, 4998; Brandegee, ibid. 4497, 4565, 4931; Borah,
ibid. 4561, 4563, 4564; Robinson, ibid. 48oo; Walsh, ibid. 4931; Gerry,
ibid. 4935; Norris, ibid. 4941.
'"'65 CONG. REC. (1924) 4802, 4929.
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could act only after the legislature had acted, and moreover
only a subsequently elected legislature itself could act. As to
the possibility of undue haste and lack of knowledge on the
part of the voters, it was pointed out that it is virtually impossible to secure the proposal by Congress by the necessary twothirds vote without long preliminary popular agitation and
discussion. Senator Walsh and a number of other senators
who favored a popular referendum objected vigorously to the
Jones amendment, and declared they preferred the existing
system to it.
It is true that the Jones amendment did present a rather
evenly balanced proposal, on the one hand making a considerable delay necessary and yet on the other hand providing for
a popular referendum in all cases, such referendum to be absolutely decisive irrespective of the action of the legislature.
It was subject to the further·objection that in case the legislature took no action at all then no referendum could occur.
The Senate at first accepted the amendment, 77 only shortly
later to reject it. 78 The Walsh substitute finally died on the
calendar. The House Judiciary Committee twice reported
favorably on the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, but no
vote was ever taken on it. Senator Brandegee twice proposed
that Congress should have the option of submitting amendments to be ratified according to either of the present modes
or by a popular referendum. 79
Assuming that there is to be a popular referendum, there
is still the question of when it should be held. The most usual
proposal is that it shall be held at the next general federal
election, in other words at the next election of members of
77

65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 49401 by a vote of 34 to 29.
Ibid. 5003 1 by a vote of 39 to 35·
•• S. J. R. 90, 65th Cong., 1st sess. (1917), and S. J. R. 41 1 66th Cong., 1st
sess. (1919), twice reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 58
CoNe. REc. (1919) 4265 1 5694-5700. See also Smith, "Shall We Make Our
Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 194 No. AM. REV. 657.
78
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the House of Representatives. 80 This means that the amendment will be voted on by the people at some time less than
two years after it was submitted by Congress. It also means
that all of the states would be passing on the amendment on
one uniform date, excepting, of course, Maine, which votes
earlier. If the amendment were rejected, that would seem
to cut off another referendum without a new submission by
Congress. Hence we would dispose of the problem whether
or not a given amendment is still pending. Other proposals
have been that it shall be voted on at the next general state
election held within the state. 81 General state elections are
held usually every two years, and in some states annually,
so that amendments would be voted on at approximately the
same time. A third conceivable plan would be to allow each
state to hold its election when it chose. 82 This, however, would
do away with uniformity of time of ratification and still leave
unsolved the problem of whether or not a given amendment
is still pending. Perhaps the most satisfactory stipulation is
that first mentioned, providing for a vote at the same time
that the lower house of Congress is being elected.
It has been suggested that to permit a popular vote at so
early a date may result in action on the amendment before
there has been an opportunity for public discussion and deliberation on the amendment. Congress might submit an
amendment only a few months before the election. Doubtless there is some force in this objection. Possibly it might
be well to prescribe a minimum period, such as one year or
80
Senator Pomerene of Ohio, S. J. R. 22, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep.
Emerson of Ohio, H. J. R. 6o and 123, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Lea
of California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929). In Australia an
amendment is submitted to popular vote within not less than two or more than
six months after it has been proposed. Constitution of Commonwealth of
Australia, § 128.
81
Senator Norris, in a letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this book.
82
Speech by Senator Wadsworth, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4495; S. J. R. 134,
75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938).
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six months, between the date of submission and that of the
popular referendum. 83 The present amendments have been
ratified in most cases by the then existing legislatures, in
some cases on receipt of telegraphic information of the approval by Congress. No amendment has taken as much as
three years to ratify, and the tremendous pressure brought
to bear on the legislatures has been such as to induce prompt
action, in some cases through special sessions. Moreover, as
Senator Walsh has pointed out, the bare fact of approval by
Congress in itself indicates that a measure has received long
. prior discussion, so that the populace does not need a long
period of time in which to make up its mind. 84
If Article Five be amended to provide for ratification of
amendments by a popular referendum, questions may arise
concerning what majority shall be necessary to carry an amendment and who shall be the judge of whether or not an amendment has been adopted by the requisite majority. By a
majority do we mean a majority of the qualified electors of
the state, or a majority of the electors voting on the amendment? The same doubt has arisen as to similarly phrased
clauses in state constitutions. Perhaps the sounder legal view
is that simply a majority of the electors voting on the amendment is sufficient, yet the adjudicated cases split about evenly
on the matter. To prevent any controversy it seems best to
provide expressly that ratification be by a majority of the
qualified electors voting on the proposed amendment. 85 The
88
Carman, "Why and How the Present Method of Amending the Federal
Constitution Should be Changed," (I938) I7 ORE. L. REv. I02,
.. 65 CONG. REc. (I924) 4558; Borah, ibid. 4564; Norris, ibid. 5002,
.. Mr. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. I8o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (I87J); Senator
Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoN G. REC. (I 9I9) 5700. See speech by Senator
· Robinson of Arkansas, 65 CoN G. REc. (I 9 24) 3 6 76 ; speeches by Senators
Harrison and George, ibid. 4999; proposal by Senator Reed of Missouri, supported by Norris, ibid. 5003, soo6; letter of June Io, I93I, by Senator Norris
to author of this book. Professor Edwar.d S. Corwin, in a letter of May 27,
193I 1 to the author of this book suggests ratification by an absolute majority
of the number voting in the most recent presidential election.
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Wadsworth-Garrett amendment is doubly ambiguous in providing simply for "confirmation by popular vote." Usage,
however, would seem to indicate that by this is meant a simple
majority rather than a two-thirds or a three-fourths or some
other majority.
In the recent congressional debates argument arose over
which was to control the matter of whether or not an amendment has been adopted,-the federal government or the
states. Under the present legislative mode, the courts will not
look behind the legislative rolls to decide whether an amendment has been adopted after it has been certified to the secretary of state by the state officials. But ratification by popular
vote does not involve a precisely analogous situation, and so
question might arise as to whether or not the federal government might attempt to regulate the conduct of the election,
the qualifications of voters, and the counting of the ballots,
etc. It was after some acrimonious debate on this as well as
other controversial issues that the Walsh substitute was recommitted to committee for clarification. 86
Another point which has frequently been raised is that of
how long an amendment remains open for ratification after it
has been submitted by Congress. As a matter of common
sense, an amendment proposed a generation or more previously should not remain open to ratification. 57 A time limit
set out in an amendment on a specific subject would govern
the ratification of that amendment. But the Supreme Court
has gone even further and said that Congress has the implied
power to prescribe a reasonable time limit for ratification,88
and that the question of time is a political one. 89 A number of
86

Senator Swanson of Virginia, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) soo7-soo9.
"'Senator Ashurst of Arizona, 55 CoNG. REC. (1917) sss6-sssH Senator
Norris, letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this book; BuRDICK, THE
LAw oF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (1922) 39·
88
Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) zs6 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 51o.
80
Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.
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proposals have therefore been made for specific time limits,
such as five/ 0 six, 91 seven, 92 or eight 93 years. Where action by
both the legislatures and the voters is contemplated, naturally
a longer period should be provided, and such changes were
offered when the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment was discussed in Congress. If ratification were to be exclusively by a
popular referendum, especially if the vote were taken at a
uniform date, there would seem to be no need for providing
a limitation, unless the referendum provision be construed to
permit another referendum without another submission by
Congress. In connection with time limitations, perhaps it
might be well to limit the time during which an application
by a legislature for a national constitutional convention is effectual.
One of the latest proposals to receive attention was Senate
Joint Resolution 134 introduced by Senator Norris in 1937. 94
Under this proposed amendment there would be ratification
by popular vote, the vote of only two-thirds of the states
would be required, and the states would be deprived of their
present right to propose amendments. Amendments would
be submitted by each state to the electors thereof at the next
90
Senator Chilton of West Virginia, S. J. R. I26, 6Jrd Cong., 2d sess.
(19I4); Mr. Igoe of Missouri, H. J. R. I37> 65th Cong., 1st sess. (I9I7).
91
Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. J. R. 207, 64th Cong., 2d sess.
(19I7), and S. J. R. 88, 65th Cong., Ist sess. (I9I7); Senator Brandegee of
Connecticut, S. J. R. go, 65th Cong., Ist sess. (I917 ), and S. J. R. 4I, 66th
Cong., Ist sess. (I9I9); speech by Senator Ashurst of Arizona, 55 CoNG. REc.
(I9I7) sss6-sss8; Senator Fletcher of Florida, S. J. R. 182, 65th Cong.,
2d sess. (I 9 I 8).
92
Mr. Cullen of New York, H. J. R. I62, 67th Cong., ISt sess. (I92I).
See article by Senator Ashurst, "Making Amendments," SATURDAY EVENING
PosT, April 25, I929, reprinted in 72 CONG. REc. (I93o) 3066.
93
Senator Wadsworth, S. J. R. Iog, 68th Cong., Ist sess. (I924). Though
advocating a time limit, no specific time is suggested by Platz, "Article Five of
the Federal Constitution," (I934) 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17 at 48.
•• See "Ratification of Constitutional Amendments by Popular Vote," HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE }UDICIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON S. }. RES. IJ4, 75th Cong. 3d sess. (I938).
See criticism of the proposal in editorial, (I938) 24 A. B. A. J. 298; Thomson, "Amending the Constitution," (I938) 42 LAW NOTES No. x, p. 9·
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general election held in the state after the date of proposal;
but if a general election was to be held within sixty days after
the date an amendment is proposed, it is to be submitted at
the next succeeding general election. The electors were to
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the state legislature. Each state was to conduct the election and determine
the result thereof as the state law provided, or in the absence
of such state law as the Congress shall provide. Congress was
to have power to prescribe by a uniform law the form in
which the question of the ratification should be submitted to
the electors in the several states. The amendment was to be
submitted to state conventions for ratification.
Beginning January 18, 1938, a subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate, consisting of George W.
Norris of Nebraska, Chairman, Carl A. Hatch of New
Mexico, Key Pittman of Nevada, Tom Connally of Texas
and Warren R. Austin of Vermont conducted hearings on the
proposal.
Federal Judge William Clark of New Jersey pointed out
to the committee that in most of the countries of the world
having a federal government, amendment involves action on
the part of the federal legislature only and that the federal
principle is preserved only by the requirement that the altering action be taken in a special manner, such as by a special
majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, with or without a
period of reflection, that is, repassage after a year. 95 Only the
United States, Switzerland, Australia, and Germany insist on
action elsewhere than in the federal legislature. Furthermore,
in all these latter countries except the United States, the action
is by popular vote and only in Australia is the vote by states.
Senator Norris' amendment approximated that of the next
most rigid amending process, that of Australia. Judge Clark
argued that ratification by legislatures was objectionable for
.. HEARINGs, supra, note 94, at p.

I I,

202

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

three reasons: 96 (r) the ratifying legislature may have been
elected before submission, hence may not be representative of
the people's wishes; ( 2) the legislature, even if subsequently
elected, may have been elected for their views on other issues;
and (3) legislators vote with an eye to reelection. In his opinion, a convention was subject to none of these three objections,
but a convention was still not as democratic a procedure as a
popular referendum. Moreover, the experience with the
Twenty-First Amendment showed that a convention was not
deliberative and merely followed the people's instructions;
it was simply an expensive form of referendum. He also advocated that ratification should be by only two-thirds of the
states.
Most of the witnesses appearing objected to the proposed
amendment. It was felt that the states should still retain the
right to request Congress to call a national convention to
amend the Constitution, since Congress might refuse to do so
in defiance of public sentiment. It was thought that the voter
was not competent to pass on the soundness of amendments.
It was argued that a vote at a general election would be confusing because of the numerous and unrelated questions to
be voted on. It was argued that there would not be sufficient
time for deliberation if amendments could be voted on only
sixty days after proposal.
The proposed amendment was also objected to on the
ground that it did not correct the difficulties in securing proposals of amendments by Congress.97 Mr. Bainbridge Colby,
former Secretary of State, took exception on a number of
grounds. 98 He pointed out that delay occurred at the stage of
proposal rather than in ratification, that ratification by popular
referenda was proposed as early as I 873, that many propo06

Ibid. 12.
Ibid. 48 1 53·
.. Ibid. SI-66.
97
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nents of a popular referendum wished to retard the amending
process, that the people are not fitted to pass on many possible
amendments, that there will be too many other issues to vote
on at general elections, that many people will fail to vote
on amendments, that popular referenda would result in delay
in ratifying amendments since dissimilar to legislatures they
are limited to certain fixed time periods, and that to allow
ratification by only two-thirds of the states would result in
political and geographical cleavages.
C.

SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS

Virtually all the changes which have been suggested in the
amending process have been as to procedure. Although in the
last decade numerous assertions have been made that there
are certain implied limitations on the content of amendments, 99
few suggestions have been made that express limitations be
inserted in the amending clause. 100 It is of course true that the
Constitutional Convention inserted three such limitations and
that a fourth limitation was suggested but rejected. Two of
these limitations, couched in absolute terms, so that apparently a unanimous vote of all the states could not destroy
them, expired in I 808. The first forbade Congress from prohibiting the importation of slaves until I 808. Apparently,
however, an amendment forbidding such importation without
mention of Congress, in other words an amendment of a legislative nature such as the Eighteenth Amendment, would have
been valid. The second limitation expiring in I 8o8 was that
99

See chap. IV, supra, pp. 87-u6, for full discussion.
But such a suggestion is made by Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred
and Forty Years After," (1928) 12 CoNST. REv. 121 at 126. Westervelt,
"Amend Article V," (1931) 24 LAWY. & BANKER 166 at 169, would amend
Article Five so as to provide "that amendments dealing strictly with the organization of government might be submitted to the legislatures of the several
states for ratification and adoption, and that those dealing in any way with
the mass of governmental powers must be submitted to conventions of the
people."
100
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no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid except in proportion to population. Although more doubtful, this too was
only a limitation on Congress, so that an amendment legislating on the subject might have been adopted. Thus these limitations were such only on the powers that could be given to
Congress. Nevertheless the principle remains clear that there
were certain things that could not be done directly by the
amending power, although very much the same result might
be accomplished indirectly. The third limitation, and the only
one now in existence, is that no state shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. Hence, even
though an amendment is adopted according to the regular
procedure, it is invalid if it deprives a state of its equal suffrage
unless the state affected consents. An amendment adopted by
all the states, however, would wipe out even this clause.
Although some of the proponents of limitations on the amending power have drawn a great deal of comfort from the equal
suffrage clause, it would seem that the limitation is more
nominal than real in its practical effect. 101
A proposal which would have resulted in a substantial restriction on the amending power was that offered by Sherman
at the Convention "that no state should be affected in its internal police." 102 Madison objected that this would pave the
way for special provisos in behalf of the individual states, and
Sherman's motion was lost. The last serious attempt to limit
the content of amendments was made just prior to the Civil
War when numerous proposals were made forbidding Congress to adopt any amendment abolishing slavery. 103 Congress
actually submitted an amendment to this effect, known as the
Corwin amendment, which was ratified by two states and by
101

See supra, chap. IV, pp. 83-87; 96-99.
See supra, chap. IV, pp. 86-87.
""'Fourteen such proposals were made between Dec. 12. 1 186o, and April 81
1864. See the list in AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1897) JS6-J68.
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an Illinois constitutional convention which happened to be in
· session. 104 It should be observed, in passing, that this amendment would have restricted only Congress and not the amending power itself, so that an amendment directly abolishing
slavery would have been valid. Only two state constitutions
contain express limitations on the content of amendments. 105
It would seem that the present federal amending power is
practically unlimited in its scope. No question could arise over
the validity of changes in the amending procedure itself, and
none as to changes in content, provided that the equal suffrage
clause is observed. Amendments limiting the substance of
future amendments would possibly be valid under the American conception of the powers of the sovereign, though in England it has been asserted that one Parliament is not bound
by the acts of another. Yet it would seem extremely unfortunate to impose any limitations on content, both because one
generation cannot foresee the needs of another and because
such restrictions make a revolution necessary to accomplish
the change which is forbidden. Fortunately the proponents of
a more difficult amending process have concentrated on
changes in procedure, so that there is little prospect at the
present time that any limitations on content will be added to
Article Five.
D.

POLICY FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

Iu concluding this study of the reform of the federal
amending power, it seems not only proper but essential to
summarize the underlying factors which are to be considered
when amendment or revision of the Constitution is sought.
One must beware of making an absolute of any one element,
since here as in most other situations it is unlikely that there
Ibid. 1961 z86, 363.
""'See chap. II, p. 2.41 note 65.
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fs any one fundamental principle entitled to exclusive emphasis.106
Before considering these various factors one must carefully
distinguish between the policy and the legality of changes
in the amending process. As has been seen, it is unquestionably legal to make any change that is desired in the amending procedure provided of course that the existing rules are
followed in making that change. But it by no means follows
that merely because a change can legally be made and is made
that such a change is a desirable one. By the policy of a change,
on the other hand, is meant the practical operation of the
machinery in its effect on the life of the nation. In considering
the reform of the federal amending power, it is the policy
we are interested in rather than the legality.
First to be considered in examining the policy of a change
suggested in the amending procedure is its effect on the maintenance of the federal system.107 Will the change so operate
as to bring about the destruction of the states, or substantially
..,. }AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. ( 1887) 549, says:
"Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in
the nature of safety-valves,-they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their
peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escapepipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with
such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient to explode
the machine. Hence the problem of the Constitution-maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites
for progress with the requisites for safety.''
Mr. Huddleston of Alabama, 67 CoNG. REc. (1926) 7203, stated that "the
clause which lies nearest to its heart is the clause which permits a change in
the Constitution. It is more vital and more fundamental than any other provision of the Constitution. For, by dealing with that clause, we may fix it so
that the Constitution is absolutely rigid and may never be amended, or we
may fix it so that it may be amended lightly and without sufficient thought. In
other words, through that clause we reach toward every other clause in the
whole Constitution, and that can not be said about any other clause of the
Constitution.
"I can not go into that in detail. I merely want to bring the thought that
unnecessary meddling with the Constitution becomes a more serious offense
when we deal with an amendment to the particular clause, than if we were
undertaking to deal with any other section."
""Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MJcH L. REV. IZ53
at n8s.
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to weaken them? It should be clear, however, that there is
nothing sacrosanct in the maintenance of the federal system
per se. The federal system is defensible only when it conduces
to the greatest good of the nation and the states. 108 As soon
as it becomes evident that the nation would be better off as a
unitary state, such as France or Italy, then let it become such,
and let the principle of the general welfare supersede that of
states' rights. Similarly if a division of the nation into its
component elements would operate for the general welfare
of those concerned, let the union be dissolved. That either one
of these situations now exists in the United States can scarcely
be seriously asserted. We are still strongly committed to the
notion of an "indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States." 109 There is little question that the trend in recent
years has been toward centralization. The increasingly industrial character of the nation, the improvement of the means of
communication, the disappearance of the frontier, and the
past feeling of confidence which the federal government has
inspired in the people have all combined with an irresistible
force to strengthen the feeling of unity. 110 Yet one cannot
deny the need of local self government, based on a real popular interest and popular knowledge of the local situation. The
1ll8 Cf., however, the statement as to the intent of the framers of the Constitution, in Goodnow, "Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions,"
(I 9 I 2) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PROC. 49 at 52: "Finally, the confidence of the
fathers in the existence of eternal political verities and the possibility that
fallible humanity might ascertain and formulate them is seen in the difficulty
if not impossibility of amending the constitution which resulted from the
processes of amendment provided."
109
Senator Reed of Pennsylvania, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4496; Frierson,
"Amending the Constitution of the United States," (192o) 33 HARV. L. REv.
659; Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I921) 30 YALE L. J. 32I
at 348, 354; Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in
Practice," (1924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PRoc. 62 at 74; HoRWILL, THE USAGES
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (I925) 220; Moschzisker, "Dangers in
Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions When Amending the Federal Constitution," (I92S) I I CoRN. L. Q. I; Garrett, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (1929) 7 TENN. L. REV, 286 at 288.
uo BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 4th ed. (I9Io) 403; THOMPSON,
FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION (I!l2l) l0.5-l27.
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Eighteenth Amendment has demonstrated that there are
limitations on what can be accomplished by the federal government. The import of this is clear: since the federal principle is a valuable one, care must be taken that the states are
consulted as such in the ratification of amendments and possibly in their proposal as well. When the states ratify as such,
it is obvious that under the natural law of self-preservation
they will safeguard their own interests. In view of the seemingly inevitable trend towards centralization, however, they
must not be given an absolute veto, and the requirement of
adoption by an excessive majority of states might well be
somewhat relaxed. That is to say, the federal principle must
be harmonized with the general welfare, since in the last analysis it is defensible only as conducing to the general welfare.111
A second factor of importance is that of the wisdom and
efficiency of the amendments secured through the change in
the amending process. Will the change be of such kind as to
result in the adoption of amendments which will prove harmful to the country? Can a lesser majority than is now required be trusted to adopt amendments which may injure
not only themselves, but the dissenting majority? Will the
constitution not become unduly prolix and cluttered up with
legislative provisions? 112 The mere fact that a simple majority, or even an extraordinary majority, desire a change by
111

Possibly the doctrine of political questions laid down in Coleman v. Miller,
( 1939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 572., leaving the ultimate decision to Congress
as to certain phases of amending procedure violates the federal principle. It
may be argued, however, that it does not since the Senate is peculiarly representative of the states.
112
Freund, "Legislative Problems and Solutions," (192.1) 7 A. B. A.]. 656
at 658, says that "when the people desire to accomplish through the constitution
a direct result independent of legislative assistance, they overlook the fact
. • • that there are few propositions of law that can be made sufficiently
brief for constitutional formulation, and at the same time self-executing." See
also BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
(192.3) 114; BuRDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION
(192.2.) 49·
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no means demonstrates that the change will prove beneficial.113 King Mob may be just as much a despot as a single
dictator. The discussions at the Constitutional Convention
show that the framers of the Constitution were frankly aristocratic in their views and deliberately set up a framework of
government and a charter to protect the rights of minorities. 114
This is quite clearly shown in Article Five, which permits
amendment not by a majority of the states or a majority of the
people, but only by three-fourths of the states without any
direct popular participation in any stage of the amending
process. This made it certain that the rights given to mim Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made
More Difficult?" (I9z6) IO MINN. L. REv. I85 at I88-I9o, says: "Generally
the votes which have been cast in state elections, and particularly in referendums
upon proposed constitutional amendments, have indicated an unwillingness
upon the part of the people to concern themselves with such questions. The
slogan, 'When in doubt, vote no!' has been applied with particular emphasis,
and from the evidence available it appears that usually the number and percentage of votes cast upon proposals for amendments have been the lowest cast
for any propositions or candidates on the ballot. The reason is that the voters
are unable or unwilling to give proper consideration to such questions. They
elect lawmakers for that purpose and have a right to expect that their representatives will take testimony, consider all of the evidence and, after due and
proper deliberation, render a reasoned decision. Many voters are not properly
trained to understand questions of the import involved in proposed constitu"
·
tional amendments. •
Walter F. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I92o) 30 YALE
L. J. 32I at 354, says: "A serious question presents itself as to whether the
federal amending process should be so easy as to permit the introduction into
the Constitution of provisions which involve distinctly sectional or political
issues. Clearly the federal Constitution performs a function different from that
of the state constitution, and should be less flexible than the state constitutions
may properly be." See also JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed.
(I 887) 55 z-5 53 ; Long, "Tinkering with the Constitution," ( I9I5) z4 YALE
L. J. 57 3 at 58 6; Brown, "Irresponsible Government by Constitutional Amendments," (I9ZZ) 8 VA. L. REV. I57; Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred
and Forty Years After," (I9z8) rz CoNST. REv. IZI at rz3. Cf., however,
the view of Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" ( I9 I I) I94
No. AM. REv. 657 at 669-6701 that the dominating political party should be
able to introduce amendments.
n• Senator Bruce of Maryland, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4557, says that
"they kept their eyes no more on the possibility of oppression in high places
than they did upon what they conceived to be the caprices, the passions, the
sudden gusts of impulse in one form or another to which men en masse are
subject. They believed in representative government rather than in pure
democracy."
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norities under the Constitution would be taken from them only
after the majority had made itself overwhelmingly strong.
In other words, the theory is that a constitutional amendment is of much greater significance than a statute, and that
it is much more likely to be a wise amendment when a large
majority concur in it. The Eighteenth Amendment is ·frequently cited to show that even a large majority can make a
mistake.
There is, however, another side of the picture. The amending process may be made so difficult as to prevent the adoption of amendments which are unquestionably sound. One
must balance against the undesirable amendments checked by
a difficult amending process the desirable ones not adopted
because of such process. 115 It has been asserted that a more
flexible amending process might have averted the Civil War.
The enemies of the Eighteenth Amendment also appear to
forget that a difficult amending process makes it almost impossible to repeal an unsatisfactory amendment. Making it
easier to amend might result in the adoption of a number of
undesirable proposals, yet such amendments might be repealed with the same ease. The doctrine of political questions
may be regarded as a method of making the amending process
easier. Moreover, it does so by placing authority in Congress
instead of the people, thus assuring some deliberation.
A third factor, and one closely related to that just discussed
is that of proper deliberation. The amending process should
not be so changed that amendments can be adopted without
an opportunity to discuss the arguments pro and con. 116 An
Ull Ernest C. Carman denies that it is better to do without good amendments
rather than allow bad ones to be adopted. Carman, "Why and How the
Present Method of Amending the Federal Constitution Should Be Changed,"
(1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 102 at 104.
116
"The great principle to be sought is to make the changes practicable, but
not too easy; to secure due deliberation, and caution; and to follow experience,
rather than to open a way for experiments, suggested by mere speculation or
theory." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 3d ed. (x8s8) 634. See also Senator Wadsworth, 65 CoNG. REc.
(1924) 4495·
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amendment should receive at least as much consideration as
a statute. Under the present system, due deliberation is more
than amply secured. The two-thirds majority required in
Congress and the three-fourths required among the states insure adequate deliberation. A measure which must pass the
scrutiny of thirty-seven legislative bodies, each in turn (except in Nebraska) divided into an upper and a lower house,
can scarcely be said to have been rushed through. In fact, the
agitation for some of the most recent amendments, such as the
income tax and woman suffrage amendments, began seventyfive and fifty years ago, so that the process if anything must be
said to be too slow. For this last reason it would seem that the
proposals for ratification only by subsequently elected legislatures and permitting of a confirmation by popular vote of
the legislative ratification should both be defeated. 117 The
present provisions for securing deliberation are entirely adequate. In fact, some of the more recent proposals call for a lessening of the majorities required both for proposal and ratification. The proposal for a popular referendum also looks in
the direction of less deliberation, since the amendment would
be voted on conclusively by the people within one or two years
after discussion.
The framers of the Constitution anticipated a frequent use
of the amending power. 118 Practically all the critics of the
present amending process, at least until the last two decades,
nT In I 826 Rep. Herrick of Maine introduced a resolution to regulate the
time for introducing amendments, proposal to be allowed only every tenth
year. CoNGRESSIONAL DEBATES, 19th Cong., 1st sess. (I 8z6) I 554· Chief
Justice Von Moschzisker of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suggested that
if a popular referendum is to be provided for, only a limited number of amendments should be voted on at the same election. Moschzisker, "Dangers in Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions when Amending the Federal Constitution," (1925) I I CORN. L. Q. I at s-6. Senator Owen, 58 CoNG. REC. (1919)
57001 proposed that there be mailed to each voter a copy of the proposals and
a copy of the arguments, for and against, prepared by two committees composed
of leading representatives of the opposing sides.
llB Hamilton's remarks at the Constitutional Convention, 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES
(1836) 530 and Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43•
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have agreed that the process should be made easier. 119 No
amendments were adopted between I 804 and I 86 5, or between I 870 and I 9 I 3. The Progressive Party in I 9 I 2 adopted
a plank favoring easier amendment. The adoption of the last
six amendments has resulted in a reversal of opinion on the
part of many, so that such proposals as the WadsworthUDMarshall C. J., in Barron v. Baltimore, (I833) 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 24 at
249-250; Brown, J., in Holden v. Hardy, (I898) I69 U.S. 336 at 387, I8
S. Ct. 3 8 3 ; WILSON, CoNGRESSIONAL GovERNMENT (I 8 85) 242; I BuRGEss,
PoLITICAL SCIENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I89I) ISO;
Potter, "The Method of Amending the Federal Constitution," (I 909) 57
U. PA. L. REv. 589 at 592; THOMPSON, "The Amendment of the Federal Constitution," (I912) 3 AcAD. PoL. Sci. PRoc. 65 at 69; BRYCE, AMERICAN
CoMMONWEALTH, 4th ed. (I9IO) 359; Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (I 9I I) I 94 No. AM. REv. 6 57; Johnstone, "An Eighteenth Century Constitution," (I912) 7 ILL. L. REV. 265; BEARD, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (I9I4) 62; DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (I9I5) I45; John W. Davis, "Present Day Problems," (I923)
48 A. B. A. REP. I93 at 20I; Senator Brookhart of Iowa, 65 CoNG. REc.
(1924) 4564, 4566; Rep. Huddleston of Alabama, 66 CONG. REc. (I925)
4572; Arneson, "Is It Easy to Amend the Constitution?" (1926) 6o AM. L.
REv. 6oo; Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be
Made More Difficult?" (I926) IO MINN. L. REv. I85.
Ames seems at first to have thought the amending process too difficult.
AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (I 887) 300 ff. But more recently he has changed his opinion. "Although
the speaker some years ago held the view that the amending process was too
difficult, he has been led, in common with others, as a result of recent experience, to a modification of that opinion. He believes that a radical change in
the method of amendment is neither necessary nor desirable." Ames, "The
Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (1924) 63
AM. PHIL. Soc. PRoc. 62 at 74·
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I o)
I4I, note, states that "it seems to be the general view that our federal constitution cannot be amended except in times of national crises." In "Amending
the Federal Constitution," (I92I) 30 YALE L. J. 32I at 348-354, he concludes
that the present process is substantially satisfactory.
See also Maggs, "The Constitution and Recovery Legislation: The Roles of
Document, Doctrine and Judges," LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN K.
McMURRAY ( I935) 399 at 40I; Dodd, "Adjustment of the Constitution to
New Needs," (I936) 22 A. B. A. J. n6; Garrison, "The Constitution and
Social Progress," (I936) IO TuLANE L. REV. 33; Howard, "Is Our Constitution Adequate for Present Day Needs?" (I937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 47 at 75;
Clark, "Some Recent Proposals for Constitutional Amendment," (I 9 3 7) I 2
Wis. L. REV. 3 I 3 at 3 I 5; Fraenkel, "What Can Be Done About the Constitution and the Supreme Court?" (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 212; Cummings, "The
Nature of the Amending Process," (I938) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 247 at 252;
Powell, "Changing Constitutional Phases," (I939) I9 BosT. U. L. REv. 509
at sr 8.
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Garrett amendment are designed to make it more difficult. 120
The weight of opinion, however, probably is that the present
process is difficult enough, perhaps exactly to the proper degree.121
The controversy over adding members to the Supreme
Court in 1937 raised the question as to the adequacy of the
amending process to secure needed reforms. Many felt that
it was too difficult to secure necessary amendments. 122 The
recently enunciated doctrine of political questions may be in
part a consequence of the difficulty of amendment. 123 Strange
as it may seem, the first definite proposal to make the amending process easier did not come until the Civil War period.
Up to 1911 approximately twenty-five amendments to the
120
Brown, "The 'New Bill of Rights' Amendment," (I922) 9 VA. L. REv.
I 4; Lanier, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I 9 23) 9 VA. L. REG.
(N. S.) 8I; Mussman, "Is the Amending Process too Difficult?" (I923) 57
AM. L. REV. 694, and "The Difficulty of Amending our Federal Constitution:
Defect or Asset?" (I929) IS A. B. A. J. 505; Senator Edge of New Jersey, 65
CoNG. REc. (I924) 4497, 4938; Klinglesmith, "Amending the Constitution
of the United States," (I925) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 355 at 368; Cadwalader,
"Amendment of the Federal Constitution," (I926) 6o AM. L. REv. 389;
Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred and Forty Years After," (I928)
I2 CoNST. REv. I2I; Garrett, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I929)
7 TENN. L. REV. 286.
121
Senator Bursum of New Mexico, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4420, stated: "It
seems to me that consideration of amendments to the Constitution ought not
to be considered the first business to take up. We have gotten along pretty
well during the last I 50 years without those amendments, and we might get
along perhaps a few days longer."
Senator Walsh, in attacking the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, ibid. 456I,
stated: "I do not think there is any occasion for any amendment to the Constitution on this subject; but, if there is, I think that the obvious tendency of
the times and the wisdom of our age suggests that the matter be submitted to
the people of the State."
Cf. the view of Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, ibid. 4569: "I am unable
to share the view of the Senator from Montana [Mr. Walsh] that this subject
is one unworthy of consideration at the present time. It seems to me that
while the experiences incident to the adoption of recent amendments are fresh
in our minds, and at a time when we are not distracted by the pendency of any
great amendment involving a question of policy upon which the country is
divided, is the ideal time to propose for consideration a measure designed to
prevent in the future evils which have been incident to the process of amendment
in the past."
122
See note I I 8, supra.
lliiiColeman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.
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amending process were offered, while since that time seventyfive proposals have been made, making a total of about one
hundred amendments offered in Congress to Article Five.
The fact that the last seventy-five proposals have been made
in the last two decades possibly foreshadows a change. The
writer predicts that with the defeat of the child labor amendment and an interval during which no amendments are
adopted, the view that the process is too difficult will gain
strength.
The need for an easier amending process can easily be overstated, however. The Constitution is of so elastic a nature that
on many subjects the desired ends can be achieved without
altering the Constitution. 124 The language of the Constitution is brief and couched in general terms. Moreover the
liberal construction school of interpretation has triumphed
over the strict constructionists, so that by a process of interpretation the terms of the Constitution may be made to cover
m AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (I887) 302; BRYCE, THE AMERICAN CoMMONWEALTH, 4th
ed. (I9Io) 37I; Goodnow, "Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions," (I 9 12) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PROC. 49; Hall, " 'An Eighteenth Century
Constitution'-A Comment," (I912) 7 ILL. L. REv. 285; Llewellyn, "The
Constitution as an Institution," (I 934) 34 CoL. L. REv. I at 4, 2 I; Dodd,
"Adjustment of the Constitution to New Needs," (I936) 22 A. B. A. J. u6;
Coudert, "Judicial Constitutional Amendment," (I904) I3 YALE L. J. 33I;
Brandeis, J., quoted by Mason, "Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Student of Social and
Economic Science," (I93I) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 665 at 693; and Corwin, "Social
Planning under the Constitution," (I932) 26 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. I at 26.
Senator Walsh of Montana, 65 CoNG. REC. (I924) 4494, has stated: "Of
course, many features of this Constitution of ours are of doubtful wisdom
theoretically. We can easily conceive that a whole flood of evils might possibly
ensue by reason of extraordinary powers granted here, but some way or other,
they never do."
Thayer, "Our New Possessions," (I 899) 12 HARV. L. REv. 464 at 468,
said: "That instrument, astonishingly well adapted for the purposes of a great,
developing nation, shows its wisdom mainly in the shortness and generality
of its provisions, in it silence, and its abstinence from petty limitations. As it
survives :fierce controversies from age to age, it is forever silently bearing
witness to the wisdom that went into its composition, by showing itself suited
to the purposes of a great people under circumstances that no one of its makers
could have foreseen. Men have found, as they are finding now, when new
and unlooked-for situations have presented themselves, that they were left with
liberty to handle them."
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most problems that arise. There are limits, however, on what
can be accomplished by interpretation. The commerce clause,
the war power, and the Fourteenth Amendment all admit of
interpretation. But such provisions as those for the electoral
college and the time of meeting of Congress itself do not.
The amendment process should not be so difficult that strained
interpretations causing loss of confidence in the judiciary
must be resorted to. 125 Nor should it be so difficult that the
federal judicial veto of legislation cannot be overcome. 126
A fourth factor is that of popular democracy. 127 The nation
has been a republic since it broke away from England. Beginning with the Jacksonian era the electorate has grown by
leaps and bounds, so that there is almost universal manhood
suffrage except in the South. The Fifteenth Amendment,
nominally at least, increased the votes of the nation. Within
our own times suffrage has been conferred on women. The
Seventeenth Amendment provided for popular election of
Senators, and very largely paved the way for agitation in
behalf of popular participation in the amending process. The
average of popular education is surely higher than it ever
was, and should become even higher with the gradual assimilation of our immigrants. The Supreme Court, the commentators on the Constitution and our political orators make
frequent reference to the sovereignty of the people. Yet the
people do not participate in a single stage of the amending
process. The Constitution was not directly adopted by the
1211

Potter, "The Method of Amending the Federal Constitution," (1909)
57 U. PA. L. REV. 589 at 595·
lJl6 Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911)
194 No.
AM. REv. 657 at 66z.
127
BORGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA (1 895) 337; SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1907) 40; MACY and GANNAWAY, COMPARATIVE FREE GOVERNMENT (1915)
z91; Eldridge, ''Need for a More Democratic Procedure of Amending the
Constitution," (1916) 10 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 683; Ames, "The Amending
Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (19z4) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc.
PRoc. 6z at 70.
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people, nor is it amendable directly by them. 128 The framers
of the Constitution distrusted democracy. 129 The optional
convention plan provided for in Article Five is never resorted
to, and if it were it would not so accurately reflect the wishes
of the people as a popular vote. It is indeed an anomalous situation where the people are given no participation in the most
important of political matters-that of altering the Constitution. Even the indirect participation presented through the
use of the legislatures can scarcely be called representative
because of the excessive majorities required both for proposal
and for adoption. Ordinarily one conceives of democracy as
acting through simple majorities. Under the present system
the representatives of thirteen states can check the wishes of
both the people and the representatives of the other thirtyfive.
Before we can correctly speak of the people as being sovereign in the United States, we must amend the Constitution
so as to permit a majority of the electorate of the entire country to amend the Constitution. There would, however, be but
a slight departure from this principle if we permitted ratification by a majority of voters in each of a majority of states,
thus making the state still the unit of ratification, or if the
provision were for ratification by a majority of the voters
in each state as well as a majority of the electorate of the entire nation. The advocates of the democratic principle must
bear in mind the other factors which have been previously
""' BORGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CoNSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA (r895) 333, in contrasting governmental with popular ratification, said: "The former springs historically from a semi-mediaeval conception
of the state, by which sovereignty is divided between the prince and the representatives of the nation, and under the influence of which the constitutions have
taken on the character of compacts between two parties. The latter is the one
whose foundations were laid by the Revolution, and which has been developed
in the democratic spirit of our time."
129
Cummings, "The Nature of the Amending Process," ( r 9 3 8) 6 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 247 at 249, citing passages from the debates in the Constitutional
Convention.
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discussed. Obviously the maintenance of the federal principle
will necessitate the preservation of the states as units in the
amending process. Moreover, to permit amendment by a
simple majority may result in the adoption of undesirable and
excessive constitutional changes, without adequate deliberation. Events in Europe cast doubt on too sweeping an extension of the democratic principle. An amendment reflecting
only the wishes of a majority may also encounter difficulties
in enforcement.
It is of course easy to make a fetish of democracy. To a great
many people Wilson's epigram about "making the world
safe for democracy" has taken on a sardonic meaning. It is
sun clear that political democracy is not a panacea for the ills
of the nation. The dictatorships in Europe and elsewhere indicate a lapse back to more aristocratic forms of government
and, according to some, a failure of democracy. Perhaps the
use of the referendam will now and then result in the adoption of unwise changes. The experience of the states of this
country has on the whole been favorable. 130 The electorate
is on the whole as conservative or more conservative than
the legislatures, so that possibly there would be fewer changes
than previously if the popular referendum were adopted.
At least, many of the proponents of a more difficult amending process will also often be found recommending ratification by popular vote. If mistakes are made, the people will
recognize that the mistakes are their own. They will naturally take more interest in a document which is their own. 131
1liO DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910)
270-292; Radin, "Popular Legislation in California," (1939) 23 MINN. L.
REv. 559·
w Senator Borah, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4562-4563 said: "The Constitution
ought to be regarded as the people's law, the people's charter. I think just so

nearly as is practicable and possible the judgment of the people, direct and immediate, should be taken as to what should be found in their Constitution.
Certainly, if we were making a constitution or rewriting the Constitution and
resubmitting it, we would feel under obligation to submit it as directly to the

2I8

AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Perhaps they will also be more willing to comply with the
laws laid down by themselves. The demand for popular democracy should be heeded to the extent of allowing participation in the ratification of amendments and possibly even
in initiation. 132
A fifth factor is that of securing clarity and certainty in the
amending process. 133 The doctrine of political questions laid
down in Coleman v. Miller 134 leaves in doubt the line between political and justiciable questions. It leaves in doubt
the procedure in Congress in deciding political questions and
the effect of nonaction by Congress. It leaves open to argument whether a decision by Congress in a particular case will
be a binding precedent in later similar situations. Orderly
procedure in the adoption of important and often permanent
people as practicable, and I feel that in incorporating amendments we should
observe the same rule.
"There are a number of reasons for this, but one of the reasons is largely
what you might call a sentimental or psychological reason, that is, I feel that
people ought to be permitted to feel that when the Constitution is completed
from time to time, and as it stands, it is their expression, an instrument which
they have made; that it is their charter, that upon them it depends largely for
its existence, and I should therefore want to bring home to them as nearly as
possible the changing of it or the amending of it or the modifying of it in any
respect.•••
"I was at one time very much disturbed over the question of the initiative and
referendum, but as I have observed its working in Switzerland and elsewhere, I
find, instead of its being a radical proposition, it is an extremely safe and conservative proposition."
""'BoRGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA (r895) 337, states that "it appears possible, after the comparative
study we have just made, to determine precisely the principle which governs
contemporary democracy in the exercise of its constituent powers. This principle
is proclaimed in the immense majority of constitutional texts we have had
occasion to examine, and dominates the entire development of the public law of
those nations whose constitutional history has been the chief object of our
investigation. It may be formulated as follows: The constituent power is
wielded directly by the people for purposes of sanction; directly or indirectly
through its representatives for purposes of initiation. In other words--considering sanction alone, which shows the essential characteristic--the imperative act
which gives being to the fundamental law proceeds directly from the body of
qualified voters, sole possessors of the sovereign rights of the nation."
,..(1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 406.
]U(I939) 307 u.s. 433> 59 s. Ct. 972·
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amendments is not as well assured as when decisions are by
the courts. Therefore, provided that an easier method of
amending the Constitution is substituted for the existing
methods provided in Article Five, it might be well also expressly to provide in Article Five that all questions arising
under Article Five are to be regarded as justiciable.
A sixth and last factor to be considered is that of enforcement. This factor has been almost entirely overlooked 135 until
recently, not only in connection with amendments but also
as to statutes in general. The Fifteenth Amendment and
more recently the Eighteenth have very forcibly brought
this question to the front. It is an unfortunate situation to have
a law passed which is not enforced. It is a great deal more
unfortunate to adopt an amendment to the national constitution which in large part remains a dead letter on the books. 136
In considering changes of the amending process, one is therefore by no means raising an academic question when one asks
185

Arnold, "Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection," (I9JZ)

42 YALE L.
1116

J.

I-24·

Moschzisker, "Dangers in Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions When
Amending the Federal Constitution," (I925) I I CoRN. L. Q. I; Brown, "The
People Should Be Consulted as to Constitutional Changes," ( 19 30) I 6 A. B.
A.]. 404.
Senator· Underwood of Alabama pointed out in the Senate debate on the
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, 55 CoN G. REc. (I 9 I 7) 55 54: "The
sound and underlying theory of democracy 'that a just form of government
requires the consent of the governed' is often subject to perversion. President
Hadley of Yale University says: 'Not content with saying that all just government is based on the consent of the governed, the enthusiastic advocates of
democracy hold that if you could only find what a majority of the governed
wanted you could easily incorporate it into law. Never was there a greater
practical error. Public law, to be effective, requires much more than the
majority to support it. It requires general acquiescence. To leave the minority
at the mercy of the whims of the majority does not conduce to law or good
government or justice between man and man. Even Rousseau, the leading
apostle of modern democracy, saw this most clearly. He said in substance: "A
majority of the people is not the people and never can be. We take a majority
vote simply as the ·best available means of ascertaining the real wishes of the
people in cases when it becomes necessary to do so." ' • • •
"It does not forgive the error of government to be able to command majorities
in legislative bodies when a vast number of people stand in opposition to statutes
which they feel and believe trench on their personal rights and endanger their
personal liberty."
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whether it will make likely the adoption of amendments which
will not be enforced. Because of the difficulties · of enforcement, it may be desirable to require that something more
than a simple majority of the legislatures or of the people
must favor a change. While a simple majority may be adequate for a statutory change, a constitutional change should
have something more substantial behind it. A simple majority may by changes in popular sentiment become a minority. Sumptuary legislation, even when favored by considerably
more than a majority, may encounter such opposition as to
breed a feeling of disrespect for law in general. The violation
of the federal principle may also result in a falling down of
enforcement because of the jealousy of the states. Altering
the amending process in such a way as to permit of unwise
or hasty changes also contributes to a failure of the law. The
passage of amendments without consulting the people by a
popular referendum may result in charges that the amendment was railroaded through the legislatures and is not representative of the real wishes of the people. It is evident, then,
that the factor of enforcement is subject to the interaction of
the other factors.
Great caution must be exercised, however, with respect to
the conclusions one draws concerning the element of enforcement. Most amendments would not be so difficult to enforce
as the Eighteenth Amendment. It has been pointed out that
it is undesirable to alter the amending process in such a way
that unenforceable or unenforced amendments will be
adopted. On the other hand, an even worse situation develops when an amendment is adopted which it is practically impossible to repeal chiefly because of difficulties in the amending process. It seems that Fils are bound to arise under either
a facile or a difficult amending process. The reformer is seemingly between Scylla and Charybdis. Balancing the evils involved, is it not perhaps saner in the long run to make the
amending process sufficiently easy so that an occasional mis-
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take is made which may be corrected in the same easy fashion,
rather than to make it so difficult that when a mistake is made
such mistakes cannot be corrected except by revolution? 137
After all, the people or some large part of them must be permitted to make their mistakes and to do so within the limits
of the Constitution. It would therefore seem undesirable to
write into the Constitution limitations on the content of
amendments, or to alter the procedure in such a way as to
make amendment almost impossible. There is no scientific
method of ascertaining beforehand whether or not an amendment can or will be enforced, and even after its adoption statements alleging nonenforcement may be hard to prove. As
Thomas Jefferson has said, each generation must be permitted
to make its own laws. It may be well to guard the people
against themselves as to ordinary matters, but it is possible
to go too far when it is sought to do this with respect to altering the Constitution. Society cannot go on without taking
some chances. The interests of progress as well as order must
be consulted, otherwise order itself will perish. 138
137
Arneson, "A More Flexible Constitution," (1927) 61 AM. L. REv. 99·
Lunt, "Amending the Constitution," (1930) 23 LAWY. & BANKER 252 at 254
(summarized from the AMERICAN MERCuRY), stated: "The problem is far from
simple. It is doubtful if any workable system could be devised, based directly
or indirectly upon popular acclaim, which would prevent the perpetration of
such sumptuary errors as the Eighteenth Amendment and yet permit of the correction of the defects discovered in the functioning of the organic law and the
inevitable adjustment to wholly unforeseen conditions."
See also the speeches of Mr. Huddleston of Alabama, 66 CoNe. REc. (1925)
4573 and 67 CoNe. REc. (1926) 7203. In the former speech he said: "But
assuming that some one of the amendments which have been adopted is objectionable and should be repealed, those who advocate making it harder to amend the
Constitution take an illogical position. They advocate making it harder to
repeal an objectionable amendment than it was to secure its adoption."
"'!Professor Munroe Smith has said: "Sooner or later, however, it will be
generally realized that the first article in any sincerely intended progressive
programme must be the amendment of the amending clause of the Federal
Constitution." Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911)
194 No. AM. REV. 657 at 673.
Mr. Osmond K. Fraenkel stated .during the Supreme Court controversy of
19 3 7: "The . . • most desirable choice would be to make easier the method of
amendment itself." Fraenkel, "What Can Be Done About the Constitution and
the Supreme Court?" (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. zrz at 226.
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